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Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Economic History

A History Of Financial Regulation In The Usa From The Beginning Until Today: 1789 To 2011, Gary Richardson Dec 2013

A History Of Financial Regulation In The Usa From The Beginning Until Today: 1789 To 2011, Gary Richardson

Gary Richardson

No abstract provided.


Intensified Regulatory Scrutiny And Bank Distress In New York City During The Great Depression,” With Patrick Van Horn, Gary Richardson May 2009

Intensified Regulatory Scrutiny And Bank Distress In New York City During The Great Depression,” With Patrick Van Horn, Gary Richardson

Gary Richardson

Bank distress peaked in New York City, at the center of the United States money market, in July and August 1931, when the banking crisis peaked in Germany and before Britain abandoned the gold standard. This article tests competing theories about the causes of New York’s banking crisis. The cause appears to have been intensified regulatory scrutiny, which was a delayed reaction to the failure of the Bank of United States, rather than the exposure of money center banks to events overseas.


Quarterly Data On The Categories And Causes Of Bank Distress During The Great Depression, Gary Richardson Dec 2007

Quarterly Data On The Categories And Causes Of Bank Distress During The Great Depression, Gary Richardson

Gary Richardson

No abstract provided.


Distress During The Great Depression: The Illiquidity-Insolvency Debate Revisited, Gary Richardson Sep 2007

Distress During The Great Depression: The Illiquidity-Insolvency Debate Revisited, Gary Richardson

Gary Richardson

During the contraction from 1929 to 1933, the Federal Reserve System tracked changes in the status of all banks operating in the United States and determined the cause of each bank suspension. This essay analyzes chronological patterns in aggregate series constructed from that data. The analysis demonstrates both illiquidity and insolvency were substantial sources of bank distress. Periods of heightened distress were correlated with periods of increased illiquidity. Contagion via correspondent networks and bank runs propagated the initial banking panics. As the depression deepened and asset values declined, insolvency loomed as the principal threat to depository institutions.


Deposit Insurance And Moral Hazard: Capital, Risk, Malfeasance, And Mismanagement. A Comment On ‘Deposit Insurance And Moral Hazard: Evidence From Texas Banking During The 1920s, Gary Richardson Aug 2007

Deposit Insurance And Moral Hazard: Capital, Risk, Malfeasance, And Mismanagement. A Comment On ‘Deposit Insurance And Moral Hazard: Evidence From Texas Banking During The 1920s, Gary Richardson

Gary Richardson

A Journal of Economic History article by Linda Hooks and Kenneth Robinson, “Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Texas Banking During the 1920s,” contains a contradiction (Hooks and Robinson 2002). Pondering the contradiction in the paper reveals insights that the authors may have overlooked. Hooks and Robinson’s article examines the experience of the banking industry in Texas during the 1920s. Texas operated a deposit-insurance system from January 1, 1910 until February 11, 1927. Deposit insurance was mandatory for all state banks, which were given the choice of two plans in which to participate. The preponderance participated in the ...


Check Is In The Mail: Correspondent Clearing And The Banking Panics Of The Great Depression, Gary Richardson Aug 2007

Check Is In The Mail: Correspondent Clearing And The Banking Panics Of The Great Depression, Gary Richardson

Gary Richardson

Weaknesses within the check-clearing system played a hitherto unrecognized role in the banking crises of the Great Depression. Correspondent check-clearing networks were vulnerable to counter-party cascades. Accounting conventions that overstated reserves available to corresponding institutions may have exacerbated the situation. The initial banking panic began when a correspondent network centered in Nashville collapsed, forcing over 100 institutions to suspend operations. As the contraction continued, additional correspondent systems imploded. The vulnerability of correspondent networks is one reason that banks that cleared via correspondents failed at higher rates than other institutions during the Great Depression.