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Full-Text Articles in Political Science

Mindscapes And Landscapes: Hayek And Simon On Cognitive Extension, Leslie Marsh Oct 2012

Mindscapes And Landscapes: Hayek And Simon On Cognitive Extension, Leslie Marsh

Leslie Marsh

Hayek’s and Simon’s social externalism runs on a shared presupposition: mind is constrained in its computational capacity to detect, harvest, and assimilate “data” generated by the infinitely fine-grained and perpetually dynamic characteristic of experience in complex social environments. For Hayek, mind and sociality are co-evolved spontaneous orders, allowing little or no prospect of comprehensive explanation, trapped in a hermeneutically sealed, i.e. inescapably context bound, eco-system. For Simon, it is the simplicity of mind that is the bottleneck, overwhelmed by the ambient complexity of the environmental. Since on Simon’s account complexity is unidirectional, Simon is far more ...


Stigmergy 3.0: From Ants To Economies, Leslie Marsh, Margery Doyle Dec 2011

Stigmergy 3.0: From Ants To Economies, Leslie Marsh, Margery Doyle

Leslie Marsh

No abstract provided.


Hayek's Philosophical Psychology, Leslie Marsh Dec 2010

Hayek's Philosophical Psychology, Leslie Marsh

Leslie Marsh

Hayek's philosophical psychology as set out in his The Sensory Order (1952) has, for the most part, been neglected. Despite being lauded by computer scientist grandee Frank Rosenblatt and by Nobel prize-winning biologist Gerald Edelman, cognitive scientists -- with a few exceptions -- have yet to discover Hayek's philosophical psychology. On the other hand, social theorists, Hayek's traditional disciplinary constituency, have only recently begun to take note and examine the importance of psychology in the complete Hayek corpus. This volume brings together for the first time state-of-the-art contributions from neuroscientists and philosophers of mind as well as economists and ...


Perspectives On Social Cognition, Leslie Marsh, Christian Onof Jan 2008

Perspectives On Social Cognition, Leslie Marsh, Christian Onof

Leslie Marsh

No longer is sociality the preserve of the social sciences, or ‘‘culture’’ the preserve of the humanities or anthropology. By the same token, cognition is no longer the sole preserve of the cognitive sciences. Social cognition (SC) or, sociocognition if you like, is thus a kaleidoscope of research projects that has seen exponential growth over the past 30 or so years. That so many disciplines now invoke the term ‘‘social cognition,’’ shouldn’t tempt one into thinking that they are all denoting the same idea. On the contrary, with such methodologically and perspectivally diverse interests involved, there is every chance ...


Perspectives On Social Cognition, Leslie Marsh, Christian Onof Jan 2008

Perspectives On Social Cognition, Leslie Marsh, Christian Onof

Leslie Marsh

No longer is sociality the preserve of the social sciences, or ‘‘culture’’ the preserve of the humanities or anthropology. By the same token, cognition is no longer the sole preserve of the cognitive sciences. Social cognition (SC) or, sociocognition if you like, is thus a kaleidoscope of research projects that has seen exponential growth over the past 30 or so years. That so many disciplines now invoke the term ‘‘social cognition,’’ shouldn’t tempt one into thinking that they are all denoting the same idea. On the contrary, with such methodologically and perspectivally diverse interests involved, there is every chance ...


Michael Wheeler: Reconstructing The Cognitive World: The Next Step, Leslie Marsh Jan 2007

Michael Wheeler: Reconstructing The Cognitive World: The Next Step, Leslie Marsh

Leslie Marsh

Michael Wheeler is the latest in a new wave of philosophical theorists that fall within a loose coalition of anti-representationalism (or anti-Cartesianism): Dynamical –, Embodied –, Extended –, Distributed –, and Situated –, theories of cognition (DEEDS an apt acronym). Against this background, cognition for Wheeler is, or should be, a more ecumenical concept. This ecumenical approach would still be amenable to making theoretical distinctions, the central one being the notion of offline and online styles of intelligence, a distinction that makes conceptual space for another closely related notion, that of propositional knowledge (knowing that) and tacit knowledge (knowing how).


Dewey: The First Ghost-Buster?, Leslie Marsh Jan 2006

Dewey: The First Ghost-Buster?, Leslie Marsh

Leslie Marsh

Ghost-busting, or less colloquially, anti-Cartesianism or non-representationalism, is a loose and internally fluid coalition (philosophical and empirical) comprising Dynamical, Embodied, Extended, Distributed, and Situated (DEEDS) theories of cognition. Gilbert Ryle – DEEDS’ anglophonic masthead [1] – supposedly exorcised the Cartesian propensity to postulate mind as an apparition-like entity somehow situated in the body. Ryle’s behaviouristic recommendation was, that just as we don’t see the wind blowing but only see the trees waving, so too should we conceive intelligence as manifest though action. The Cartesian ghost of old has mutated, taking the form of the ‘Machine in the Machine’, the brain ...


A History Of Political Experience, Leslie Marsh Dec 2005

A History Of Political Experience, Leslie Marsh

Leslie Marsh

This book survives superficial but fails deeper scrutiny. A facile, undiscerning criticism of Lectures in the History of Political Thought (LHPT) is that on Oakeshott’s own account these are lectures on a non-subject: ‘I cannot detect anything which could properly correspond to the expression “the history of political thought”’ (p. 32). This is an entirely typical Oakeshottian swipe – elegant and oblique – at the title of the lecture course he inherited from Harold Laski. If title and quotation sit awkwardly we should remember that Oakeshott never prepared the text for publication – a fortiori he did not prepare it for publication ...


Review Of Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles To A Science Of Consciousness, Leslie Marsh Jan 2005

Review Of Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles To A Science Of Consciousness, Leslie Marsh

Leslie Marsh

The question of how a physical system gives rise to the phenomenal or experiential (olfactory, visual, somatosensitive, gestatory and auditory), is considered the most intractable of scientific and philosophical puzzles. Though this question has dominated the philosophy of mind over the last quarter century, it articulates a version of the age-old mind–body problem. The most famous response, Cartesian dualism, is on Daniel Dennett’s view still a corrosively residual and redundant feature of popular (and academic) thinking on these matters. Fifteen years on from his anti-Cartesian theory of consciousness (Consciousness Explained, 1991), Dennett’s frustration with this tradition is ...