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Comparative Politics

Latin America

Gabriel L. Negretto

Publication Year

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Full-Text Articles in Political Science

Political Parties And Institutional Design: Explaining Constitutional Choice In Latin America, Gabriel L. Negretto Jan 2009

Political Parties And Institutional Design: Explaining Constitutional Choice In Latin America, Gabriel L. Negretto

Gabriel L. Negretto

The formulas for electing presidents and the rules determining the legislative powers of presidents are important variables for explaining the performance of presidential democracies. This article develops a strategic choice model to explain variations in these institutional features. Based on this model, it is proposed here that constitution makers are likely to opt for more-than-plurality rules of presidential elections when the number of parties necessary to pass constitutional changes increases. It is also proposed that the makers of constitutions are likely to strengthen the legislative powers of the president when the number of parties necessary to pass constitutional changes increases ...


“Choosing How To Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers, And Presidential Elections In Latin America”, Gabriel L. Negretto Jan 2006

“Choosing How To Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers, And Presidential Elections In Latin America”, Gabriel L. Negretto

Gabriel L. Negretto

Students of presidential regimes claim that while the combination of plurality rule for presidential elections and concurrent electoral cycles favors bipartism, majority rule for electing presidents favors multipartism. I argue that a reverse causality also affects the relationship between party systems and electoral systems. Using a bargaining model of institutional change, I propose that while dominant and large parties are likely to choose plurality rule and concurrent elections, small parties are likely to choose majority rule. I also argue that military rulers and mil- itary-civilian coalitions tend to follow the logic of electoral choice of small parties. These hypotheses are ...