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Full-Text Articles in Political Science

"Authoritarian Constitution Making: The Role Of The Military In Latin America", Gabriel L. Negretto Feb 2014

"Authoritarian Constitution Making: The Role Of The Military In Latin America", Gabriel L. Negretto

Gabriel L. Negretto

During the twentieth century, military dictatorships produced the largest number of authoritarian constitutions in Latin America. Why would military rulers invest time and resources in drafting constitutions? I argue that military leaders engage in constitution making to introduce more effective transformations of the political order during their rule and to have influence over the functioning of democracy after leaving power. However, in order to achieve all these goals, military dictators must be able to mobilize popular and partisan support for the authoritarian regime. Since this condition is rarely met, military rulers often fail in their constitution making strategy. I provide ...


“La Reforma Política En América Latina. Reglas Electorales Y Distribución De Poder Entre Presidente Y Congreso”, Gabriel L. Negretto Sep 2010

“La Reforma Política En América Latina. Reglas Electorales Y Distribución De Poder Entre Presidente Y Congreso”, Gabriel L. Negretto

Gabriel L. Negretto

El cambio frecuente de instituciones políticas pone en entredicho la supuesta estabilidad que éstas tienen como reglas que estructuran el juego político y hace evidente la necesidad de explicar los procesos que les dan origen. Un paso previo para avanzar en esta investigación es establecer cuál es la frecuencia y el conteni- do de los cambios institucionales que ocurren tanto en el tiempo como entre países. El presente artículo analiza, en perspectiva histórica comparada, la extensión, contenido y dirección de las reformas políticas realizadas de 1978 a 2008 en América Latina en materia de reglas electorales y distribución de poder ...


“Paradojas De La Reforma Constitucional En América Latina”, Gabriel L. Negretto May 2009

“Paradojas De La Reforma Constitucional En América Latina”, Gabriel L. Negretto

Gabriel L. Negretto

No abstract provided.


Political Parties And Institutional Design: Explaining Constitutional Choice In Latin America, Gabriel L. Negretto Jan 2009

Political Parties And Institutional Design: Explaining Constitutional Choice In Latin America, Gabriel L. Negretto

Gabriel L. Negretto

The formulas for electing presidents and the rules determining the legislative powers of presidents are important variables for explaining the performance of presidential democracies. This article develops a strategic choice model to explain variations in these institutional features. Based on this model, it is proposed here that constitution makers are likely to opt for more-than-plurality rules of presidential elections when the number of parties necessary to pass constitutional changes increases. It is also proposed that the makers of constitutions are likely to strengthen the legislative powers of the president when the number of parties necessary to pass constitutional changes increases ...


“Propuesta Para Una Reforma Electoral En México”, Gabriel L. Negretto Jan 2007

“Propuesta Para Una Reforma Electoral En México”, Gabriel L. Negretto

Gabriel L. Negretto

No abstract provided.


“Minority Presidents And Democratic Performance In Latin America”, Gabriel L. Negretto Jan 2006

“Minority Presidents And Democratic Performance In Latin America”, Gabriel L. Negretto

Gabriel L. Negretto

A widely accepted argument among scholars of presidential regimes in Latin America is that inter-branch cooperation is impaired when the president’s party falls short of a majority of seats in the legislature. This argument fails to take into account three factors that should have an effect on executive-legislative relations in the event that the president’s party has no independent control over the assembly: the location of the president’s party in the policy space, the capacity of the president to sustain a veto, and the legislative status of the parties included in the cabinet. I propose the hypothesis ...


“Choosing How To Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers, And Presidential Elections In Latin America”, Gabriel L. Negretto Jan 2006

“Choosing How To Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers, And Presidential Elections In Latin America”, Gabriel L. Negretto

Gabriel L. Negretto

Students of presidential regimes claim that while the combination of plurality rule for presidential elections and concurrent electoral cycles favors bipartism, majority rule for electing presidents favors multipartism. I argue that a reverse causality also affects the relationship between party systems and electoral systems. Using a bargaining model of institutional change, I propose that while dominant and large parties are likely to choose plurality rule and concurrent elections, small parties are likely to choose majority rule. I also argue that military rulers and mil- itary-civilian coalitions tend to follow the logic of electoral choice of small parties. These hypotheses are ...