Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Behavioral Economics Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 26 of 26

Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics

Estimating Auction Equilibria Using Individual Evolutionary Learning, Kevin James May 2019

Estimating Auction Equilibria Using Individual Evolutionary Learning, Kevin James

Computational and Data Sciences (Ph.D.) Dissertations

I develop the Generalized Evolutionary Nash Equilibrium Estimator (GENEE) library. The tool is designed to provide a generic computational library for running genetic algorithms and individual evolutionary learning in economic decision-making environments. Most importantly, I have adapted the library to estimate equilibria bidding functions in auctions. I show it produces highly accurate estimates across a large class of auction environments with known solutions. I then apply GENEE to estimate the equilibria of two additional auctions with no known solutions: first-price sealed-bid common value auctions with multiple signals, and simultaneous first-price auctions with subadditive values


Centrality And Cooperation In Networks, Boris Van Leeuwen, Abhijit Ramalingam, David Rojo Arjona, Arthur Schram Sep 2018

Centrality And Cooperation In Networks, Boris Van Leeuwen, Abhijit Ramalingam, David Rojo Arjona, Arthur Schram

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, teams with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.


Preference Conformism: An Experiment, Enrique Fatas, Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap, David Rojo Arjona Mar 2018

Preference Conformism: An Experiment, Enrique Fatas, Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap, David Rojo Arjona

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

This paper reports on an experiment designed to test whether people’s preferences change to become more alike. Such preference conformism would be worrying for an economics that takes individual preferences as given (‘de gustibus es non disputandum’). So the test is important. But it is also difficult. People can behave alike for many reasons and the key to the design of our test, therefore, is the control of the other possible reasons for observing apparent peer effects. We find evidence of preference conformism in the aggregate and at the individual level (where there is heterogeneity). It appears also to ...


Coordination When There Are Restricted And Unrestricted Options, Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap, David Rojo Arjona, Robert Sugden Feb 2017

Coordination When There Are Restricted And Unrestricted Options, Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap, David Rojo Arjona, Robert Sugden

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

One might expect that, in pure coordination games, coordination would become less frequent as the number of options increases. Contrary to this expectation, we report an experiment which found more frequent coordination when the option set was unrestricted than when it was restricted. To try to explain this result, we develop a method for eliciting the general rules that subjects use to identify salient options in restricted and unrestricted sets. We find that each such rule, if used by all subjects, would generate greater coordination in restricted sets. However, subjects tend to apply different rules to restricted and unrestricted sets.


Who Reacts To Income Tax Rate Changes? The Relationship Between Income Taxes And The Motivation To Work: The Case Of Azerbaijan, Orkhan Nadirov, Bruce Dehning, Khatai Aliyev, Minura Iskandarova Jan 2017

Who Reacts To Income Tax Rate Changes? The Relationship Between Income Taxes And The Motivation To Work: The Case Of Azerbaijan, Orkhan Nadirov, Bruce Dehning, Khatai Aliyev, Minura Iskandarova

Accounting Faculty Articles and Research

This research investigates the effects of income taxation on the motivation to work by employing a survey method for the Azerbaijan population. The two research questions of interest are, if subjects consider income taxes when deciding how many hours to work and how subjects would react to a hypothetical 5% income tax rate increase. Also examined are the responses to these questions between subjects with different socio-economic characteristics. Examining cross-sectional data of 326 respondents reveals that income taxes do not influence Azerbaijan labour market participants’ motivation to work, regardless of their socio-economic characteristics. Empirical results indicate that reactions to hypothetical ...


Are Subjects Making Financial Decisions In Lab Auctions Or Are They Just Gambling?, Cary Deck, Jungmin Lee, Javier Reyes Jan 2015

Are Subjects Making Financial Decisions In Lab Auctions Or Are They Just Gambling?, Cary Deck, Jungmin Lee, Javier Reyes

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Optimal bidding strategies in first-price and Dutch auctions are theoretically isomorphic but depend on bidder risk attitudes. However, laboratory experiments consistently find different behaviour between auction formats. This article explores whether the notion in psychology that financial and gambling risks are viewed differently can explain the discrepancy. Ultimately, the evidence does not support this hypothesis, but a bidder's propensity to gamble is associated with how much risk he takes in both auctions whereas his propensity to take financial risks is not. The results suggest that subjects may view themselves as gambling in laboratory auctions rather than making financial decisions.


How Portable Is Level-0 Behavior? A Test Of Level-K Theory In Games With Non-Neutral Frames, Shaun Hargreaves Heap, David Rojo Arjona, Robert Sugden Jun 2014

How Portable Is Level-0 Behavior? A Test Of Level-K Theory In Games With Non-Neutral Frames, Shaun Hargreaves Heap, David Rojo Arjona, Robert Sugden

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We test the portability of level‐0 assumptions in level‐k theory in an experimental investigation of behavior in Coordination, Discoordination, and Hide and Seek games with common, non‐neutral frames. Assuming that level‐0 behavior depends only on the frame, we derive hypotheses that are independent of prior assumptions about salience. Those hypotheses are not confirmed. Our findings contrast with previous research which has fitted parameterized level‐k models to Hide and Seek data. We show that, as a criterion of successful explanation, the existence of a plausible model that replicates the main patterns in these data has a ...


Differential Responding By Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca Mulatta) And Humans (Homo Sapiens) To Variable Outcomes In The Assurance Game, Audrey E. Parrish, Sarah F. Brosnan, Bart J. Wilson, Michael J. Beran Jan 2014

Differential Responding By Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca Mulatta) And Humans (Homo Sapiens) To Variable Outcomes In The Assurance Game, Audrey E. Parrish, Sarah F. Brosnan, Bart J. Wilson, Michael J. Beran

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Behavioral flexibility in how one responds to variable partner play can be examined using economic coordination games in which subjects play against a variety of partners and therefore may need to alter their behavior to produce the highest payoff. But how do we study this behavioral flexibility once players have settled on a response? Here, we investigated how responding by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens) playing a computerized single-player version of a coordination game, the Assurance game, changed as a function of the variable responses (Stag/Hare) generated by multiple simulations (SIMs). We were interested in whether ...


Uniqueness Of Equilibrium In Directed Search Models, Jaehong Kim, Gabriele Camera Jan 2014

Uniqueness Of Equilibrium In Directed Search Models, Jaehong Kim, Gabriele Camera

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study a decentralized trading model as in [7], where a finite number of heterogeneous capacity-constrained sellers compete for a finite number of homogeneous buyers, by posting prices. This "directed search" model is known to admit symmetric equilibria; yet, uniqueness has proved elusive. This study makes two contributions: a substantive contribution is to establish uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium; a methodological contribution is to develop a tool based on directional derivatives to characterize equilibrium.


Strategies Of Cooperation And Punishment Among Students And Clerical Workers, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari Oct 2013

Strategies Of Cooperation And Punishment Among Students And Clerical Workers, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when ...


The Status Costs Of Subordinate Cultural Capital: At-Home Fathers' Collective Pursuit Of Cultural Legitimacy Through Capitalizing Consumption Practices, Gokcen Coskuner-Balli, Craig J. Thompson Jun 2013

The Status Costs Of Subordinate Cultural Capital: At-Home Fathers' Collective Pursuit Of Cultural Legitimacy Through Capitalizing Consumption Practices, Gokcen Coskuner-Balli, Craig J. Thompson

Business Faculty Articles and Research

Consumer researchers have primarily conceptualized cultural capital either as an endowed stock of resources that tend to reproduce socioeconomic hierarchies among consumer collectivities or as constellations of knowledge and skill that consumers acquire by making identity investments in a given consumption field. These studies, however, have given scant attention to the theoretical distinction between dominant and subordinate forms of cultural capital, with the latter affording comparatively lower conversion rates for economic, social, and symbolic capital. To redress this oversight, this article presents a multimethod investigation of middle-class men who are performing the emergent gender role of at-home fatherhood. Our analysis ...


Go West Young Man: Self-Selection And Endogenous Property Rights, Taylor Jaworski, Bart J. Wilson Apr 2013

Go West Young Man: Self-Selection And Endogenous Property Rights, Taylor Jaworski, Bart J. Wilson

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

If, as Hume argues, property is a self-referring custom of a group of people, then property rights depend on how that group forms and orders itself. In this article we investigate how people construct a convention for property in an experiment in which groups of self-selected individuals can migrate between three geographically separate regions. To test a hypothesis of Demsetz's, we vary across two treatments the external benefits of migrating. We find that self-selection has a powerful effect on establishing conventions of property and begetting increases in wealth through exchange and specialization. We also find support for the Demsetz ...


Binding Promises And Cooperation Among Strangers, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni Mar 2013

Binding Promises And Cooperation Among Strangers, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.


Experimental Markets With Frictions, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni Jan 2013

Experimental Markets With Frictions, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Decentralized and impersonal exchange is fundamental to contemporary economies, where many interactions take place among individuals with low levels of information about their counterpart. We review the experimental literature about markets with frictions, where strangers interact in pairs formed at random in economies of indefinite duration. We focus on the impact of communication on the efficiency of the outcome and report results of a new experiment.


Cooperative Strategies In Anonymous Economies: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni Jan 2012

Cooperative Strategies In Anonymous Economies: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study cooperation in economies of indefinite duration. Participants faced a sequence of prisoner’s dilemmas with anonymous opponents. We identify and characterize the strategies employed at the individual level. We report that (i) grim trigger does not describe well individual play and there is wide heterogeneity in strategies; (ii) systematic defection does not crowd-out systematic cooperation; (iii) coordination on cooperative strategies does not improve with experience. We discuss alternative methodologies and implications for theory.


Did I Do That? Group Positioning And Asymmetry In Attributional Bias, Brian Gunia, Brice Corgnet Jan 2010

Did I Do That? Group Positioning And Asymmetry In Attributional Bias, Brian Gunia, Brice Corgnet

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

A laboratory experiment examined whether one structural feature of groups—members’ physical positioning—may produce asymmetry in their perceived contribution to a task. In particular, we investigated asymmetry in group members’ (often excessive) claims of credit for collective tasks ("the self-serving attributional bias"). Consistent with the availability account of this bias, group members located in the middle of a group, with easy visual access to their partners’ contributions, demonstrated less bias than outside members (who demonstrated bias consistent with prior research)—but no less satisfaction. Further analyses suggested that these results reflected bias reduction among middle members and did stem ...


Multi-Player Bargaining With Endogenous Capacity, Gabriele Camera, Cemil Selcuk Jan 2010

Multi-Player Bargaining With Endogenous Capacity, Gabriele Camera, Cemil Selcuk

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study equilibrium prices and trade volume in a market with several identical buyers and a seller who commits to an inventory and then offers goods sequentially. Prices are determined by a strategic costly bargaining process with a random sequence of proponents. A unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists, characterized by no costly delays and heterogeneous sale prices. In equilibrium constraining capacity is a bargaining tactic the seller uses to improve a weak bargaining position. With capacity constraints, sale prices approach the outcome of an auction as bargaining costs vanish. The framework provides a building block for price formation in models ...


Team Formation And Self‐Serving Biases, Brice Corgnet Jan 2010

Team Formation And Self‐Serving Biases, Brice Corgnet

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

There is extensive evidence which indicates that people learn positively about themselves. We build on this finding to develop a model of team formation. We show that under complete information learning positively about oneself prevents efficient team formation. Agents becoming overconfident tend to ask for an excessive share of the group outcome. Positive learning generates divergence in workers' beliefs and hampers efficient team formation. Interestingly, in a context of incomplete information regarding the partner's ability, extensive learning biases may reduce the divergence in agents' beliefs and facilitate efficient team formation as a result. We apply our model to coauthorship ...


Justice And Fairness In The Dictator Game, Karl Schurter, Bart J. Wilson Jul 2009

Justice And Fairness In The Dictator Game, Karl Schurter, Bart J. Wilson

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

This article uses a laboratory experiment to examine the question of whether justice and fairness are different motivational forces in the dictator game. "Justice" and "fairness" are often used interchangeably because their meanings and usages are so closely linked, despite their distinct connotations. Using four different treatments, our experimental design investigates the subtle differences between the two social concepts to explicate generosity in the dictator game. The results indicate that justice, not fairness, legitimizes property rights in the dictator game.


Cooperation Among Strangers Under The Shadow Of The Future, Gabriele Camera, M. Casari Jan 2009

Cooperation Among Strangers Under The Shadow Of The Future, Gabriele Camera, M. Casari

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study the emergence of norms of cooperation in experimental economies populated by strangers interacting indefinitely. Can these economies achieve full efficiency even without formal enforcement institutions? Which institutions for monitoring and enforcement facilitate cooperation? Finally, what classes of strategies do subjects employ? We find that, first, cooperation can be sustained even in anonymous settings; second, some type of monitoring and punishment institutions significantly promote cooperation; and, third, subjects mostly employ strategies that are selective in punishment.


Contagion Equilibria In A Monetary Model, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello Jan 2007

Contagion Equilibria In A Monetary Model, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

This article explores the Monetary Models.


Oxytocin Increases Generosity In Humans, Paul J. Zak, Angela Stanton, Sheila Ahmadi Jan 2007

Oxytocin Increases Generosity In Humans, Paul J. Zak, Angela Stanton, Sheila Ahmadi

Business Faculty Articles and Research

Human beings routinely help strangers at costs to themselves. Sometimes the help offered is generous-offering more than the other expects. The proximate mechanisms supporting generosity are not well-understood, but several lines of research suggest a role for empathy. In this study, participants were infused with 40 IU oxytocin (OT) or placebo and engaged in a blinded, one-shot decision on how to split a sum of money with a stranger that could be rejected. Those on OT were 80% more generous than those given a placebo. OT had no effect on a unilateral monetary transfer task dissociating generosity from altruism. OT ...


Currency Competition In A Fundamental Model Of Money, Gabriele Camera, Ben Craig, Christopher Waller Jan 2004

Currency Competition In A Fundamental Model Of Money, Gabriele Camera, Ben Craig, Christopher Waller

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study how two fiat monies, one safe and one risky, compete in a decentralized trading environment. The currencies' equilibrium values, their transaction velocities and agents' spending patterns are endogenously determined. We derive conditions under which agents holding diversified currency portfolios spend the safe currency first and hold the risky one for later purchases. We also examine when the reverse spending pattern is optimal. Traders generally favor dealing in the safe currency, unless trade frictions and the currency risk is low. As risk increases or trading becomes more difficult, the transaction velocity and value of the safe money increases.


Jack Of All Trades Or Master Of One? Specialization, Trade And Money, Gabriele Camera, Robert R. Reed, Christopher Waller Jan 2003

Jack Of All Trades Or Master Of One? Specialization, Trade And Money, Gabriele Camera, Robert R. Reed, Christopher Waller

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We consider a model of decentralized exchange where individuals choose the set of goods they produce. Specialization involves producing a smaller set of goods and doing it more proÞciently. In doing so, agents reduce production costs, but also reduce the ease of trading their output. We derive the equilibrium degree of specialization and examine how it is affected by underlying fundamentals. Due to the existence of a hold-up problem, individuals specialize too little relative to the social optimum. Introducing money leads to more specialization relative to barter and increases welfare.


Money And Price Dispersion, Gabriele Camera, Dean Corbae Jan 1999

Money And Price Dispersion, Gabriele Camera, Dean Corbae

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We relax restrictions on the storage technology in a prototypical monetary search model to study price dispersion. When multiple units of currency can be stored, buyers and sellers enter matches with potentially different willingness to buy or sell. Across the distribution of possible bilateral matches, prices will generally differ even though agents have identical preferences and technologies. We provide existence conditions for a particularly simple equilibrium pattern of exchange and prices. We prove that in the limiting case where search frictions are eliminated, equilibrium prices are uniform. We also prove that a higher initial money stock raises the average price ...


Futures Contracting And Dividend Uncertainty In Experimental Asset Markets, David P. Porter, Vernon L. Smith Jan 1995

Futures Contracting And Dividend Uncertainty In Experimental Asset Markets, David P. Porter, Vernon L. Smith

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Prices in experimental asset markets tend to bubble and then crash to dividend value at the end of the asset's useful life. Explanations for this phenomenon are (1) that participants cannot form reliable future price expectations or (2) dividend risk aversion. We report the results of experiments to test these hypotheses. In one experimental series, a futures market is introduced so that participants can obtain information on future share prices. In another series of experiments, the per-period dividend is known with certainty. The futures market treatment had little effect on the character of bubble. The certain dividend treatment had ...