Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Philosophy of Mind Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Mind

Trust, Trustworthiness, And The Moral Consequence Of Consistency, Jason R. D'Cruz Jan 2015

Trust, Trustworthiness, And The Moral Consequence Of Consistency, Jason R. D'Cruz

Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

Situationists such as John Doris, Gilbert Harman, and Maria Merritt suppose that appeal to reliable behavioral dispositions can be dispensed with without radical revision to morality as we know it. This paper challenges this supposition, arguing that abandoning hope in reliable dispositions rules out genuine trust and forces us to suspend core reactive attitudes of gratitude and resentment, esteem and indignation. By examining situationism through the lens of trust we learn something about situationism (in particular, the radically revisionary moral implications of its adoption) as well as something about trust (in particular, that the conditions necessary for genuine trust include ...


On The Semantic Expression Of Mental Acts, William Grimes Jan 2014

On The Semantic Expression Of Mental Acts, William Grimes

Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

In this unpublished manuscript, the author aims to provide "a concept of the language of the semantic expression of mental acts" based on the insights both of ordinary language philosophy and logical reconstruction.


Williamson On Knowledge And Psychological Explanation, P.D. Magnus, Jonathan Cohen Oct 2003

Williamson On Knowledge And Psychological Explanation, P.D. Magnus, Jonathan Cohen

Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

According to many philosophers, psychological explanation canlegitimately be given in terms of belief and desire, but not in termsof knowledge. To explain why someone does what they do (so the common wisdom holds) you can appeal to what they think or what they want, but not what they know. Timothy Williamson has recently argued against this view. Knowledge, Williamson insists, plays an essential role in ordinary psychological explanation.Williamson's argument works on two fronts.First, he argues against the claim that, unlike knowledge, belief is``composite'' (representable as a conjunction of a narrow and a broadcondition). Belief's failure ...