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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Using Spectrum Auctions To Enhance Competition In Wireless Services, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz1 Jan 2011

Using Spectrum Auctions To Enhance Competition In Wireless Services, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz1

Peter Cramton

Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.


A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton Mar 2009

A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

On Monday, 23 March 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner presented the Public-Private Investment Program as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis (www.financialstability.gov). The Treasury’s description still leaves many issues unanswered. We flesh out the auction design for legacy loans. A two-sided auction is required. Both banks and private investors must compete in a transparent and competitive process.


How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton Jan 2009

How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

I study the design of auctions of natural resources, such as oil or mineral rights. A good auction design promotes both an efficient assignment of rights and competitive revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition are key factors in determining the best design. With weak competition and additive values, a simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auction may suffice. With more complex value structures, a dynamic auction with package bids, such as the clock-proxy auction, likely is needed to promote the efficiency and revenue objectives. Bidding on production shares, rather than bonuses, typically increases government take ...


Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton Jan 2009

Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction. Then I present the package clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the weaknesses, of the simultaneous ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements of the package clock auction: the pricing rule and the activity rule. Along the way, I summarize both experimental and field results with the package clock auction.


Report On Key Design Elements Of Auctions Under Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Peter Cramton Oct 2008

Report On Key Design Elements Of Auctions Under Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Auctions For Injecting Bank Capital (Addendum To 'A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction'), Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel Oct 2008

Auctions For Injecting Bank Capital (Addendum To 'A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction'), Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

Public discussion has turned, in the past few days, toward using some of the $700 billion in rescue funds for the injection of government money into banks in return for ownership stakes. The purpose of this short note, an addendum to “A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction,” is to describe an auction mechanism suitable for injections of capital into banks. The auctions would price the equity purchases through a competitive process.


Auctioning Long-Term Gas Contracts In Colombia, Peter Cramton Sep 2008

Auctioning Long-Term Gas Contracts In Colombia, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

This paper presents an approach to auctioning long-term gas contracts in Colombia. I propose an annual auction for long-term firm gas contracts. The auction would assign and price all firm gas contracts, with the exception of gas from the Guajira field, which is assigned administratively at a regulated price. The proposal is a partial market design in that it does not address the transportation of gas from producer to consumer.

The goal of the approach is to improve the transparency and efficiency of the gas market with a coordinated auction for long-term gas contracts. Currently, gas contracts are sold in ...


A Review Of The L-Band Auction, Peter Cramton Sep 2008

A Review Of The L-Band Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

In May 2008, Ofcom’s L-band auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s second combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 17 lots. Eight bidders competed for the lots. In sharp contrast to the first combinatorial clock auction, the 10-40 GHz auction, in which each of the ten bidders won spectrum, in the L-band auction there was a single winner—Qualcomm won all the lots. This note briefly reviews the auction.


A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel Sep 2008

A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

The US Treasury has proposed purchasing $700 billion of troubled assets to restore liquidity and solve the current financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as reverse auctions where appropriate. This paper presents a high-level design for a troubled asset reverse auction and discusses the auction design issues. We assume that the key objectives of the auction are to: 1) provide a quick and effective means to purchase troubled assets and increase liquidity; 2) protect the taxpayer by yielding a price for assets related to their value; and 3) offer a transparent rules-based process that minimizes discretion and favoritism. We propose ...


The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule For Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Robert Day Sep 2008

The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule For Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Robert Day

Peter Cramton

We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe, and proposed for use in the FAA’s landing-slot auctions in the United States. Specifically, we compute a unique point “in the core” that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the resulting payments can be decomposed into a series of economically meaningful and equitable penalties, adding to the perceived “fairness” of this payment rule. Further, we discuss the many benefits of this combinatorial auction paradigm.


A Review Of The 10-40 Ghz Auction, Peter Cramton Sep 2008

A Review Of The 10-40 Ghz Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

In February 2008, Ofcom’s 10-40 GHz auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s first combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 27 lots. Each of the ten bidders won one or more lots. All 27 lots were assigned. This note briefly reviews the auction.


Market Design: Auctions And Matching, Peter Cramton Jan 2008

Market Design: Auctions And Matching, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Innovation And Market Design, Peter Cramton Jan 2008

Innovation And Market Design, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Market design plays an essential role in promoting innovation. I examine emission allowance auctions, airport slot auctions, spectrum auctions, and electricity markets, and demonstrate how the market design can encourage innovation. Improved pricing information is one source of innovation. Enhancing competition is another driver of innovation seen in all of the applications. Market design fosters innovation in other ways as well by addressing other potential market failures.


Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less Market Power, More Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft Jan 2008

Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less Market Power, More Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft

Peter Cramton

A forward reliability market is presented. The market coordinates new entry through the forward procurement of reliability options—physical capacity bundled with a financial option to supply energy above a strike price. The market assures adequate generating resources and prices capacity from the bids of competitive new entry in an annual auction. Efficient performance incentives are maintained from a load-following obligation to supply energy above the strike price. The capacity payment fully hedges load from high spot prices, and reduces supplier risk as well. Market power is reduced in the spot market, since suppliers enter the spot market with a ...


The Effect Of Incumbent Bidding In Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis Of Prices In The Closed And Open Segments Of Fcc Auction 35, Peter Cramton, Allan T. Ingraham, Hal J. Singer Jan 2008

The Effect Of Incumbent Bidding In Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis Of Prices In The Closed And Open Segments Of Fcc Auction 35, Peter Cramton, Allan T. Ingraham, Hal J. Singer

Peter Cramton

This paper examines the impact of an incumbent carrier’s participation in two simultaneously conducted auctions: one set-aside for non-incumbents and one open to all carriers. This paper estimates the extent to which prices in the closed auction were inflated by the participation of incumbents. This paper also estimates what prices would have been in the open auction had incumbents been excluded from bidding in the closed. It is found that an incumbent’s participation in the closed auction through a front, Alaska Native, enabled it to win more licenses at lower prices in FCC Auction 35. In contrast, non-incumbents ...


An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg Dec 2007

An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Comments On The Rggi Market Design, Peter Cramton Nov 2007

Comments On The Rggi Market Design, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity To Protect Competition In A Consolidating Industry, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson Nov 2007

The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity To Protect Competition In A Consolidating Industry, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

This paper is provided in connection with the 2007 Telecommunications Symposium – Voice, Video and Broadband: The Changing Competitive Landscape and Its Impact on Consumers, sponsored by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“the Division”). Our focus is on the state of competition in the wireless sector. Maintaining a competitive wireless sector is particularly critical if, as the Division’s agenda indicates, wireless services are to function as a competitive alternative to wireline technologies. Strengthening competition is especially important now after recent mergers that consolidated the wireless industry into a few dominant firms (two to four depending ...


Comments On The Fcc’S Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures For Auction 73, Peter Cramton, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson Aug 2007

Comments On The Fcc’S Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures For Auction 73, Peter Cramton, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Possible Design For A Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, Peter Cramton Aug 2007

Possible Design For A Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Colombia’S Forward Energy Market, Peter Cramton Aug 2007

Colombia’S Forward Energy Market, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

This paper presents a market design for Colombia’s forward energy market, which is scheduled to began in 2008. The forward energy market is an organized market to procure energy for electricity customers on a forward basis. It includes both the regulated market (residential and other small customers) and the nonregulated market (large customers). Currently, regulated customers represent 68% of the total electricity demand and nonregulated customers represent the remaining 32%. The proposed design is novel in that it integrates both the regulated and nonregulated customers into a single organized market. Although the regulated and nonregulated energy products remain distinct ...


Economist Letter To Ntia On 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Simon Wilkie, Robert Wilson Jul 2007

Economist Letter To Ntia On 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Simon Wilkie, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

As the 700 MHz auction approaches, we are writing to clear up a common misconception about the nature of spectrum auctions and the impact of various rules on auction revenues.


Essential Entry: Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton Jul 2007

Essential Entry: Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

A common misconception is that an open access provision on a sliver of the 700 MHz spectrum would reduce auction revenues. In fact, the open access, wholesale, and bidding credit provisions put forth by Frontline Wireless, will motivate new entry, enhance competition in the auction, and raise revenues.


Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson Jun 2007

Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

There have been several comments that criticize auction rules that prevent the two major low-frequency incumbents from winning all of the newly available spectrum and incorporating it into their proprietary networks. Such rules include new-entrant set-asides, new-entrant bidding credits, and the open access plan. We disagree with these criticisms and argue that given the current market structure, such rules are likely to improve welfare and auction revenues. We are submitting this report to provide sound economic analysis of these claims.


Economic Comments On The Design Of The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson Jun 2007

Economic Comments On The Design Of The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

We comment on the service and auction rules discussed in the Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, FCC 07-72, 27 April 2007. We recommend that the FCC designate one license for a wholesale operation that provides open access nationwide on nondiscriminatory terms. This is necessary to enable entry of new businesses offering wireless services in retail markets. It also enables local operators to offer roaming at competitive prices. The new license accords with the Commission’s policy to encourage competition, and recognizes the benefits to consumers from low prices and expanded services.


Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton Jun 2007

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Affidavit arguing that the Illinois auction for energy for small customers was a competitive auction. On behalf of J. Aron & Company and Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc.


Product Design For Colombia’S Regulated Market, Peter Cramton Jun 2007

Product Design For Colombia’S Regulated Market, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

This paper presents a product design for Colombia’s regulated market (MOR), which is scheduled to began in 2008. The regulated market consists of residential and other small customers. Currently, regulated customers represent 69% of the total load. I propose a market based on a single load-following product in which each supplier bids to serve its desired share of the Colombia regulated load. Thus, a supplier that wins a 10% share at auction has an obligation to serve 10% of the actual regulated load in every hour of the commitment period. The supplier is paid the MOR clearing price for ...


Why Large Licenses Are Best For The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton Apr 2007

Why Large Licenses Are Best For The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.


Market-Based Alternatives For Managing Congestion At New York’S Laguardia Airport, Peter Cramton, Michael O. Ball, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Frank Berardino, George Donohue, Mark Hansen, Karla Hoffman Apr 2007

Market-Based Alternatives For Managing Congestion At New York’S Laguardia Airport, Peter Cramton, Michael O. Ball, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Frank Berardino, George Donohue, Mark Hansen, Karla Hoffman

Peter Cramton

We summarize the results of a project that was motivated by the expiration of the “High Density Rule,” which defined the slot controls employed at New York’s LaGuardia Airport for more than 30 years. The scope of the project included the analysis of several administrative measures, congestion pricing options and slot auctions. The research output includes a congestion pricing procedure and also the specification of a slot auction mechanism. The research results are based in part on two strategic simulations. These were multi-day events that included the participation of airport operators, most notably the Port Authority of New York ...


Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton Feb 2007

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Affidavit identifying manipulation of New York's capacity market by KeySpan and the need for market monitoring and mitigation. On behalf of Consolidated Edison Company of New York.