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Tracking Berle’S Footsteps: The Trail Of The Modern Corporation’S Last Chapter, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter 2010 Seattle University School of Law

Tracking Berle’S Footsteps: The Trail Of The Modern Corporation’S Last Chapter, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter

Seattle University Law Review

Readers game enough to work through all three hundred pages of The Modern Corporation and Private Property looking for insights on corporate law today encounter two, apparently contradictory, lines of thought. One line, set out in Books II and III, resonates comfortably with today’s shareholder-centered corporate legal theory. Here the book teaches that even as ownership and control have separated, managers should function as trustees for the shareholders and so should exercise their wide-ranging powers for the shareholders’ benefit. The other line of thought emerges in Books I and IV, where The Modern Corporation encases this shareholder trust model ...


Neo-Brandeisianism And The New Deal: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., William O. Douglas, And The Problem Of Corporate Finance In The 1930s, Jessica Wang 2010 Seattle University School of Law

Neo-Brandeisianism And The New Deal: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., William O. Douglas, And The Problem Of Corporate Finance In The 1930s, Jessica Wang

Seattle University Law Review

This essay revisits Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and The Modern Corporation and Private Property by focusing on the triangle of Berle, Louis D. Brandeis, and William O. Douglas in order to examine some of the underlying assumptions about law, economics, and the nature of modern society behind securities regulation and corporate finance in the 1930s. I explore Douglas and Berle’s academic and political relationship, the conceptual underpinnings of Brandeis, Berle, and Douglas’s critiques of modern finance, and the ways in which the two younger men—Berle and Douglas—ultimately departed from their role model, Brandeis.


The Birth Of Corporate Governance, Harwell Wells 2010 Seattle University School of Law

The Birth Of Corporate Governance, Harwell Wells

Seattle University Law Review

Part I of this Article briefly examines the concept of “corporate governance” and argues for dating the concept’s origins to the debates of the 1920s. Part II then moves on to examine early scholarly and popular discussions of the separation of ownership and control. After surveying the historical developments that produced the recognizably modern corporate economy around the turn of the century, it examines early scholarly and popular discussions of the separation of ownership and control, focusing on three major thinkers, Louis D. Brandeis, Walter Lippmann, and Thorstein Veblen. It argues that, while each of these authors examined the ...


The New Financial Assets: Separating Ownership From Control, Tamar Frankel 2010 Seattle University School of Law

The New Financial Assets: Separating Ownership From Control, Tamar Frankel

Seattle University Law Review

In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner Means wrote about the separation of ownership from control in corporations. They noted that the interests of the controlling directors and managers can diverge from those of the shareholder owners of the firm. . . . There are those who consider such a decoupling beneficial. Others express the same concern that Berle and Means have expressed. And depending on what one focuses on in viewing the pluses and minuses of these separations, one could reach different conclusions. I reach a number of conclusions. First, the separation of ownership from control creates ...


Corporate Power In The Public Eye: Reassessing The Implications Of Berle’S Public Consensus Theory, Marc T. Moore, Antoine Rebérioux 2010 Seattle University School of Law

Corporate Power In The Public Eye: Reassessing The Implications Of Berle’S Public Consensus Theory, Marc T. Moore, Antoine Rebérioux

Seattle University Law Review

We analyze Berle’s overall corporate governance project in accordance with what we see as its four core sub-themes: (A) the limitations of external market forces as a constraint on managerial decision-making power; (B) the desirability of internal (corporate) over external (market) actors in allocating corporate capital; (C) civil society and the public consensus as a continuous informal check on managerial decision-making power; and (D) shareholder democracy (as opposed to shareholder primacy or shareholder wealth maximization) as a socially instrumental institution. We seek to debunk the popular misconception that Berle’s early work was a defense of the orthodox shareholder ...


Tracking Berle's Footsteps: The Trail Of The Modern Corporation's Law Chapter, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter 2010 University of Pennsylvania

Tracking Berle's Footsteps: The Trail Of The Modern Corporation's Law Chapter, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Foreword: In Berle’S Footsteps, Charles R.T. O'Kelley 2010 Seattle University School of Law

Foreword: In Berle’S Footsteps, Charles R.T. O'Kelley

Seattle University Law Review

On the weekend of November 6–8, 2009, scholars from around the world gathered in Seattle for a symposium—In Berle’s Footsteps—celebrating the launch of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society. As founding director of the Berle Center, I described our undertaking: “It is with a profound sense of obligation to the legacy that has been entrusted to my care, that I announce the launching of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society. It is a privilege to follow in Berle’s footsteps.”


Opening Remarks, Chancellor William B. Chandler III 2010 Seattle University School of Law

Opening Remarks, Chancellor William B. Chandler Iii

Seattle University Law Review

Law is, in many ways, a backwards-looking field. We litigate over facts that have already occurred, challenge deals that have already been signed, and apply rules of decision based on previously-established precedent or statutes already enacted. To the extent that this Center and the symposium reflect on Berle’s work, they too are an exercise in looking back. Indeed, some might say the establishment of a Center named in Berle’s honor is a monument to the past.


Securities Intermediaries And The Separation Of Ownership From Control, Jill E. Fisch 2010 Seattle University School of Law

Securities Intermediaries And The Separation Of Ownership From Control, Jill E. Fisch

Seattle University Law Review

The Modern Corporation & Private Property is a paradigm-shifting analysis of the modern corporation. The book is perhaps best known for the insights of Berle and Means about the separation of ownership from control and the consequences of that separation for the allocation of power within the corporation. The Berle and Means story focuses on the shareholder as the owner of the corporation. Berle and Means saw the mechanism of centralized management—in which the shareholder retains the economic interest but not the control rights associated with ownership—as threatening the conception of shareholder interests in terms of property rights. In ...


Then And Now: Professor Berle And The Unpredictable Shareholder, Jennifer G. Hill 2010 Seattle University School of Law

Then And Now: Professor Berle And The Unpredictable Shareholder, Jennifer G. Hill

Seattle University Law Review

Shareholders, and the relationship between shareholders and management, lay at the heart of Professor Berle’s scholarship. The goal of this Article is to compare the image of shareholders emerging from The Modern Corporation and Private Property and the Berle/Dodd debate with a range of contemporary visions of the shareholder that underpin some international regulatory responses to recent financial debacles, from Enron to the current global financial crisis. As the Article dis- cusses, these recent developments in the era of financial crises have prompted a reevaluation of the traditional image of the shareholder—and the role of the shareholder ...


Revisiting Berle And Rethinking The Corporate Structure, Kelli A. Alces 2010 Seattle University School of Law

Revisiting Berle And Rethinking The Corporate Structure, Kelli A. Alces

Seattle University Law Review

Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means painted what remains a defining portrait of corporate law. The separation of ownership and control they described and the agency costs it causes are still a central concern of the law of corporate governance. For that reason, Berle’s work is relevant nearly eighty years after its publication. Seemingly forgotten, however, is that Berle’s enduring description of the corporate structure was published before most of today’s corporate law was in place. His work preceded the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and even preceded the dominance of Delaware ...


"To Learn The Trade Of A Potter": Apprenticeship, Emulation, And Deviance In The Wachovian Tradition, Jessica Lauren Taylor 2010 College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

"To Learn The Trade Of A Potter": Apprenticeship, Emulation, And Deviance In The Wachovian Tradition, Jessica Lauren Taylor

Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects

No abstract provided.


Firms As Social Actors, Richard Adelstein 2010 Wesleyan University

Firms As Social Actors, Richard Adelstein

Division II Faculty Publications

A close look at what firms are and how they act.


Organizations And Economics, Richard Adelstein 2010 Wesleyan University

Organizations And Economics, Richard Adelstein

Division II Faculty Publications

A contribution to a symposium on a paper by Richard Posner.


Firms As Social Actors, Richard Adelstein 2009 Wesleyan University

Firms As Social Actors, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A close look at what firms are and how they act.


Organizations And Economics, Richard Adelstein 2009 Wesleyan University

Organizations And Economics, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A contribution to a symposium on a paper by Richard Posner.


¿En Qué Momento Se Jodió El Sur? Crecimiento Económico, Derechos De Propiedad Y Regulación Del Crédito En Las Colonias Británicas Y Españolas En América, Enrique Pasquel 2009 Universidad Peruana de Ciencias Aplicadas

¿En Qué Momento Se Jodió El Sur? Crecimiento Económico, Derechos De Propiedad Y Regulación Del Crédito En Las Colonias Británicas Y Españolas En América, Enrique Pasquel

Enrique Pasquel

Las instituciones legales de las colonias británicas y españolas pueden ayudar a explicar los distintos niveles de desarrollo económico en esas regiones. Este artículo se centra en el marco legal de los derechos de propiedad y el mercado del crédito en la época colonial, analizando las políticas de asignación de tierras, el establecimiento de registros, los programas de titulación, las cargas sobre la tierra y las restricciones al crédito.


Measuring Poverty And Human Capital Development In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed 2009 Department of Economics. Al Neelain University, Khartoum, Sudan

Measuring Poverty And Human Capital Development In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Catastrophes in Sudan are of many dimensions. Food security is a chronic and intrinsic problem in Sub Saharan Africa which is a fact recognized by the international society. Political instability, civil wars and finally recent secession of its Southern part is another fact which may be taken as a vivid example for other regions of that previously largest African country to be followed. The present paper introduces an analysis and assessment of measurements for human development indices in Sudan. It is empirically concluded that human welfare is invisible. The parameters are very low. Strategies are needed to provide for basic ...


If A Pure Market Economy Is So Good, Why Doesn’T It Exist? The Importance Of Changing Preferences Versus Incentives In Social Change, JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL, Edward P. Stringham 2009 San Jose State University

If A Pure Market Economy Is So Good, Why Doesn’T It Exist? The Importance Of Changing Preferences Versus Incentives In Social Change, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Edward P. Stringham

Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Many economists argue that a pure market economy cannot come about because people will always have incentives to use coercion (Cowen and Sutter, 2005; Holcombe, 2004). We maintain that these economists leave out an important factor in social change. Change can come about by altering incentives or preferences, but since most neoclassical economists ignore changing preferences, they too quickly conclude that change is impossible. History shows that social change based on changes in preferences is common. By recognizing that preferences need not be constant, political economists can say much more about changing the world.


Is The European Union Ready For Fdi From Emerging Markets?, Judith Clifton, Daniel Díaz-Fuentes 2009 Universidad de Cantabria

Is The European Union Ready For Fdi From Emerging Markets?, Judith Clifton, Daniel Díaz-Fuentes

Judith Clifton

This chapter asks whether the European Union Member States are ready for inward Foreign Direct Investment from the Emerging Markets. It concludes that European Union Member States have relatively open Foreign Direct Investment regimes in the international context, and yet instances of protectionism have been apparent in the recent period. However, protectionism has occurred both vis-a-vis Foreign Direct Investment from the Global South as well as from within the European Union, particularly in the so-called 'strategic' industries.


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