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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy of Mind

The Toxicity Of Otherness, Justin Malone Dec 2018

The Toxicity Of Otherness, Justin Malone

English Department: Traveling American Modernism (ENG 366, Fall 2018)

This article discusses the dangerous philosophical principle of Othering, wherein a group of people are ostracized for being different from the majority. While categorization of information is a fundamental aspect of how the brain works, the categorization of people homogenizes their complexities. In doing so, a group is seen as a single entity, rather than individuals, which strips them of their humanity. After a group has been Othered, society will inevitably invoke some method of forced displacement upon them. Additionally, the article emphasizes the importance of affected individuals telling the stories of their experiences with oppression from Othering. Sharing one ...


Probable Causes And The Distinction Between Subjective And Objective Chance, Stuart M. Glennan Jan 1997

Probable Causes And The Distinction Between Subjective And Objective Chance, Stuart M. Glennan

Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS

In this paper I present both a critical appraisal of Humphreys' probabilistic theory of causality and a sketch of an alternative view of the relationship between the notions of probability and of cause. Though I do not doubt that determinism is false, I claim that the examples used to motivate Humphreys' theory typically refer to subjective rather than objective chance. Additionally, I argue on a number of grounds that Humphreys' suggestion that linear regression models be used as a canonical form for the description of causal relations is untenable. I conclude by exploring the variety of ways in which probabilistic ...


Computationalism And The Problem Of Other Minds, Stuart M. Glennan Jan 1995

Computationalism And The Problem Of Other Minds, Stuart M. Glennan

Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS

In this paper I discuss Searle's claim that the computational properties of a system could never cause a system to be conscious. In the first section of the paper I argue that Searle is correct that, even if a system both behaves in a way that is characteristic of conscious agents (like ourselves) and has a computational structure similar to those agents, one cannot be certain that that system is conscious. On the other hand, I suggest that Searle's intuition that it is “empirically absurd” that such a system could be conscious is unfounded. In the second section ...