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Full-Text Articles in Other Economics

Give Me A Challenge Or Give Me A Raise, Aleksandr Alekseev Sep 2019

Give Me A Challenge Or Give Me A Raise, Aleksandr Alekseev

ESI Working Papers

I study the effect of task difficulty on workers' effort and compare it to the effect of monetary rewards in an incentivized lab experiment. I find that task difficulty has an inverse-U effect on effort, and that this effect is quantitatively large when compared to the effect of conditional monetary rewards. Difficulty acts as a mediator of monetary rewards: conditional rewards are most effective at the intermediate or high levels of difficulty. I show that the inverse-U pattern of effort response to difficulty is not consistent with the Expected Utility model but is consistent with the Rank-Dependent Utility model that ...


Deciding To Delegate: On Distributional Consequences Of Endogenous Delegation, Lara Ezquerra, Praveen Kujal Sep 2019

Deciding To Delegate: On Distributional Consequences Of Endogenous Delegation, Lara Ezquerra, Praveen Kujal

ESI Working Papers

We allow for principals to self-select into delegating (or not) the allocation decision to an agent in a modified dictator game. The standard dictator game is obtained when they choose not to delegate. Nearly half the subjects choose to be a dictator and make the allocation themselves. Dictators thus obtained transfer lower amounts to receivers, relative to when the decision making is passed to an agent (or the standard dictator game). Subjects self-selecting into the role of a dictator give less relative to those that pass the allocation decision to an agent. Finally, the distributional consequences of delegating, or not ...


An Experimental Investigation Of Income, Insurance, And Investments In Health Over The Life Course, J. Dustin Tracy, Hillard Kaplan, Kevin A. James, Stephen Rassenti Aug 2019

An Experimental Investigation Of Income, Insurance, And Investments In Health Over The Life Course, J. Dustin Tracy, Hillard Kaplan, Kevin A. James, Stephen Rassenti

ESI Working Papers

We examine the impacts of age, income and insurance plan on behavior in a virtual environment with cash-motivated subjects, who live multi-period lives in which they earn income and spend on enjoyment, insurance, and investments in health. Health shocks increase simulating aging. The 2x2 experimental has high and low income subjects, and offers employer-based or actuarial insurance. We find: 1) subject behavior approximated optimal responses; 2) in all treatments, subjects under-invested in health early in life and over-invested in health late in life; 3) subjects in the employer-based plan purchased insurance at higher rates; 4) the employer-based plan reduced differences ...


Lying And Shirking Under Oath, Nicolas Jacquemet, Alexander James, Stéphane Luchini, James J. Murphy, Jason F. Shogren Aug 2019

Lying And Shirking Under Oath, Nicolas Jacquemet, Alexander James, Stéphane Luchini, James J. Murphy, Jason F. Shogren

ESI Working Papers

This study explores whether an oath to honesty can reduce both shirking and lying among crowd-sourced internet workers. Using a classic coin-flip experiment, we first show that a substantial majority of Mechanical Turk workers both shirk and lie when reporting the number of heads flipped. We then demonstrate lying can be reduced by first asking each worker to swear voluntarily on his or her honor to tell the truth in subsequent economic decisions. The oath, however, did not reduce shirking as measured by time- at-coin-flip-task, although it did increase the time they spent answering a demographic survey. Conditional on response ...


Adding Tournament To Tournament: Combining Between-Team And Within-Team Incentives, Michael Majerczyk, Roman Sheremeta, Yu Tian Aug 2019

Adding Tournament To Tournament: Combining Between-Team And Within-Team Incentives, Michael Majerczyk, Roman Sheremeta, Yu Tian

ESI Working Papers

We examine theoretically and experimentally how combining between-team and within-team incentives affects behavior in team tournaments. Theory predicts that free-riding will occur when there are only between-team incentives, and offering within-team incentives may solve this problem. However, if individuals collude, then within-team incentives may not be as effective at reducing free-riding. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, the results of our experiment indicate that although between-team incentives are effective at increasing individual effort, there is substantial free-riding and declining effort over time. Importantly, a combination of between-team and within-team incentives is effective not only at generating effort but also at sustaining ...


Co-Enforcement Of Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence From Turfs In Chile, Carlos A. Chávez, James J. Murphy, John K. Stranlund Aug 2019

Co-Enforcement Of Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence From Turfs In Chile, Carlos A. Chávez, James J. Murphy, John K. Stranlund

ESI Working Papers

This work presents the results of framed field experiments designed to study the co-enforcement of access to common pool resources. The experiments were conducted in the field with participants in the territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) management scheme that regulates access to nearshore fisheries along the coast of Chile. In the experiments, TURF members not only decided on harvest but also invested in monitoring to deter poaching by outsiders. Treatments varied whether the monitoring investment was an individual decision or determined by a group vote. Per-unit sanctions for poaching were exogenous as if provided by a government authority, and ...


The Effect Of Social Information In The Dictator Game With A Taking Option, Tanya O'Garra, Valerio Capraro, Praveen Kujal Jul 2019

The Effect Of Social Information In The Dictator Game With A Taking Option, Tanya O'Garra, Valerio Capraro, Praveen Kujal

ESI Working Papers

We experimentally study how redistribution choices are affected by positive and negative information regarding the behaviour of a previous participant in a dictator game with a taking option. We use the strategy method to identify behavioural ‘types’, and thus distinguish ‘conformists’ from ‘counter-conformists’, and unconditional choosers. Unconditional choosers make up the greatest proportion of types (about 80%) while only about 20% of subjects condition their responses to social information. We find that both conformity and counter-conformity are driven by a desire to be seen as moral (the ‘symbolization’ dimension of moral identity). The main difference is that, conformity is also ...


Classical Economics: Lost And Found, Sabiou M. Inoua, Vernon Smith Jul 2019

Classical Economics: Lost And Found, Sabiou M. Inoua, Vernon Smith

ESI Working Papers

"We argue that neoclassical value theory suffers from a more basic and serious logical indeterminacy, which is inherent in the axiom of price-taking behavior, and which renders price dynamics indeterminate before inquiring as to its stability. If everyone in the economy takes price as given, whence come these prices? Who is giving these prices? Jevons avoided the indeterminacy by assuming that people must have complete information on supply and demand, and the consequent equilibrium prices—‘perfect competition.’ Walras in effect imported an external agent who found the prices by trial-and-error-correction (the Walrasian Auctioneer). Paradoxically, both approaches had the potential better ...


Cournot Marked The Turn From Classical To Neoclassical Thinking, Vernon L. Smith, Sabiou M. Inoua Jul 2019

Cournot Marked The Turn From Classical To Neoclassical Thinking, Vernon L. Smith, Sabiou M. Inoua

ESI Working Papers

For classical economists, markets served the highest value buyers without anyone in the market needing to know that it was possible to write aggregate buyer reservation prices in the form, D = F (p). Cournot, thereby launched neoclassical economics as modelling and thinking of economic action in terms of their outcome effects, rather than their roots in human experience.


Productivity In Baseball: How Babe Ruth Beats The Benchmark, Peter A. Groothuis, Kurt W. Rotthoff, Mark C. Strazicich May 2019

Productivity In Baseball: How Babe Ruth Beats The Benchmark, Peter A. Groothuis, Kurt W. Rotthoff, Mark C. Strazicich

The Journal of SPORT

Many statistics are used to measure the productivity of hitters in Major League Baseball, such as the number of home runs and the number of runs batted in a season. However, comparing the talent of individual players across time is difficult as rules and technologies change. In this paper, we propose applying a practice commonly utilized in the finance literature to compare the performance of individual stocks and other assets, namely, we “benchmark” the productivity of each player’s performance to players in the same time period. Applying our benchmarking strategy to annual Major League Baseball data from 1871-2010, we ...


The Impact Of Cleft Lip/Palate And Clp Surgical Intervention On The Social Integration Of Adolescents In India, Mustafa Zahid May 2019

The Impact Of Cleft Lip/Palate And Clp Surgical Intervention On The Social Integration Of Adolescents In India, Mustafa Zahid

Master's Theses

Cleft Lip/Palate, a congenital orofacial anomaly, carries an incidence rate of approximately 1 in every 1000 births. In addition to the stigma associated with the condition, the varying levels of cleft severity might result in lower life outcomes which could include lower cognitive ability, physical and psychological well-being, social and behavioral outcomes of adolescents. This paper focuses on the social integration element of life outcomes, which is composed of the social inclusion and prosocial behavior of the adolescent. Despite the affordability of restorative surgeries, patients in rural areas of Low and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) such as India face accessibility ...


Monetary Equilibrium And The Cost Of Banking Activity, Paola Boel, Gabriele Camera May 2019

Monetary Equilibrium And The Cost Of Banking Activity, Paola Boel, Gabriele Camera

ESI Working Papers

We investigate the effects of banks’ operating costs on allocations and welfare in a low interest rate environment. We introduce an explicit production function for banks in a microfounded model where banks employ labor resources, hired on a competitive market, to run their operations. In equilibrium, this generates a spread between interest rates on loans and deposits, which naturally reflects the underlying monetary policy and the efficiency of financial intermediation. In a deflation or low inflation environment, equilibrium deposits yield zero returns. Hence, banks end up soaking up labor resources to offer deposits that do not outperform idle balances, thus ...


Local Food Policy & Consumer Food Cooperatives: Evolutionary Case Studies, Afton Hupper May 2019

Local Food Policy & Consumer Food Cooperatives: Evolutionary Case Studies, Afton Hupper

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Darwin’s theory of natural selection has played a central role in the development of the biological sciences, but evolution can also explain change in human culture. Institutions, mechanisms that govern behavior and social order, are important subjects of cultural evolution. Institutions can help stabilize cooperation, defined as behavior that benefits others, often at a personal cost. Cooperation is important for solving social dilemmas, scenarios in which the interests of the individual conflict with those of the group. A number of mechanisms by which institutions evolve to support cooperation have been identified, yet theoretical models of institutional change have rarely ...


The Quality Of Xbrl Structured Financial Statements: An Empirical Examination Of Custom Tags, Aidana Razhap Kyzy May 2019

The Quality Of Xbrl Structured Financial Statements: An Empirical Examination Of Custom Tags, Aidana Razhap Kyzy

School of Arts & Sciences Theses

In 2009 the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) system to improve the process by which financial statements can be used. Interactive financial data filed with the SEC using XBRL provides easily readable and comparable financial data, thereby improving transparency and efficiency in the corporate market. SEC rules permit companies to use custom tags in their financial reports in cases when an appropriate element cannot be found in the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) standard XBRL taxonomy. The inordinate use of custom tags may result in a reduction of financial report quality by ...


Box Office Showdown: How Does Movie Market Saturation Affect First Weekend Box Office Revenues?, Matthew Steele May 2019

Box Office Showdown: How Does Movie Market Saturation Affect First Weekend Box Office Revenues?, Matthew Steele

Economics Honors Projects

The scheduling of release dates for feature films is among the most important decisions that movie studios make in the life cycle of a movie. While the economic literature on the movie industry has largely focused on modeling the box office success of a movie based on its own characteristics—star power, critical reception, and trailer data—there is a dearth of literature concerning the way that competition from within the industry affects box office revenues. This article primarily uses a propensity score matching model to fill a gap in the literature, establishing causal relationships between different forms of competition ...


Do Economic Inequalities Affect Long-Run Cooperation & Prosperity?, Gabriele Camera, Cary Deck, David Porter Apr 2019

Do Economic Inequalities Affect Long-Run Cooperation & Prosperity?, Gabriele Camera, Cary Deck, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

We explore if fairness and inequality motivations affect cooperation in indefinitely repeated games. Each round, we randomly divided experimental participants into donor-recipient pairs. Donors could make a gift to recipients, and ex-ante earnings are highest when all donors give. Roles were randomly reassigned every period, which induced inequality in ex-post earnings. Theoretically, income-maximizing players do not have to condition on this inequality because it is payoff-irrelevant. Empirically, payoff-irrelevant inequality affected participants’ ability to coordinate on efficient play: donors conditioned gifts on their own past roles and, with inequalities made visible, discriminated against those who were better off.


Reconsidering Rational Expectations And The Aggregation Of Diverse Information In Laboratory Security Markets, Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, Mark Desantis, Kyle Hampton, Erik O. Kimbrough Apr 2019

Reconsidering Rational Expectations And The Aggregation Of Diverse Information In Laboratory Security Markets, Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, Mark Desantis, Kyle Hampton, Erik O. Kimbrough

ESI Working Papers

The ability of markets to aggregate diverse information is a cornerstone of economics and finance, and empirical evidence for such aggregation has been demonstrated in previous laboratory experiments. Most notably Plott and Sunder (1988) find clear support for the rational expectations hypothesis in their Series B and C markets. However, recent studies have called into question the robustness of these findings. In this paper, we report the result of a direct replication of the key information aggregation results presented in Plott and Sunder. We do not find the same strong evidence in support of rational expectations that Plott and Sunder ...


The Political Economy Of Foreign Aid And Growth: Theory And Evidence, Sultan Mehmood, Avner Seror Mar 2019

The Political Economy Of Foreign Aid And Growth: Theory And Evidence, Sultan Mehmood, Avner Seror

ESI Working Papers

In this paper, we demonstrate that even when foreign aid is used to fund patronage, it may still have a positive - and significant - effect on economic growth in developing countries. First, we present a theory that formalizes the effect of aid on economic growth and patronage. Next, we provide evidence from Pakistan consistent with the predictions of the model that foreign aid increases economic growth, despite being used for patronage. The identification strategy we propose allows us to provide causal evidence for the predictions of the model.


Designing Call Auction Institutions To Eliminate Price Bubbles: Is English Dutch The Best?, Cary Deck, Maroš Servátka, Steven Tucker Mar 2019

Designing Call Auction Institutions To Eliminate Price Bubbles: Is English Dutch The Best?, Cary Deck, Maroš Servátka, Steven Tucker

ESI Working Papers

The bubble and burst pattern in asset market experiments is among the most replicable results in experimental economics. Numerous studies have searched for means to reduce this mispricing. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we compare mispricing in standard double auction markets to prices in two clock auctions. The double Dutch auction, shown to be more efficient than the double auction in commodity market experiments, does not eliminate bubbles. However, the English Dutch auction does yield prices reflective of underlying fundamentals and succeeds in taming bubbles even with inexperienced traders in the common declining fundamental value environment.


Salience And Social Choice, Mark Schneider, Jonathan W. Leland Mar 2019

Salience And Social Choice, Mark Schneider, Jonathan W. Leland

ESI Working Papers

The axioms of expected utility and discounted utility theory have been tested extensively. In contrast, the axioms of social welfare functions have only been tested in a few questionnaire studies involving choices between hypothetical income distributions. In this note, we conduct a controlled experiment with 100 subjects in the role of social planners that tests five fundamental properties of social welfare functions to provide a basic test of cardinal social choice theory. We find that four properties of the standard social welfare functions tested are systematically violated, producing an Allais paradox, a common ratio effect, a framing effect, and a ...


A Time To Print, A Time To Reform, Lars Boerner, Jared Rubin, Battista Severgnini Mar 2019

A Time To Print, A Time To Reform, Lars Boerner, Jared Rubin, Battista Severgnini

ESI Working Papers

The public mechanical clock and the movable type printing press were two of the most important and complex general purpose technologies of the late medieval period. We document two of their most important, yet unforeseeable, consequences. First, an instrumental variables analysis indicates that towns that were early adopters of clocks were more likely to also be early adopters of presses. We posit that towns with clocks became upper-tail human capital hubs|both technologies required extensive technical know-how that had many points of overlap. Second, a three-stage instrumental variables analysis indicates that the press influenced the adoption of Lutheranism and Calvinism ...


The Attack And Defense Games, Roman Sheremeta Jan 2019

The Attack And Defense Games, Roman Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

The attack and defense game is a game in which an attacker (a group of attackers) has an incentive to revise the status quo and a defender (a group of defenders) wants to protect it. The asymmetry in objectives creates incompatible interests and results in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, this equilibrium could be heavily impacted by behavioral considerations.


Endogenous Market Formation And Monetary Trade: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Dror Goldberg, Avi Weiss Jan 2019

Endogenous Market Formation And Monetary Trade: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Dror Goldberg, Avi Weiss

ESI Working Papers

The theory of money assumes decentralized bilateral exchange and excludes centralized multilateral exchange. However, endogenizing the exchange process is critical for understanding the conditions that support the use of money. We develop a “travelling game” to study the emergence of decentralized and centralized exchange, theoretically and experimentally. Players located on separate islands can either trade locally, or pay a cost to trade elsewhere, so decentralized and centralized markets can both emerge in equilibrium. The former minimize trade costs through monetary exchange; the latter maximizes overall surplus through non-monetary exchange. Monetary trade emerges when coordination is problematic, while centralized trade emerges ...


A Bias Aggregation Theorem, Mark Schneider Jan 2019

A Bias Aggregation Theorem, Mark Schneider

ESI Working Papers

In a market where some traders are rational (maximize expected utility) and others are systematically biased (deviate from expected utility due to some bias parameter, q), do equilibrium prices necessarily depend on q? In this note, focusing on the case where there is an aggregate and systematic bias in the population, we show that market prices can still be unbiased. Hence, we establish that systematically biased agents do not necessarily imply biased market prices. We show that the parametric model we use also predicts observed deviations from expected utility in laboratory and market environments.


Cooperation Among Strangers With And Without A Monetary System, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari Jan 2019

Cooperation Among Strangers With And Without A Monetary System, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari

ESI Working Papers

Human societies prosper when their members move beyond local exchange and cooperate with outsiders in the creation of wealth. Collaboration of this type presents formidable challenges because interaction is impersonal, reciprocity is unfeasible and trust cannot be easily established. Here we study this cooperation problem by modeling strategic interaction among strangers through an Intertemporal Exchange Game. The setup can be easily implemented in the laboratory to study a variety of cooperation-enhancing institutions. In particular, we study the role of a fiat monetary system by introducing intrinsically worthless tokens that can be offered in exchange for cooperation. The experiments show that ...


A Full Characterization Of Best-Response Functions In The Lottery Colonel Blotto Game, Dan Kovenock, David Rojo Arjona Jan 2019

A Full Characterization Of Best-Response Functions In The Lottery Colonel Blotto Game, Dan Kovenock, David Rojo Arjona

ESI Working Papers

We fully characterize best-response functions in Colonel Blotto games with lottery contest success functions.


Money Is More Than Memory, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari Dec 2018

Money Is More Than Memory, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari

ESI Working Papers

Impersonal exchange is the hallmark of an advanced society and money is one key institution that supports it. Economic theory regards money as a crude arrangement for monitoring counterparts’ past conduct. If so, then a public record of past actions—or memory—should supersede the function performed by money. This intriguing theoretical postulate remains untested. In an experiment, we show that the suggested functional equivalence between money and memory does not translate into an empirical equivalence: money removed the incentives to free ride, while memory did not. Monetary systems performed a richer set of functions than just revealing past behaviors.


Modeling Interactions Between Risk, Time, And Social Preferences, Mark Schneider Dec 2018

Modeling Interactions Between Risk, Time, And Social Preferences, Mark Schneider

ESI Working Papers

Recent studies have observed systematic interactions between risk, time, and social preferences that constitute violations of `dimensional independence' and are not explained by the leading models of decision making. This note provides a simple approach to modeling such interaction effects while predicting new ones. In particular, we present a model of rational-behavioral preferences that takes the convex combination of `behavioral' System 1 preferences and `rational' System 2 preferences. The model provides a unifying approach to analyzing risk, time, and social preferences, and predicts how these preferences are correlated with reliance on System 1 or System 2 thinking.


A Dual System Model Of Risk And Time Preferences, Mark Schneider Dec 2018

A Dual System Model Of Risk And Time Preferences, Mark Schneider

ESI Working Papers

Discounted Expected Utility theory has been a workhorse in economic analysis for over half a century. However, it cannot explain empirical violations of 'dimensional independence' demonstrating that risk interacts with time preference and time interacts with risk preference, nor does it explain present bias or magnitude-dependence in risk and time preferences, or correlations between risk preference, time preference, and cognitive reflection. We demonstrate that these and other anomalies are explained by a dual system model of risk and time preferences that unless models of a rational economic agent, models based on prospect theory, and dual process models of decision making.


Using Response Times To Measure Ability On A Cognitive Task, Aleksandr Alekseev Dec 2018

Using Response Times To Measure Ability On A Cognitive Task, Aleksandr Alekseev

ESI Working Papers

I show how using response times as a proxy for effort coupled with an explicit process-based model can address a long-standing issue of how to separate the effect of cognitive ability on performance from the effect of motivation. My method is based on a dynamic stochastic model of optimal effort choice in which ability and motivation are the structural parameters. I show how to estimate these parameters from the data on outcomes and response times in a cognitive task. In a laboratory experiment, I find that performance on a Digit-Symbol test is a noisy and biased measure of cognitive ability ...