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Articles 1 - 20 of 20

Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics

Report On Key Design Elements Of Auctions Under Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Peter Cramton Oct 2008

Report On Key Design Elements Of Auctions Under Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Innovation And Market Design, Peter Cramton Jan 2008

Innovation And Market Design, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Market design plays an essential role in promoting innovation. I examine emission allowance auctions, airport slot auctions, spectrum auctions, and electricity markets, and demonstrate how the market design can encourage innovation. Improved pricing information is one source of innovation. Enhancing competition is another driver of innovation seen in all of the applications. Market design fosters innovation in other ways as well by addressing other potential market failures.


An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg Dec 2007

An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Comments On The Rggi Market Design, Peter Cramton Nov 2007

Comments On The Rggi Market Design, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Possible Design For A Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, Peter Cramton Aug 2007

Possible Design For A Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg Jan 2006

Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg

Peter Cramton

A comprehensive book on combinatorial auctions―auctions in which bidders can bid on packages of items. The book consists of original material intended for researchers, students, and practitioners of auction design. It includes a foreword by Vernon Smith, an introduction to combinatorial auctions, and twenty-three cross-referenced chapters in five parts. Part I covers mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction and the ascending proxy auction. Part II is on bidding and efficiency issues. Part III examines computational issues and algorithmic considerations, especially the winner determination problem―how to identify the (tentative) winning set of bids that maximizes revenue. Part IV discusses ...


Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey Dec 2005

Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Comments On Doc Notice Of Preliminary Results Of Countervailing Duty Review, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey Jul 2005

Comments On Doc Notice Of Preliminary Results Of Countervailing Duty Review, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey Feb 2004

Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Upset Pricing In Auction Markets: An Overview, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Mar 2003

Upset Pricing In Auction Markets: An Overview, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


An Analysis Of Auction Volume And Market Competition For The Coastal Forest Regions In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Sep 2002

An Analysis Of Auction Volume And Market Competition For The Coastal Forest Regions In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Reserve Prices, Stumpage Fees, And Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Sep 2002

Reserve Prices, Stumpage Fees, And Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Setting The Upset Price In British Columbia Timber Auctions, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Sep 2002

Setting The Upset Price In British Columbia Timber Auctions, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Auctioning Timber To Maximize Revenues In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Jun 2002

Auctioning Timber To Maximize Revenues In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


A Comparison Of Equation-Based And Parity Pricing Of Stumpage Fees For British Columbia Timber Under Long-Term Tenures, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Apr 2002

A Comparison Of Equation-Based And Parity Pricing Of Stumpage Fees For British Columbia Timber Under Long-Term Tenures, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Testing For Anti-Competitive Bidding In Auction Markets, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Mar 2002

Testing For Anti-Competitive Bidding In Auction Markets, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Auction-Based Timber Pricing And Complementary Market Reforms In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Mar 2002

Auction-Based Timber Pricing And Complementary Market Reforms In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How And Why To Auction Not Grandfather, Peter Cramton, Suzi Kerr Jan 2002

Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How And Why To Auction Not Grandfather, Peter Cramton, Suzi Kerr

Peter Cramton

An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve carbon caps set by international negotiation to limit global climate change. To minimize administrative costs, permits would be required at the level of oil refineries, natural gas pipe lines, liquid sellers, and coal processing plants. To maximize liquidity in secondary markets, permits would be fully tradable and bankable. The government would conduct quarterly auctions. A standard ascending-clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery. An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving polluters permits in proportion to past pollution ...


A Review Of Markets For Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, Peter Cramton Sep 2000

A Review Of Markets For Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


The Distributional Effects Of Carbon Regulation, Peter Cramton, Suzi Kerr Jan 1999

The Distributional Effects Of Carbon Regulation, Peter Cramton, Suzi Kerr

Peter Cramton

We examine the distributional effects of carbon regulation. An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve carbon caps set by international negotiation to limit global climate change. An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving polluters permits in proportion to past pollution), because it allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexibility in distribution of costs, provides greater incentives for innovation, and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents.