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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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1997

Public Policy

Bosnia Herzegovina

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Articles 1 - 18 of 18

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Ddasaccident220, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Dec 1997

Ddasaccident220, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

The investigators concluded that the accident was "preventable". The mine should have been found during excavation but the appropriate SOPs were not being used. Supervision was inadequate and the control of movement in cleared areas was not in accordance with SOPs.


Ddasaccident221, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Nov 1997

Ddasaccident221, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

The investigators decided that Victim No.1 probably believed the area was safe because it had been checked by the dog. They were "unable to draw any meaningful conclusions about the dog's performance on that day". They felt that Victim No.1 was "not sufficiently systematic" in his detector search.


Ddasaccident222, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Oct 1997

Ddasaccident222, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

The investigators concluded that the demining group had insufficient "lead-time" to properly plan the task, that the base-line was not marked and marking of cleared areas was inadequate and that the mine was below the depth that prodding and excavation would normally find it.


Ddasaccident223, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Oct 1997

Ddasaccident223, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

The investigators found no fault with the company's SOPs but said that "insufficient planning and lead-time was allowed for the clearance team to be prepared…". They thought that the "contractual pressure created an atmosphere of unnecessary urgency", that communications between the demining company and the [QA] were inadequate and that the parties involved were all interpreting the contract differently.


Ddasaccident224, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Sep 1997

Ddasaccident224, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

The team were finishing their shift for the day and the victim was asked to mark the edge of the area that had been surveyed that day. As he walked to that point he trod on an undetected PMA-3. The victim was later told that the mine had been laid too deep for the detectors to locate. The victim was wearing military boots, leggings, a frag-jacket, and a helmet & visor.


Ddasaccident237, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Sep 1997

Ddasaccident237, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

The document stated that the victim had been recently trained by the group he was working with. He was working in an area known to contain PMA-1 and PMA-3 mines. He was not wearing a helmet and visor and was prodding for mines. He was prodding with "a vertical stabbing motion" when he detonated a PMA-3.


Ddasaccident225, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Sep 1997

Ddasaccident225, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

At 12:40 the two victims were at an appropriate place to site a spur, so the Team Leader instructed them to start a lane off to the left. The deminers changed roles, exchanging leggings and marking tape when they did so [only one set of leggings was issued per pair of deminers]. As Victim No.2 was withdrawing his partner asked him to pass the machete. He returned and did so, then walked away again. He was about five metres away when the mine detonated.


Ddasaccident226, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Aug 1997

Ddasaccident226, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

A local farmer had reported a UXO to the police. The team located the farmer, then parked their vehicle 50m from the accident site and walked with the farmer towards the suspected UXO. The farmer entered the field with Victim No.1 following. The farmer indicated the rough direction of the device and Victim No.2 moved up behind him. All three began to search, all within 1.5 metres of each other. The medic returned to the vehicle to be near to the medical kit. "Statements indicate that at the moment of detonation Victim No.1 bent over slightly ...


Ddasaccident234, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Aug 1997

Ddasaccident234, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

The Team Commander knew that there were mines present. "After thorough checking [he] had ordered the removal of 15cm of topsoil, followed by a second 15cm. The mine was still 15cm below the surface. This was too deep for the detector to pick it up and too deep for the prodder to reveal its presence… the ground compacted under his weight and set off the mine."


Ddasaccident236, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Jul 1997

Ddasaccident236, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

The document stated that the victim was called to confirm the presence of a mine by one of his colleagues. He turned to comply, and as he did so his foot slipped "on a piece of wood" and he fell over. As he got up "he put his foot outside the cleared lane and detonated a PMA-3 which was buried and not visible".


Ddasaccident235, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Jul 1997

Ddasaccident235, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

The document stated that the deminers were working on a bare and stony slope. They were "familiar with the ground" and the minefield record. The victim stood at the edge of the mined area, stepped into it and saw a GORADZE mine. He asked a deminer behind him (the report records that the second man was "unprotected") to confirm the identification and moved forward. As he did so he stepped on a mine that he had not seen. As he fell backwards he detonated a second mine that he had failed to detect.


Ddasaccident227, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Jul 1997

Ddasaccident227, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

The victim [who was wearing protective equipment including leggings] took over clearance at the new end-of-lane and had cleared about five metres when he stepped on a mine that may have been "concealed below a small rock". The Team Leader was close to the victim. Three other deminers hurried along the lane to his assistance and they carried the victim to the Control Point where the medic attended him. The victim suffered "bruising and flesh injuries to his lower leg and fractures to his left foot". He was not expected to require amputation. It took "approximately 15 minutes" to reach ...


Ddasaccident228, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Jul 1997

Ddasaccident228, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

Prior to the accident the Team Leader had "used a machete to clear foliage and to inspect uncleared ground" in the accident lane. He did not use a detector or prodder. He advanced ten metres in this way, then handed over to the victim. The ten metres were counted as "cleared". The Team Leader was reported to have "used this system on other occasions to encourage deminers to clear areas faster". He was not wearing any protective equipment. During this time he missed what the report states was a "PMA" [I infer a PMA-3]. The deminers returned to work and ...


Ddasaccident231, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Jun 1997

Ddasaccident231, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

The document stated that the team was active demining in an area with a "mixture" of AP mines including improvised MRUD directional fragmentation mines. A deminer was defusing a MRUD and working directly in front of it. A second deminer was walking towards him to help and a third was observing "from about 10 metres away, also in direct line-of-sight". "The mine detonated killing the two…closest to it and severely wounding the third."


Ddasaccident230, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Jun 1997

Ddasaccident230, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

The document stated that two teams were due to begin demining in adjacent mined areas at Grid reference CQ 088 850. The team commanders held records of the mined area and had a discussion about the accuracy of those records. One of them said the records were inaccurate but that he knew where the mines were. He led two of his men to show them where the mines were. At 10:45 one of the three men surveying the area activated a PROM-1.


Ddasaccident232, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database May 1997

Ddasaccident232, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

The document states that the demining team were working in a gulley in a wooded area. "They had used prodders to prove the ground from which they were lifting mines. They also used detectors to sweep the area to 15m beyond the area which had been prodded". A member of the demining team who had been involved in laying the mines during the war "walked into the area which had been swept by detectors and detonated a PMA-3".


Ddasaccident233, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Apr 1997

Ddasaccident233, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

The document stated that the demining group were working in a wooded area known to be mined. The SFOR monitors offered to lend the group protective equipment but they declined the offer. They did accept the offer of prodders. While prodding a deminer detonated a PMA-3.


Ddasaccident229, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database Mar 1997

Ddasaccident229, Humanitarian Demining Accident And Incident Database

Global CWD Repository

The team decided that the work had moved away from the direction of the path, so work would start three metres behind the end of the lane and go in a slightly different direction. This was in the area that had been probed, not checked by a dog. The deminers walked to the new start point, then began to return to the change-over point. Victim No.1 was behind Victim No.2 when he stepped on a PMA-2. He suffered a "traumatic amputation" below his right knee. Victim No.2 had "less serious" injuries.