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Full-Text Articles in Political Economy

The Political Economy Of Environmental Justice: A Comparative Study Of New Delhi And Los Angeles, Ratik Asokan Jan 2015

The Political Economy Of Environmental Justice: A Comparative Study Of New Delhi And Los Angeles, Ratik Asokan

CMC Senior Theses

Though mainstream environmentalism, both in the U.S. and India, was initially rooted in social justice, it has, over time, moved away from this focus. The Environmental Justice Movement consequently arose to reunite social and environmental activism. In this thesis, I trace the historical relationship between the mainstream environmentalism, the Environmental Justice Movement, and marginalized communities. After providing this general overview, I examine two case studies – in Los Angeles and New Delhi respectively – where marginalized communities have been involved in Environmental Justice activities. My analysis reveals that marginalized communities often act in an ‘environmentalist’ or ‘environmentally friendly’ manner, without defining ...


The Financial Underpinnings Of The Eu Crisis: Financial Deregulation, Privatization, And Asymmetric State Power, Nina Q. Eichacker May 2014

The Financial Underpinnings Of The Eu Crisis: Financial Deregulation, Privatization, And Asymmetric State Power, Nina Q. Eichacker

Doctoral Dissertations

This dissertation asks the following questions. How has financial liberalization affected the incidence of financial crisis in Europe? How have power asymmetries within Western Europe facilitated the process of financial liberalization, and distributed the costs and gains from this liberalization? How have these dynamics been demonstrated at the state level?

It charts the institutional liberalization and privatization of European finance from the 1960s onward and presents a survey of descriptive statistics that show how different financial stability, financial flow, and macroeconomic variables have changed in Western Europe since the early 1980s, generally increasing financial and economic instability. It also demonstrates ...


The Political Economy Of Telecoms And Electricity Internationalization In The Single Market, Judith Clifton, Daniel Díaz-Fuentes, Revuelta Julio Jan 2010

The Political Economy Of Telecoms And Electricity Internationalization In The Single Market, Judith Clifton, Daniel Díaz-Fuentes, Revuelta Julio

Judith Clifton

As a consequence of liberalization policies in the European Union (EU), a number of formerly inward-looking incumbents in telecommunications and electricity transformed themselves into some of the world’s leading Multinationals. The relationship between liberalization and incumbent internationalization, however, is contested. Three political economy arguments on this relationship are tested. The first claims that incumbents most exposed to domestic liberalization would internationalise most. The second asserts that incumbents operating where liberalization was restricted could exploit monopolistic rents to finance internationalisation. The third argument claims that a diversity of paths will be adopted by countries and incumbents vis-à-vis liberalization and internationalization ...


Computing The Extent Of Circumvention Of Proposition 13: A Response, Robert L. Sexton, Gary M. Galles Dec 1999

Computing The Extent Of Circumvention Of Proposition 13: A Response, Robert L. Sexton, Gary M. Galles

Robert L Sexton

ABSTRACT. Galles and Sexton (1998) showed that California state and local revenues exceeded their previous real per capita levels as did the sum of property taxes plus charges and miscellaneous revenues within a decade after Proposition 13 passed, and concluded that Proposition 13 was only temporarily successful at shrinking California state and local governments. Khoury and Pal (2000) challenge this conclusion. However, their conclusion that Proposition 13’s circumvention “has been only marginal” results from using per $1000 of income comparisons rather than real per capita comparisons and from using growth rate changes, which fail to adjust for U.S ...


An Alternative Tale Of Two Tax Jurisdictions: A Reply, Robert L. Sexton, Gary Galles Jun 1999

An Alternative Tale Of Two Tax Jurisdictions: A Reply, Robert L. Sexton, Gary Galles

Robert L Sexton

ABSTRACT. Cebula (1999) suggests that the success of California's Proposition 13 and Massachusetts' Proposition 2-1/2 is better judged by their effects on the growth rates of real per capita revenues and expenditures rather than on the te^ek of those variables, which Galles and Sexton (1998) used to evaluate those measures. However, the data shows that virtually all of their effects, relative to the United States as a whole, arose during their implementation periods, and that there is no clear evidence of the "longer term success in terms of reducing the growth rate of real per capita revenues ...


Restricting Taxation: The Impact Of Proposition 13 On California Tax And Expenditure Trends, Robert L. Sexton, Gary M. Galles, James E. Long Dec 1994

Restricting Taxation: The Impact Of Proposition 13 On California Tax And Expenditure Trends, Robert L. Sexton, Gary M. Galles, James E. Long

Robert L Sexton

Abstract: This paper examines trends in California taxes and expenditures at the state and local level. In particular, it considers whether Proposition 13, which has been blamed by politicians and the press for virtually every ensuing fiscal problem facing state and local governments in California, deserves such criticism, or whether the roots of those problems lie elsewhere.


A Pollution Control Approach To Analysis Of The Balanced Budget Amendment, Robert L. Sexton, Dwight R. Lee Sep 1988

A Pollution Control Approach To Analysis Of The Balanced Budget Amendment, Robert L. Sexton, Dwight R. Lee

Robert L Sexton

Fiscal Pollution (excessive budget deficits), in certain aspects, is like environmental pollution. In both types of pollution some, possibly most individuals would be willing to reduce their own pollution if others would do the same. In the case of fiscal pollution individuals would be willing to give up their special interest demands if others would reciprocate in kind. But as long as individuals are forced to pay for the programs of others there is little incentive to reduce their own demands. Hence, restraints on political hehavior such as a balanced budget amendment to the U.S. Constitution are needed to ...