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Full-Text Articles in Political Economy

Incorporating Policymaker Costs And Political Competition Into Rent-Seeking Games, R. Kenneth Godwin, Edward J. Lopez, Barry J. Seldon Jul 2006

Incorporating Policymaker Costs And Political Competition Into Rent-Seeking Games, R. Kenneth Godwin, Edward J. Lopez, Barry J. Seldon

Faculty Publications

We incorporate policymaker costs of supplying rents and variable intensities of competition among rent seekers into the standard rent-seeking game. By incorporating these aspects, the game has greater verisimilitude to the lobbying process. The first aspect captures the fact that in rent-seeking contests there is a positive probability that neither firm will obtain the rent. The second aspect captures the fact that firms seeking different rents still must compete for policymakers' resources. We find that lobbying expenditures, rent-seeking profits, and rent dissipation depend on the intensity of competition and the value of the rent relative to policymaker costs. For example ...


Incorporating Policymaker Costs And Political Competition Into Rent-Seeking Games, R. Kenneth Godwin, Edward J. Lopez, Barry J. Seldon Jul 2006

Incorporating Policymaker Costs And Political Competition Into Rent-Seeking Games, R. Kenneth Godwin, Edward J. Lopez, Barry J. Seldon

Edward J. Lopez

We incorporate policymaker costs of supplying rents and variable intensities of competition among rent seekers into the standard rent-seeking game. By incorporating these aspects, the game has greater verisimilitude to the lobbying process. The first aspect captures the fact that in rent-seeking contests there is a positive probability that neither firm will obtain the rent. The second aspect captures the fact that firms seeking different rents still must compete for policymakers' resources. We find that lobbying expenditures, rent-seeking profits, and rent dissipation depend on the intensity of competition and the value of the rent relative to policymaker costs. For example ...