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Articles 1 - 9 of 9

Full-Text Articles in Political Economy

Wealth And Power In A Collegial Polity, Roy Gardner Dec 1981

Wealth And Power In A Collegial Polity, Roy Gardner

Economic Staff Paper Series

This paper considers the reflection of political power upon the distribution of wealth in a collegial polity, where political power is unequally distributed. Power and the economic outcome are both analyzed in terms of the Shapley value. The more powerful a political agent is, the greater is that agent's final wealth, as given by the value allocation.


The Plea Bargain In England And America: A Comparative Institutional Approach, Richard Adelstein Jan 1981

The Plea Bargain In England And America: A Comparative Institutional Approach, Richard Adelstein

Division II Faculty Publications

A comparative view of adjudication by guilty plea in the US and the UK.


Rural To Urban Migration: Population Distribution Patterns 19, Philip E. Graves Jan 1981

Rural To Urban Migration: Population Distribution Patterns 19, Philip E. Graves

PHILIP E GRAVES

The abstract would be exactly the same as the introduction to the paper, and need not be repeated here.


Power And Employment, Roy Gardner Jan 1981

Power And Employment, Roy Gardner

Economic Staff Paper Series

In any economic system, but especially in centrally planned economies, there exists an important interaction between the political structure and the economic outcome. In a society like that of the Soviet Union, there are considerable differences in power among the various segments of society. These differences in power lead to the existence of economic classes, not unlike those in capitalist economies.^ The difference in economic outcome in such circumstances can be striking. During the 1920's the Soviet Union experienced substantial unemployment among the industrial labor force, with unemployment rates exceeding 10?^. At the same time, an industrial worker or ...


Wealth, Prices, And The Power To Requisition: The New Economic Policy In The Soviet Union, Roy Gardner Jan 1981

Wealth, Prices, And The Power To Requisition: The New Economic Policy In The Soviet Union, Roy Gardner

Economic Staff Paper Series

This paper constructs a game theoretical model of the N.E.P. (New Economic Policy, 1921-1930) in the Soviet Union. The N.E.P. is modeled as a cooperative income redistribution game, whose solution concept is the Shapley value. Special attention is paid to the connection between political power, as measured by party strength, and economic power, inversely related to the taxation rate. The equation relating peasant party strength and the state grain procurement rate is fitted for the available data, 1925- 1930. The model shows clearly the relationship between falling political power of the peasants and the rising rate ...


Institutional Function And Evolution In The Criminal Process, Richard Adelstein Jan 1981

Institutional Function And Evolution In The Criminal Process, Richard Adelstein

Division II Faculty Publications

An extended development of the foundations of the price exaction model of the criminal process.


The Plea Bargain In England And America: A Comparative Institutional Approach, Richard Adelstein Dec 1980

The Plea Bargain In England And America: A Comparative Institutional Approach, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A comparative view of adjudication by guilty plea in the US and the UK.


The Supply Side Of The Street., Derek Shearer, Martin Carnoy Dec 1980

The Supply Side Of The Street., Derek Shearer, Martin Carnoy

Derek Shearer

Focuses on the legislation on income redistribution introduced by the Administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan as of November 7, 1981. Transfer of resources from the poor and the working class to the rich; Plans to stimulate economic growth by increasing business and investor profits; Need for increased purchasing power for the success of Reagan's program; Problems in supply-side economics; Benefits of increasing military spending.


Institutional Function And Evolution In The Criminal Process, Richard Adelstein Dec 1980

Institutional Function And Evolution In The Criminal Process, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

An extended development of the foundations of the price exaction model of the criminal process.