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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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SelectedWorks

Market Design

2004

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Vickrey Auctions With Reserve Pricing, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel Apr 2004

Vickrey Auctions With Reserve Pricing, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders’ reports of private information, and then efficiently allocates this quantity among the bidders. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy with private values and an ex post equilibrium with interdependent values. If the auction is followed by resale, then truthful bidding remains an equilibrium in the auction-plus-resale game. In settings with perfect resale, the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing maximizes seller revenues.


Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey Feb 2004

Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.