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Full-Text Articles in Political Economy

Local Environmental Quality And Inter-Jurisdictional Spillovers, John W. Hatfield, Katrina Kosec Jul 2019

Local Environmental Quality And Inter-Jurisdictional Spillovers, John W. Hatfield, Katrina Kosec

Katrina Kosec

We investigate the classic question of how the provision of a local publicly-provided good--air quality--varies with the degree of decentralization of policymaking. Exploiting exogenous variation in the natural topography of the United States to instrument for the number of local government jurisdictions in a metropolitan area, we show that areas with more jurisdictions have significantly lower air quality, and significantly higher concentrations of the toxic air pollutants most closely associated with cancer and non-cancer health risks. Moreover, we estimate that this increase in pollution lowers housing values by at least 3%. By contrast, local drinking water quality--a publicly-provided good not ...


Incorporating Policymaker Costs And Political Competition Into Rent-Seeking Games, R. Kenneth Godwin, Edward J. Lopez, Barry J. Seldon Jul 2006

Incorporating Policymaker Costs And Political Competition Into Rent-Seeking Games, R. Kenneth Godwin, Edward J. Lopez, Barry J. Seldon

Faculty Publications

We incorporate policymaker costs of supplying rents and variable intensities of competition among rent seekers into the standard rent-seeking game. By incorporating these aspects, the game has greater verisimilitude to the lobbying process. The first aspect captures the fact that in rent-seeking contests there is a positive probability that neither firm will obtain the rent. The second aspect captures the fact that firms seeking different rents still must compete for policymakers' resources. We find that lobbying expenditures, rent-seeking profits, and rent dissipation depend on the intensity of competition and the value of the rent relative to policymaker costs. For example ...


Incorporating Policymaker Costs And Political Competition Into Rent-Seeking Games, R. Kenneth Godwin, Edward J. Lopez, Barry J. Seldon Jul 2006

Incorporating Policymaker Costs And Political Competition Into Rent-Seeking Games, R. Kenneth Godwin, Edward J. Lopez, Barry J. Seldon

Edward J. Lopez

We incorporate policymaker costs of supplying rents and variable intensities of competition among rent seekers into the standard rent-seeking game. By incorporating these aspects, the game has greater verisimilitude to the lobbying process. The first aspect captures the fact that in rent-seeking contests there is a positive probability that neither firm will obtain the rent. The second aspect captures the fact that firms seeking different rents still must compete for policymakers' resources. We find that lobbying expenditures, rent-seeking profits, and rent dissipation depend on the intensity of competition and the value of the rent relative to policymaker costs. For example ...