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Full-Text Articles in Economic History

The Historical And Legal Creation Of A Fissured Workplace: The Case Of Franchising, Brian Callaci Jan 2019

The Historical And Legal Creation Of A Fissured Workplace: The Case Of Franchising, Brian Callaci

Doctoral Dissertations

This dissertation explores the consequences of institutional change in capitalist firms, focusing on vertical dis-integration, the legal boundaries of the firm and what David Weil has called workplace "fissuring," in which corporations place intermediaries (subcontractors, temp agencies, or franchisees) between themselves and workers, often with negative consequences for workers. It focuses specifically on franchising, a type of fissured workplace in which one firm outsources retail operations to smaller, legally independent franchisees. The first chapter uses archival sources to identify the legal and policy changes driving workplace fissuring in the franchising context: specifically the relaxing of antitrust prohibitions on vertical restraints ...


A Theory Without A Movement, A Hope Without A Name: The Future Of Marxism In A Post-Marxist World, Justin Schwartz Jun 2013

A Theory Without A Movement, A Hope Without A Name: The Future Of Marxism In A Post-Marxist World, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

Just as Marx's insights into capitalism have been most strikingly vindicated by the rise of neoliberalism and the near-collapse of the world economy, Marxism as social movement has become bereft of support. Is there any point in people who find Marx's analysis useful in clinging to the term "Marxism" - which Marx himself rejected -- at time when self-identified Marxist organizations and societies have collapsed or renounced the identification, and Marxism own working class constituency rejects the term? I set aside bad reasons to give on "Marxism," such as that the theory is purportedly refuted, that its adoption leads necessarily ...


The History And Rationale For A Separate Bank Resolution Process, Thomas Fitzpatrick, Moira Kearney-Marks, James Thomson Feb 2012

The History And Rationale For A Separate Bank Resolution Process, Thomas Fitzpatrick, Moira Kearney-Marks, James Thomson

James B Thomson

Everyone recognizes the need to have a credible resolution regime in place for fi nancial companies whose failure could harm the entire financial system, but people disagree about which regime is best. The emergence of the parallel banking system has led policymakers to reconsider the dividing line between fi rms that should be resolved in bankruptcy and firms that should be subject to a special resolution regime. A look at the history of insolvency resolution in this country suggests that a blended approach is worth considering. Activities that have potential systemic impact might be best handled administratively, while all other ...


The Rise Of Planning In Industrial America, 1865-1914 Dec 2011

The Rise Of Planning In Industrial America, 1865-1914

Richard Adelstein

How American firms grew very large after the Civil War, and how Americans responded to them.


Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz Jan 2011

Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility ...


Coase, Institutionalism, And The Origins Of Law And Economics, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2011

Coase, Institutionalism, And The Origins Of Law And Economics, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Ronald Coase merged two traditions in economics, marginalism and institutionalism. Neoclassical economics in the 1930s was characterized by an abstract conception of marginalism and frictionless resource movement. Marginal analysis did not seek to uncover the source of individual human preference or value, but accepted preference as given. It treated the business firm in the same way, focusing on how firms make market choices, but saying little about their internal workings.

“Institutionalism” historically refers to a group of economists who wrote mainly in the 1920s and 1930s. Their place in economic theory is outside the mainstream, but they have found new ...


Firms As Social Actors, Richard Adelstein Jan 2010

Firms As Social Actors, Richard Adelstein

Division II Faculty Publications

A close look at what firms are and how they act.


Organizations And Economics, Richard Adelstein Jan 2010

Organizations And Economics, Richard Adelstein

Division II Faculty Publications

A contribution to a symposium on a paper by Richard Posner.


Firms As Social Actors, Richard Adelstein Dec 2009

Firms As Social Actors, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A close look at what firms are and how they act.


Organizations And Economics, Richard Adelstein Dec 2009

Organizations And Economics, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A contribution to a symposium on a paper by Richard Posner.


¿En Qué Momento Se Jodió El Sur? Crecimiento Económico, Derechos De Propiedad Y Regulación Del Crédito En Las Colonias Británicas Y Españolas En América, Enrique Pasquel Dec 2009

¿En Qué Momento Se Jodió El Sur? Crecimiento Económico, Derechos De Propiedad Y Regulación Del Crédito En Las Colonias Británicas Y Españolas En América, Enrique Pasquel

Enrique Pasquel

Las instituciones legales de las colonias británicas y españolas pueden ayudar a explicar los distintos niveles de desarrollo económico en esas regiones. Este artículo se centra en el marco legal de los derechos de propiedad y el mercado del crédito en la época colonial, analizando las políticas de asignación de tierras, el establecimiento de registros, los programas de titulación, las cargas sobre la tierra y las restricciones al crédito.


The Coase Theorem And Arthur Cecil Pigou, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Dec 2008

The Coase Theorem And Arthur Cecil Pigou, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In "The Problem of Social Cost" Ronald Coase was highly critical of the work of Cambridge University Economics Professor Arthur Cecil Pigou, presenting him as a radical government interventionist. In later work Coase's critique of Pigou became even more strident. In fact, however, Pigou's Economics of Welfare created the basic model and many of the tools that Coase's later work employed. Much of what we today characterize as the "Coase Theorem," including the relevance of transaction costs, externalities, and bilateral monopoly, was either stated or anticipated in Pigou's work. Further, Coase's extreme faith in private ...


Economics Of Plea Bargaining, Richard Adelstein Jan 2007

Economics Of Plea Bargaining, Richard Adelstein

Division II Faculty Publications

A short summary of earlier work for a sociological audience.


Economics Of Plea Bargaining, Richard Adelstein Dec 2006

Economics Of Plea Bargaining, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A short summary of earlier work for a sociological audience.


An Economic Model Of Fair Use (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein Jan 2006

An Economic Model Of Fair Use (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein

Division II Faculty Publications

A formal model of the law of fair use.


An Economic Model Of Fair Use (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein Dec 2005

An Economic Model Of Fair Use (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A formal model of the law of fair use.


Knowledge And Power In The Mechanical Firm: Planning For Profit In Austrian Perspective, Richard Adelstein Jan 2005

Knowledge And Power In The Mechanical Firm: Planning For Profit In Austrian Perspective, Richard Adelstein

Division II Faculty Publications

A theory of central planning employing Austrian themes and applied to private firms and Taylorism.


Knowledge And Power In The Mechanical Firm: Planning For Profit In Austrian Perspective, Richard Adelstein Dec 2004

Knowledge And Power In The Mechanical Firm: Planning For Profit In Austrian Perspective, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A theory of central planning employing Austrian themes and applied to private firms and Taylorism.


Equity And Efficiency In Markets For Ideas, Richard Adelstein Jan 2002

Equity And Efficiency In Markets For Ideas, Richard Adelstein

Division II Faculty Publications

Intellectual property and patent protection in light of the AIDS crisis in Africa.


Equity And Efficiency In Markets For Ideas, Richard Adelstein Dec 2001

Equity And Efficiency In Markets For Ideas, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

Intellectual property and patent protection in light of the AIDS crisis in Africa.


Toward A Comparative Economics Of Plea Bargaining (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein Jan 2001

Toward A Comparative Economics Of Plea Bargaining (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein

Division II Faculty Publications

A comparison of adversarial and inquisitorial approaches to criminal adjudication and its implications for plea bargaining.


Toward A Comparative Economics Of Plea Bargaining (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein Dec 2000

Toward A Comparative Economics Of Plea Bargaining (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A comparison of adversarial and inquisitorial approaches to criminal adjudication and its implications for plea bargaining.


Victims As Cost Bearers, Richard Adelstein Jan 1999

Victims As Cost Bearers, Richard Adelstein

Division II Faculty Publications

A brief recasting of the price exaction model.


Victims As Cost Bearers, Richard Adelstein Dec 1998

Victims As Cost Bearers, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A brief recasting of the price exaction model.


Four Entries, Richard Adelstein Jan 1998

Four Entries, Richard Adelstein

Division II Faculty Publications

Four entries: "American Institutional Economics and the Legal System" (I: 61-66); "John Rogers Commons" (I: 324-327); Richard Theodore Ely" (II: 28-29); and "Plea Bargaining: A Comparative Approach"


Four Entries, Richard Adelstein Dec 1997

Four Entries, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

Four entries: "American Institutional Economics and the Legal System" (I: 61-66); "John Rogers Commons" (I: 324-327); Richard Theodore Ely" (II: 28-29); and "Plea Bargaining: A Comparative Approach"


Relativism, Reflective Equilibrium, And Justice, Justin Schwartz Jan 1997

Relativism, Reflective Equilibrium, And Justice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

THIS PAPER IS THE CO-WINNER OF THE FRED BERGER PRIZE IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW FOR THE 1999 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE BEST PUBLISHED PAPER IN THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS.

The conflict between liberal legal theory and critical legal studies (CLS) is often framed as a matter of whether there is a theory of justice that the law should embody which all rational people could or must accept. In a divided society, the CLS critique of this view is overwhelming: there is no such justice that can command universal assent. But the liberal critique of CLS, that it degenerates into ...


What's Wrong With Exploitation?, Justin Schwartz Jan 1995

What's Wrong With Exploitation?, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

Abstract: Marx thinks that capitalism is exploitative, and that is a major basis for his objections to it. But what's wrong with exploitation, as Marx sees it? (The paper is exegetical in character: my object is to understand what Marx believed,) The received view, held by Norman Geras, G.A. Cohen, and others, is that Marx thought that capitalism was unjust, because in the crudest sense, capitalists robbed labor of property that was rightfully the workers' because the workers and not the capitalists produced it. This view depends on a Labor Theory of Property (LTP), that property rights are ...


The Paradox Of Ideology, Justin Schwartz Jan 1993

The Paradox Of Ideology, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

A standard problem with the objectivity of social scientific theory in particular is that it is either self-referential, in which case it seems to undermine itself as ideology, or self-excepting, which seem pragmatically self-refuting. Using the example of Marx and his theory of ideology, I show how self-referential theories that include themselves in their scope of explanation can be objective. Ideology may be roughly defined as belief distorted by class interest. I show how Marx thought that natural science was informed by class interest but not therefore necessarily ideology. Capitalists have an interest in understanding the natural world (to a ...


Deciding For Bigness, Richard Adelstein Jan 1991

Deciding For Bigness, Richard Adelstein

Division II Faculty Publications

Antitrust as a constitutional constraint on the growth of firms.