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Full-Text Articles in International Economics

Optimal International Agreement And Treatment Of Domestic Subsidy, Gea M. Lee Jan 2012

Optimal International Agreement And Treatment Of Domestic Subsidy, Gea M. Lee

Research Collection School Of Economics

We investigate how a domestic subsidy is treated in an international agreement, when a government, having incentive to use its domestic subsidy as a means of import protection, can disguise its protective use of subsidy as a legitimate intervention with which to address a market imperfection. We show that any optimal agreement, as opposed to the conventional message of the targeting principle, restricts the home government’s freedom to select its domestic subsidy in order to increase the market-access level for foreign exporters. Our finding suggests that a proper restriction on domestic subsidy is somewhere between GATT and WTO rules.


The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang Aug 2004

The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper attempts to develop a formal economic framework to analyze the influences of domestic political considerations by democratic governments in shaping the WTO enforcement outcomes following a violation ruling against the defendant. Since a different mix of import and export sectors in the defendant and complainant country will benefit from the various potential enforcement outcomes, they become competing forces which steer the strategic interactions between the disputing governments. The results of the paper illustrate the complainant's strategy in selecting the retaliation list, and the likelihood of the defendant's compliance or compensation in response to the proposed or ...


The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang Jul 2004

The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper attempts to develop a formal economic framework to analyze the influences of domestic political considerations by democratic governments in shaping the WTO enforcement outcomes following a violation ruling against the defendant. Since a different mix of import and export sectors in the defendant and complainant country will benefit from the various potential enforcement outcomes, they become competing forces which steer the strategic interactions between the disputing governments. The results of the paper illustrate the complainant's strategy in selecting the retaliation list, and the likelihood of the defendant's compliance or compensation in response to the proposed or ...