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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

2009

Business

Market Design

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Prediction Markets To Forecast Electricity Demand, Peter Cramton, Luciano De Castro Mar 2010

Prediction Markets To Forecast Electricity Demand, Peter Cramton, Luciano De Castro

Luciano I. de Castro

Forecasting electricity demand for future years is an essential step in resource planning. A common approach is for the system operator to predict future demand from the estimates of individual distribution companies. However, the predictions thus obtained may be of poor quality, since the reporting incentives are unclear. We propose a prediction market as a form of forecasting future demand for electricity. We describe how to implement a simple prediction market for continuous variables, using only contracts based on binary variables. We also discuss specific issues concerning the implementation of such a market.


A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton Mar 2009

A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

On Monday, 23 March 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner presented the Public-Private Investment Program as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis (www.financialstability.gov). The Treasury’s description still leaves many issues unanswered. We flesh out the auction design for legacy loans. A two-sided auction is required. Both banks and private investors must compete in a transparent and competitive process.


Foreword To Ross Baldick's 'Single Clearing Price In Electricity Markets', Peter Cramton Jan 2009

Foreword To Ross Baldick's 'Single Clearing Price In Electricity Markets', Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Argues that consumers and suppliers are better off with the clearing-price auction in electricity markets.


How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton Jan 2009

How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

I study the design of auctions of natural resources, such as oil or mineral rights. A good auction design promotes both an efficient assignment of rights and competitive revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition are key factors in determining the best design. With weak competition and additive values, a simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auction may suffice. With more complex value structures, a dynamic auction with package bids, such as the clock-proxy auction, likely is needed to promote the efficiency and revenue objectives. Bidding on production shares, rather than bonuses, typically increases government take ...


Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton Jan 2009

Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction. Then I present the package clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the weaknesses, of the simultaneous ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements of the package clock auction: the pricing rule and the activity rule. Along the way, I summarize both experimental and field results with the package clock auction.