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Full-Text Articles in Political Science

Parties And Patronage: A Comparative Analysis Of The Indian Case, Charles Robert Hankla Aug 2006

Parties And Patronage: A Comparative Analysis Of The Indian Case, Charles Robert Hankla

Political Science Faculty Publications

What political factors influence the allocation of economic patronage in democracies? Answering this question is vital to improving our knowledge of how states and markets interact. In this paper, I argue that changing levels of party centralization can drive important changes in the allocation of state largess. When governing parties are centralized, national party leaders will control sources of patronage, targeting benefits to particularly influential regions and industries. By contrast, when governing parties are decentralized, influential sub-national party leaders will advocate for their constituents, allocating patronage evenly through a national logroll. I find evidence for these relationships by comparing India ...


Thaksin Triumphant: The Implications Of One-Party Dominance, Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Alex Mutebi Jan 2006

Thaksin Triumphant: The Implications Of One-Party Dominance, Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Alex Mutebi

Erik Kuhonta

No abstract provided.


Party Linkages And Economic Policy: An Examination Of Indira Gandhi’S India, Charles R. Hankla Jan 2006

Party Linkages And Economic Policy: An Examination Of Indira Gandhi’S India, Charles R. Hankla

Political Science Faculty Publications

We know from observation that some democracies intervene deeply in their domestic economies while others adopt a more laissez faire approach. Can we explain these differences solely with ideology, or are other political influences also at work? I argue in this paper that elected leaders sometimes opt for hefty economic regulation purely to generate sources of patronage that can be used to maintain their political positions. Leaders are most tempted to take this approach, I contend, when their political parties are not stably linked to sources of electoral support. Unstably linked governing parties will tend to have very short time ...


Party Strength And International Trade: A Cross National Analysis, Charles Robert Hankla Jan 2006

Party Strength And International Trade: A Cross National Analysis, Charles Robert Hankla

Political Science Faculty Publications

We know from observation that some democracies intervene deeply in their domestic economies while others adopt a more laissez faire approach. Can we explain these differences solely with ideology, or are other political influences also at work? I argue in this paper that elected leaders sometimes opt for hefty economic regulation purely to generate sources of patronage that can be used to maintain their political positions. Leaders are most tempted to take this approach, I contend, when their political parties are not stably linked to sources of electoral support. Unstably linked governing parties will tend to have very short time ...


The Washington Party Networks And The Future Of American Politics, Richard M. Skinner Dec 2005

The Washington Party Networks And The Future Of American Politics, Richard M. Skinner

Richard M. Skinner

Political parties today can best be understood as matrices of relationships between political actors, rather than merely as formal institutions. This notion allows us to better understand today’s intensely partisan environment. The Washington party networks consist of professionals involved in party politics; some of these individuals hold public office or work for party committees; many others pursue careers as lobbyists, consultants or interest group representatives. As they move from job to job, they remained ensconced in webs of partisan relationships.