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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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SelectedWorks

Market Design

Finance

2002

Articles 1 - 13 of 13

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

An Analysis Of Auction Volume And Market Competition For The Coastal Forest Regions In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Sep 2002

An Analysis Of Auction Volume And Market Competition For The Coastal Forest Regions In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Reserve Prices, Stumpage Fees, And Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Sep 2002

Reserve Prices, Stumpage Fees, And Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Setting The Upset Price In British Columbia Timber Auctions, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Sep 2002

Setting The Upset Price In British Columbia Timber Auctions, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Demand Reduction And Inefficiency In Multi-Unit Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel Jul 2002

Demand Reduction And Inefficiency In Multi-Unit Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. Treasury, spectrum and electricity auctions are examples. In auctions where bidders pay the market-clearing price for items won, large bidders have an incentive to reduce demand in order to pay less for their winnings. This incentive creates an inefficiency in multiple-item auctions. Large bidders reduce demand for additional items and so sometimes lose to smaller bidders with lower values. We demonstrate this inefficiency in an auction model which allows interdependent values. We also establish that the ranking of the uniform-price and pay-as-bid auctions is ambiguous in both revenue and efficiency terms ...


Auctioning Timber To Maximize Revenues In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Jun 2002

Auctioning Timber To Maximize Revenues In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Comments On Alternative Policy Options For Managing Capacity And Mitigating Congestion And Delay At Laguardia Airport, Peter Cramton Jun 2002

Comments On Alternative Policy Options For Managing Capacity And Mitigating Congestion And Delay At Laguardia Airport, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Recommending auctions to manage congestion at LaGuardia.


A Comparison Of Equation-Based And Parity Pricing Of Stumpage Fees For British Columbia Timber Under Long-Term Tenures, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Apr 2002

A Comparison Of Equation-Based And Parity Pricing Of Stumpage Fees For British Columbia Timber Under Long-Term Tenures, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Testing For Anti-Competitive Bidding In Auction Markets, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Mar 2002

Testing For Anti-Competitive Bidding In Auction Markets, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Auction-Based Timber Pricing And Complementary Market Reforms In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham Mar 2002

Auction-Based Timber Pricing And Complementary Market Reforms In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton Feb 2002

Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments in support of wireless number portability. For Leap Wireless.


Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton Feb 2002

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments on proposed changes to how the energy clearing price is calculated. For ISO New England.


Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How And Why To Auction Not Grandfather, Peter Cramton, Suzi Kerr Jan 2002

Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How And Why To Auction Not Grandfather, Peter Cramton, Suzi Kerr

Peter Cramton

An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve carbon caps set by international negotiation to limit global climate change. To minimize administrative costs, permits would be required at the level of oil refineries, natural gas pipe lines, liquid sellers, and coal processing plants. To maximize liquidity in secondary markets, permits would be fully tradable and bankable. The government would conduct quarterly auctions. A standard ascending-clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery. An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving polluters permits in proportion to past pollution ...


Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton Jan 2002

Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Auctions have emerged as the primary means of assigning spectrum licenses to companies wishing to provide wireless communication services. Since July 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted 33 spectrum auctions, assigning thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Countries throughout the world are conducting similar auctions. I review the current state of spectrum auctions. Both the design and performance of these auctions are addressed.