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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

The Epistemic And Psychological Mechanisms Perpetuating Racism Within The Criminal Justice System, Danielle Walker Apr 2019

The Epistemic And Psychological Mechanisms Perpetuating Racism Within The Criminal Justice System, Danielle Walker

Theses

Abstract

Many attempts have been made by philosophers, political activists, psychologists, historians, social advocates, and others to explain the mechanisms at play in the perpetuation and resulting manifestations of systemic and institutional racism. On one side of the debate there lies a theory that there is an epistemic failure at the root of racial bias towards Blacks, white ignorance, a collective amnesia regarding what has and does take place in society, as it pertains to their oppression and isolation, like the view of philosopher Charles W. Mills. According to Mills, this type of ignorance, or non-knowing, is a cognitive phenomenon ...


Knock-Knock! Whose Peer? The Epistemic Significance Of Humor, Kaci Harrison Apr 2018

Knock-Knock! Whose Peer? The Epistemic Significance Of Humor, Kaci Harrison

Theses

Debates about the epistemic significance of peer disagreement are highly idealized. Some have even suggested that genuine cases of epistemic peer disagreement never in fact obtain, since even seemingly trivial differences in experience and attitudes can bias evidential processing. This thesis defends the view that these criticisms are overstated: the problem is not that epistemic peer disagreements do not exist, but rather that we lack an account of how it is possible to identify our epistemic peers. I argue that attention to the sense of humor provides one important source of evidence regarding the experiences and attitudes of others that ...


The Epistemic Status Of Moral Conceptual Truths, Kara D. Boschert Apr 2017

The Epistemic Status Of Moral Conceptual Truths, Kara D. Boschert

Theses

Evolutionary debunking arguments assume that morality could, conceptually speaking, be about anything. A response to this contention is that there are some moral conceptual truths which counter assertions that we could be in error about basic moral truths. According to proponents of moral conceptual truths, some things, by definition, cannot count as moral. Putative moral conceptual truths, such as “stealing is wrong,” are thought to enjoy a privileged epistemic status because anyone who denies them forfeits their ability to engage in competent moral reasoning. This paper explores whether moral conceptual truths can offer a satisfactory response to the debunkers’ premise ...


Justify This! The Roles Of Epistemic Justification, Tamala L. Endriss Apr 2017

Justify This! The Roles Of Epistemic Justification, Tamala L. Endriss

Theses

Since Gettier's (1963) paper, epistemology has exploded with ideas of how to overcome cases where an agent has a justified true belief, and yet, does not have knowledge. Some epistemologists have tried to escape the Gettier Problem by stating knowledge is true belief plus something else, whereby removing justification, which seems to be the key player in Gettier Problems. Still, others suggest that any addition to true belief will cause issues. Timothy Williamson (2000) contends that knowledge is not analyzable. For Williamson, knowledge is the most basic state of mind; it is a factive mental state that cannot be ...