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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Mind

Representationalism About Sensory Phenomenology, Matthew Ivanowich Nov 2015

Representationalism About Sensory Phenomenology, Matthew Ivanowich

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

This dissertation examines representationalism about sensory phenomenology—the claim that for a sensory experience to have a particular phenomenal character is a matter of it having a particular representational content. I focus on a particular issue that is central to representationalism: whether reductive versions of the theory should be internalist or externalist. My primary goals are (i) to demonstrate that externalist representationalism fails to provide a reductive explanation for phenomenal qualities, and (ii) to present a reductive internalist version of representationalism that utilizes the empirical framework of psychophysics and neuroscience to develop a philosophical theory of content. The bulk of ...


Reflections In A Mirror, Damian Cox Aug 2015

Reflections In A Mirror, Damian Cox

Damian Cox

In this paper, I develop a solution to the puzzle of mirror perception: why do mirrors appear to reverse the image of an object along a left/right axis and not around other axes, such as the top/bottom axis? I set out the different forms the puzzle takes and argue that one form of it – arguably the key form – has not been satisfactorily solved. I offer a solution in three parts: setting out the conditions in which an apparent left/right reversal of mirror images is generated; explaining why these conditions are so often met; explaining why we are ...


The Lens Of Language, Eli Ridley Segal Jan 2015

The Lens Of Language, Eli Ridley Segal

Senior Projects Fall 2015

This project seeks to contextualize the iconic philosophical questions regarding skepticism, object existence, perception, and emotion, within the discourse of ordinary language philosophy. Aided by Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell, I argue for the non existence of objects-in-themselves. This provides the scaffolding for an examination of perception and emotion unhindered by a reliance on, or appeal to, the so-called 'objective world.' Recognizing the influence exerted by language over our conscious experience, I argue for an ordinary-language formulation of embodied cognition. With this in mind, I demonstrate the philosophical implications of such a picture through the canonical problem of 'other minds.' Ultimately ...