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Consciousness

Western University

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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Mind

A New Framework For Enactivism: Understanding The Enactive Body Through Structural Flexibility And Merleau-Ponty’S Ontology Of Flesh, John Jenkinson Feb 2017

A New Framework For Enactivism: Understanding The Enactive Body Through Structural Flexibility And Merleau-Ponty’S Ontology Of Flesh, John Jenkinson

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

The enactive approach to cognition and consciousness offers a valuable alternative to the standard approaches dominant in the sciences of mind. As an embodied account, enactivism incorporates theoretical perspectives on the body from phenomenology, cognitive science, and biology, which provides a unique interpretation of embodiment with critical insight into the embodied nature of cognition and consciousness. Nonetheless, I argue that several revisions are required to make enactivism viable within the context of the sciences of mind. The enactive account of subjectivity is problematic, in light of arguments developed in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s later texts, because it is implicitly dualistic. I ...


Phenomenal Intentionality And The Problem Of Cognitive Contact, Christopher A. Young Nov 2015

Phenomenal Intentionality And The Problem Of Cognitive Contact, Christopher A. Young

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

Abstract

Part 1 of the thesis questions the traditional relation model of intentionality. After fixing reference on the target phenomenon, intentionality, and explaining my interest in it, I ask what sorts of things intentionality might be a relation to. I consider ordinary objects, properties, propositions and hybrid views, and conclude all make the intentional relation appear rather mysterious. From there, I move on to examine the relation view’s most prominent proponents, the tracking theorists—pointing out some challenges such views face, and concluding that it might be worthwhile looking into alternatives to the relation view.

Part 2 asks whether ...


The Resilience Of A Refined Higher-Order Thought Theory Of Consciousness, Lee-Anna T. Sangster Jan 2013

The Resilience Of A Refined Higher-Order Thought Theory Of Consciousness, Lee-Anna T. Sangster

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

This dissertation consists of three independent papers, each defending the Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory of Consciousness against a different objection. First the HOT theory is defended against the Theory of Mind (TOM) Objection. Since the HOT theory requires that a subject be able to represent mental states in thought in order to have mental states that are conscious, objectors argue from empirical evidence that few creatures pass TOM tests to the conclusion that few creatures must be capable of having conscious mental states according to the HOT theory. The counter-intuitiveness of this claim is then taken as reason for rejecting ...