Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Philosophy of Mind Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 27 of 27

Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Mind

Against The Received Wisdom: Why Should The Criminal Justice System Give Kids A Break?, Stephen J. Morse Jul 2019

Against The Received Wisdom: Why Should The Criminal Justice System Give Kids A Break?, Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Professor Gideon Yaffe’s recent, intricately argued book, The Age of Culpability: Children and the Nature of Criminal Responsibility, argues against the nearly uniform position in both law and scholarship that the criminal justice system should give juveniles a break not because on average they have different capacities relevant to responsibility than adults, but because juveniles have little say about the criminal law, primarily because they do not have a vote. For Professor Yaffe, age has political rather than behavioral significance. The book has many excellent general analyses about responsibility, but all are in aid of the central thesis about ...


Self-Actualization And The Need To Create As A Limit On Copyright, Christopher S. Yoo Aug 2018

Self-Actualization And The Need To Create As A Limit On Copyright, Christopher S. Yoo

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Personhood theory is almost invariably cited as one of the primary theoretical bases for copyright. The conventional wisdom views creative works as the embodiment of their creator’s personality. This unique connection between authors and their works justifies giving authors property interests in the results of their creative efforts.

This Chapter argues that the conventional wisdom is too limited. It offers too narrow a vision of the ways that creativity can develop personality by focusing exclusively on the results of the creative process and ignoring the self-actualizing benefits of the creative process itself. German aesthetic theory broadens the understanding of ...


Law And The Sciences Of The Brain/Mind, Stephen J. Morse Apr 2016

Law And The Sciences Of The Brain/Mind, Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This chapter is a submission to the Oxford Handbook of Law and the Regulation of Technology edited by Roger Brownsword. It considers whether the new sciences of the brain/mind, especially neuroscience and behavioral genetics, are likely to transform the law’s traditional concepts of the person, agency and responsibility. The chapter begins with a brief speculation about why so many people think these sciences will transform the law. After reviewing the law’s concepts, misguided challenges to them, and the achievements of the new sciences, the chapter confronts the claim that these sciences prove that we are really not ...


Moore On The Mind, Stephen J. Morse Dec 2015

Moore On The Mind, Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In revised form, this chapter will be published in a volume, Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Truths: The Philosophy of Michael S. Moore, a festschrift for Michael Moore edited by Professor Kimberly Ferzan and me for Oxford University Press. The chapter first addresses a particular approach to foundational metaphysical issues in the philosophy of mind, action and responsibility that I term “Spockian solutions,” which are home remedies modeled on those found in the baby and child care book of famed pediatrician, the late Dr. Benjamin Spock. It then engages with Moore’s work on a variety of topics concerning action and ...


Criminal Law And Common Sense: An Essay On The Perils And Promise Of Neuroscience, Stephen J. Morse Dec 2015

Criminal Law And Common Sense: An Essay On The Perils And Promise Of Neuroscience, Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Common Sense Of Contract Formation, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, David A. Hoffman Jan 2015

The Common Sense Of Contract Formation, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, David A. Hoffman

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

What parties know and think they know about contract law affects their obligations under the law and their intuitive obligations toward one another. Drawing on a series of new experimental questionnaire studies, this Article makes two contributions.First, it lays out what information and beliefs ordinary individuals have about how to form contracts with one another. We find that the colloquial understanding of contract law is almost entirely focused on formalization rather than actual assent, though the modern doctrine of contract formation takes the opposite stance. The second Part of the Article tries to get at whether this misunderstanding matters ...


Neuroscience, Free Will, And Criminal Responsibility, Stephen J. Morse Jan 2015

Neuroscience, Free Will, And Criminal Responsibility, Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This chapter argues that the folk-psychological model of the person and responsibility is not challenged by determinism in general or by neurodeterminism in particular. Until science conclusively demonstrates that human beings cannot be guided by reasons and that mental states play no role in explaining behavior, the folk-psychological model of responsibility is justified. This chapter discusses the motivations to turn to science to solve the hard normative problems the law addresses, as well as the law's psychology and its concepts of the person and responsibility. Then it considers the general relation of neuroscience to law, which I characterize as ...


Pragmatic Rationality And Risk, Claire Oakes Finkelstein Jan 2013

Pragmatic Rationality And Risk, Claire Oakes Finkelstein

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Pragmatic theories focus on whether agents fare better acting on the basis of a particular intention or plan, rather than whether this can be justified in terms of the expected utility associated with the plan. This article argues that, while attractive, pragmatic theories have difficulty vindicating the rationality of plans involving an element of risk. In “Assure and Threaten,” David Gauthier noticed this difficulty with respect to deterrent threats. This article argues that the same difficulty exists for assurances involving an element of risk. It then explores whether Pragmatists could solve the shortcomings of their approach by adopting the Chance ...


Provocation As Partial Justification And Partial Excuse, Mitchell N. Berman Jan 2011

Provocation As Partial Justification And Partial Excuse, Mitchell N. Berman

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The partial defense of provocation provides that a person who kills in the heat of passion brought on by legally adequate provocation is guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. It traces back to the twelfth century, and exists today, in some form, in almost every U.S. state and other common law jurisdictions. But long history and wide application have not produced agreement on the rationale for the doctrine. To the contrary, the search for a coherent and satisfying rationale remains among the main occupations of criminal law theorists. The dominant scholarly view holds that provocation is best explained and ...


Neuroscience And The Future Of Personhood And Responsibility, Stephen J. Morse Jan 2011

Neuroscience And The Future Of Personhood And Responsibility, Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This is a chapter in a book, Constitution 3.0: Freedom and Technological Change, edited by Jeffrey Rosen and Benjamin Wittes and published by Brookings. It considers whether likely advances in neuroscience will fundamentally alter our conceptions of human agency, of what it means to be a person, and of responsibility for action. I argue that neuroscience poses no such radical threat now and in the immediate future and it is unlikely ever to pose such a threat unless it or other sciences decisively resolve the mind-body problem. I suggest that until that happens, neuroscience might contribute to the reform ...


Thoroughly Modern: Sir James Fitzjames Stephen On Criminal Responsibility, Stephen J. Morse Jan 2008

Thoroughly Modern: Sir James Fitzjames Stephen On Criminal Responsibility, Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

5 Ohio St. J. Crim. Law 505 (2008)


The Non-Problem Of Free Will In Forensic Psychiatry And Psychology, Stephen J. Morse Mar 2007

The Non-Problem Of Free Will In Forensic Psychiatry And Psychology, Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This article demonstrates that there is no free will problem in forensic psychiatry by showing that free will or its lack is not a criterion for any legal doctrine and it is not an underlying general foundation for legal responsibility doctrines and practices. There is a genuine metaphysical free will problem, but the article explains why it is not relevant to forensic practice. Forensic practitioners are urged to avoid all usage of free will in their forensic thinking and work product because it is irrelevant and spawns confusion.


Addiction, Genetics, And Criminal Responsibility, Stephen J. Morse Jan 2006

Addiction, Genetics, And Criminal Responsibility, Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Justification And Excuse, Law And Morality, Mitchell N. Berman Jan 2003

Justification And Excuse, Law And Morality, Mitchell N. Berman

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Anglo-American theorists of the criminal law have concentrated on-one is tempted to say "obsessed over"-the distinction between justification and excuse for a good quarter-century and the scholarly attention has purchased unusually widespread agreement. Justification defenses are said to apply when the actor's conduct was not morally wrongful; excuse defenses lie when the actor did engage in wrongful conduct but is not morally blameworthy. A near consensus thus achieved, theorists have turned to subordinate matters, joining issue most notably on the question of whether justifications are "subjective"-turning upon the actor's reasons for acting-or "objective"-involving only facts ...


Inevitable Mens Rea, Stephen J. Morse Jan 2003

Inevitable Mens Rea, Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Neither Desert Nor Disease, Stephen J. Morse Jan 1999

Neither Desert Nor Disease, Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


In Defense Of The Model Penal Code: A Reply To Professor Fletcher, Paul H. Robinson Jan 1998

In Defense Of The Model Penal Code: A Reply To Professor Fletcher, Paul H. Robinson

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Incommensurable Choices And The Problem Of Moral Ignorance, Leo Katz Jan 1998

Incommensurable Choices And The Problem Of Moral Ignorance, Leo Katz

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Moral Responsibility: A Story, An Argument, And A Vision, Stephen J. Morse Jan 1998

Moral Responsibility: A Story, An Argument, And A Vision, Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Not So Hard (And Not So Special), After All: Comments On Zimring's "The Hardest Of The Hard Cases", Stephen J. Morse Jan 1996

Not So Hard (And Not So Special), After All: Comments On Zimring's "The Hardest Of The Hard Cases", Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Irrelevance Of The Intended To Prima Facie Culpability: Comment On Moore, Claire Oakes Finkelstein Jan 1996

The Irrelevance Of The Intended To Prima Facie Culpability: Comment On Moore, Claire Oakes Finkelstein

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Against Nature: On Robert Wright's The Moral Animal, Amy L. Wax Jan 1996

Against Nature: On Robert Wright's The Moral Animal, Amy L. Wax

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Brain And Blame, Stephen J. Morse Jan 1996

Brain And Blame, Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Proximate Cause In Michael Moore's Act And Crime, Leo Katz Jan 1994

Proximate Cause In Michael Moore's Act And Crime, Leo Katz

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty And Legal Theory, Stephen R. Perry Jan 1989

Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty And Legal Theory, Stephen R. Perry

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Failed Explanations And Criminal Responsibility: Experts And The Unconscious, Stephen J. Morse Jan 1982

Failed Explanations And Criminal Responsibility: Experts And The Unconscious, Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Crazy Behavior, Morals, And Science: An Analysis Of Mental Health Law, Stephen J. Morse Jan 1978

Crazy Behavior, Morals, And Science: An Analysis Of Mental Health Law, Stephen J. Morse

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.