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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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SelectedWorks

Market Design

Finance

2001

Articles 1 - 10 of 10

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Ex Parte Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton Oct 2001

Ex Parte Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Further comments on the CMRS spectrum cap. For Leap Wireless.


Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton Jun 2001

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comment on modifications to installed capability market. For ISO New England.


Lessons Learned From The Uk 3g Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton May 2001

Lessons Learned From The Uk 3g Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Market Effectiveness Assessment, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien May 2001

Market Effectiveness Assessment, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits For Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Wt Docket No. 01-14, Federal Communications Commission, "Declaration Of Peter Cramton,", Peter Cramton Apr 2001

2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits For Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Wt Docket No. 01-14, Federal Communications Commission, "Declaration Of Peter Cramton,", Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton Apr 2001

Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Further comments on the impact of a delayed sale of spectrum license by Pacific Communication. For American Wireless.


Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton Mar 2001

Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments on the impact of fronts in the C and F Block Broadband PCS auction.


The Optimality Of Being Efficient, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel Mar 2001

The Optimality Of Being Efficient, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

In an optimal auction, a revenue-optimizing seller often awards goods inefficiently, either by placing them in the wrong hands or by withholding goods from the market. This conclusion rests on two assumptions: (1) the seller can prevent resale among bidders after the auction; and (2) the seller can commit to not sell the withheld goods after the auction. We examine how the optimal auction problem changes when these assumptions are relaxed. In sharp contrast to the no resale assumption, we assume perfect resale: all gains from trade are exhausted in resale. In a multiple object model with independent signals, we ...


Expert Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton Feb 2001

Expert Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments on the impact of a delayed sale of spectrum license by Pacific Communication. For American Wireless.


Pricing In The California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch From Uniform Pricing To Pay-As-Bid Pricing?, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors Jan 2001

Pricing In The California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch From Uniform Pricing To Pay-As-Bid Pricing?, Peter Cramton, Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, Richard D. Tabors

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.