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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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SelectedWorks

Market Design

Finance

1997

Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Using Auctions To Divest Generation Assets, Peter Cramton, Lisa J. Cameron, Robert Wilson Dec 1997

Using Auctions To Divest Generation Assets, Peter Cramton, Lisa J. Cameron, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

In most states, ratepayers will compensate utilities for their stranded costs. As a result, these costs must be measured as accurately as possible, in a manner that is easily understood by all concerned parties. We describe the options for measuring stranded costs and argue that a simultaneous ascending auction is the best approach.


Package Bidding For Spectrum Licenses, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson Oct 1997

Package Bidding For Spectrum Licenses, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

The FCC was an innovator in adopting the rules of the simultaneous ascending-price auction for its sales of spectrum licenses. While these rules have performed well in the auctions conducted so far (and would perform even better with the design improvements suggested in our first report), there are two inherent limitations in any design that seeks to assign and price the licenses individually. First, such designs create strategic incentives for bidders interested in multiple licenses that are substitutes to reduce their demands for some of the licenses in order to reduce the final prices of the others; this is the ...


Auction Design Enhancements For Non-Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson Sep 1997

Auction Design Enhancements For Non-Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

We evaluate a number of possible enhancements to the FCC auctions. We consider only changes to the current auction rules that stay within the basic format of the simultaneous multiple round auction for individual licenses. This report summarizes and extends our e-mail exchanges with FCC staff on this topic. A subsequent report will cover auctions with combination bids. Overall, the FCC spectrum auctions have been an enormous success. However, there are two design goals in the auction where important improvement can be achieved within the basic rules structure. These are restricting collusion among bidders and reducing the time taken to ...


Reply Statement On The Effect Of Nextwave’S Participation In The C-Block Auction On Antigone And Devco, Peter Cramton Apr 1997

Reply Statement On The Effect Of Nextwave’S Participation In The C-Block Auction On Antigone And Devco, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

For Antigone and Devco.


Statement On The Effect Of Nextwave’S Participation In The C-Block Auction On Antigone And Devco, Peter Cramton Mar 1997

Statement On The Effect Of Nextwave’S Participation In The C-Block Auction On Antigone And Devco, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

For Antigone and Devco.


The Fcc Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment, Peter Cramton Jan 1997

The Fcc Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful. Similar items sold for similar prices and bidders successfully formed efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition and price uncertainty played an important role in determining behavior. Bidding credits and installment payments also played a major role in several of the auctions.