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Full-Text Articles in Political Science

Don’T Be Silly: Lawmakers “Rarely” Read Legislation And Oftentimes Don’T Understand It . . . But That’S Okay, Brian Christopher Jones Sep 2013

Don’T Be Silly: Lawmakers “Rarely” Read Legislation And Oftentimes Don’T Understand It . . . But That’S Okay, Brian Christopher Jones

Brian Christopher Jones

During the debate over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("Obamacare"), the reading and understanding of legislation became one of the most controversial issues mentioned in Congress and throughout the media. This led many to state that lawmakers should “read the bill,” and led one academic to propose a read-the-bill rule for Congress, where legislators would not vote or vote “no” if they had not read the full text of the legislation. My essay argues that in contemporary legislatures such proposals are unfeasible, and would ultimately produce lower quality legislation. In doing so, the piece uses interviews with legislative ...


Parlamento Re-Activo. De Cómo Partidos Poderosos Habitan En Una Legislatura Con Potestades Recortadas, Daniel Chasquetti Apr 2012

Parlamento Re-Activo. De Cómo Partidos Poderosos Habitan En Una Legislatura Con Potestades Recortadas, Daniel Chasquetti

Daniel Chasquetti

This article examines the institutional features of the Uruguayan Parliament and its particular relationship with a powerful Executive and an institutionalized party system. The thesis argues that the current Parliament’s prerogatives arise in the preferences of political parties, which at different junctures reformers chose to design a government system with a powerful Executive branch. This implied the definition of a reactive legislature and a functional habitat for the development of a stable political party cast. In order to demonstrate these statements, the author tooks several empirical tests to assess the consequences of this institutional design, the power exerted by ...


El Secreto Del Éxito: Presidentes Y Cártles Legislativos En Uruguay, Daniel Chasquetti Dec 2011

El Secreto Del Éxito: Presidentes Y Cártles Legislativos En Uruguay, Daniel Chasquetti

Daniel Chasquetti

In the last two decades the Uruguayan political system has shown a cooperative relationship between the two government branches. he Executives were able to pass their legislative agenda in an eicient way by building cartel-party at the Houses. his article proposes an explanation based on the theoretical developments of Cox and McCubbins (1993 and 2005), about the creation of legislative cartels in Uruguay. In particular, the article explains how constitutes a central authority in the House where the executive holds a dominant inluence, and how that authority usurps and controls the agenda power. I also present new evidence about the ...