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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Mind

Neuroscience, Materialism, And The Soul: Limit Questions, Jeremy M. Aymard Jun 2017

Neuroscience, Materialism, And The Soul: Limit Questions, Jeremy M. Aymard

Dialogue & Nexus

In light of recent discoveries in neuroscience linking the mind to physical processes, Christian philosophers have resorted to a more materialistic view of the human person, using neuroscience as support for their view that an immaterial soul does not exist. In this essay, I will point out a major flaw in the logic for defending a materialistic view, argue that either a bipartite or tripartite view of the human person is more aligned with Scripture, and hopefully point towards a more reliable means for attaining truth regarding human nature and the soul.


Down Syndrome, The Image Of God, And Personhood, Paris Webb May 2017

Down Syndrome, The Image Of God, And Personhood, Paris Webb

Dialogue & Nexus

People with Down syndrome help Christians understand what being made in the image of God truly means. After describing Down syndrome, we will examine the different views of the image of God and how these relate to people with Down syndrome. Another approach will be to define personhood in light of God’s image and relate it to Down syndrome. We will use the principles held by the L’Arche community as an exemplar in this discussion to demonstrate that those with Down syndrome encourage us to expand our understanding of the image of God. Consequently, Down’s persons allow ...


Mollifying Neuroscience And Christian Faith: An Emergent Monistic Claim For Free Will And The Soul, Paul Figel May 2017

Mollifying Neuroscience And Christian Faith: An Emergent Monistic Claim For Free Will And The Soul, Paul Figel

Dialogue & Nexus

Modern neuroscience makes it difficult for one to support a case for substance dualism regarding the existence of a soul and free will. The neuroscientific evidence stems from several experiments in which test subjects were instructed to perform a simple voluntary movement. Scientists consistently observed neurological antecedents preceding the subject’s conscious decision to perform the action. An examination of these experiments and the conclusions drawn will show several key inconsistencies that weaken the extreme anti-conscious will claim. However, it is important to not reject the neurological evidence against substance dualism, but instead discover a new perspective (e.g. emergent ...


Volume 3 Editorial, Daniel Brannan May 2017

Volume 3 Editorial, Daniel Brannan

Dialogue & Nexus

No abstract provided.