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A Study Of Virtuous And Vicious Anger, Zac Cogley Jan 2014

A Study Of Virtuous And Vicious Anger, Zac Cogley

Book Sections/Chapters

In this chapter, I defend an account of an angrily virtuous, or patient, person informed by recent research on emotion in empirical and philosophical psychology. I argue that virtue and vice with respect to anger is determined by excellence and deficiency with respect to all three of anger’s functions: its involvement in (1) appraisal of wrongdoing, (2) its role as a motivating force, and (3) its communicative function. Many accounts of anger assess it only with respect to one of these functions. Most typically, anger is assessed instrumentally with regard to its role in motivation. As I show, any ...


Basic Desert Of Reactive Emotions, Zac Cogley May 2013

Basic Desert Of Reactive Emotions, Zac Cogley

Publication

In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions – appraisal, communication, and sanction – that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.


Basic Desert And Reactive Emotions, Zac Cogley Jan 2013

Basic Desert And Reactive Emotions, Zac Cogley

Publication

It is common for philosophers to invoke the idea that someone deserves an emotion like anger because she has done something morally wrong. While appeals to this notion of desert are common in the literature, such references aren’t thoroughly examined. For example, what do we mean when we say that someone deserves anger because she wronged us? This question is important because it is common for one philosopher to claim that someone deserves anger for a moral wrong while another denies it. Without an account of desert claims it is difficult to evaluate which position is more plausible.

We ...


The Three-Fold Significance Of The Blaming Emotions, Zac Cogley Jan 2013

The Three-Fold Significance Of The Blaming Emotions, Zac Cogley

Book Sections/Chapters

Many philosophers working on moral responsibility understand that concept in a Strawsonian way; they follow P.F. Strawson in thinking that we should understand claims about someone’s moral responsibility in terms of the appropriateness of a certain class of emotions. In this paper, I use recent work in psychology of emotion to direct attention to the reasons why emotions are so tightly connected to our moral responsibility practices. Using the blaming emotions (anger, indignation, and resentment) as a model, I identify three different functions that emotions serve: motivation, appraisal and communication. Identifying discrete functions that the blaming emotions serve ...


The Three-Fold Significance Of The Blaming Emotions, Zac Cogley Jan 2012

The Three-Fold Significance Of The Blaming Emotions, Zac Cogley

Publication

Much of the philosophical work on moral responsibility assumes that we should understand people’s moral responsibility for the actions they take in terms of the appropriateness of the blaming emotions—resentment, anger, and indignation. However, current theorizing about the blaming emotions is often psychologically uninformed. Drawing on work in empirical psychology, I have recently argued that anger serves three functions in human psychology: appraisal, motivation, and communication. In this project, I propose to extend that analysis to the entire class of blaming emotions. I will show that theorizing about moral responsibility is myopic if it focuses on one of ...