Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Political Science Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

2006

Selected Works

China

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Political Science

The Political Economy Of Township Government Debt, Township Enterprises, And Rural Financial Institutions In China, Lynette H. Ong Jun 2006

The Political Economy Of Township Government Debt, Township Enterprises, And Rural Financial Institutions In China, Lynette H. Ong

Lynette H Ong, Dr

This paper sheds light on the ways in which township governments had mobilized resources from local financial institutions, and how failure to repay many of these loans had given rise to sizeable local government debt. Mobilization of resources was done through loans to collective enterprises whose de facto owners were township authorities. Though the enterprises were nominal borrowers, loan transactions would not have occurred in the absence of guarantees by township governments. Another way of financial resource mobilization was by establishing local informal financial organizations that were subject to less strict regulations, and over which township authorities could exercise control ...


Multiple Principals And Collective Action: China’S Rural Credit Cooperatives And Poor Households’ Access To Credit, Lynette H. Ong May 2006

Multiple Principals And Collective Action: China’S Rural Credit Cooperatives And Poor Households’ Access To Credit, Lynette H. Ong

Lynette H Ong, Dr

Ample empirical evidence suggests that Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs), which are the core credit institutions in rural China, are not accountable to their member households. This article argues that this conundrum can be explained by an institutional analysis of the credit cooperatives using the multiple principals–agent framework: the credit cooperatives as agents are accountable to multiple heterogeneous principals—with multiple conflicting objectives. The multiple principals are (1) the County RCC Unions, which exercise control using the evaluation criteria on which the remuneration of grassroots RCC officers is assessed; (2) local party secretaries, who exert influence through top personnel appointment ...