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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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SelectedWorks

Market Design

Finance

2003

Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Estimating Auction Revenues For The Proposed Fcc Sale Of 3g Spectrum For Broadband And Advanced Wireless Services, Peter Cramton Dec 2003

Estimating Auction Revenues For The Proposed Fcc Sale Of 3g Spectrum For Broadband And Advanced Wireless Services, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Upset Pricing In Auction Markets: An Overview, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Mar 2003

Upset Pricing In Auction Markets: An Overview, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Competitive Bidding Behavior In Uniform-Price Auction Markets, Peter Cramton Mar 2003

Competitive Bidding Behavior In Uniform-Price Auction Markets, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

For Duke Energy.


Rebuttal Addendum: Assessment Of Submissions Of The California Parties, Peter Cramton Mar 2003

Rebuttal Addendum: Assessment Of Submissions Of The California Parties, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Competitive Bidding Behavior In Uniform-Price Auction Markets, Peter Cramton Mar 2003

Competitive Bidding Behavior In Uniform-Price Auction Markets, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Profit-maximizing bidding in uniform price auction markets involves bidding above marginal cost. It therefore is not surprising that such behavior is observed in electricity markets. Common bidding behavior such as “hockey stick” bids easily are explained by suppliers determining their supply offers to maximize profits. This incentive to bid above marginal cost is not the result of coordinated action among the bidders. Rather, each bidder is independently selecting its bid to maximize profits based on its estimate of the residual demand curve it faces. Profit-maximizing bidding does not mean that “the sky’s the limit.” Typically, bidders are limited in ...


Electricity Market Design: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly, Peter Cramton Jan 2003

Electricity Market Design: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

This paper examines principles of market design as applied to electricity markets. I illustrate the principles with examples of both good and bad designs. I discuss one of the main design challenges—dealing with market power. I then discuss FERC’s choice of a standard market design.