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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

Mapping Objectivity And Bias In Relation To Argument, J. Anthony Blair May 2016

Mapping Objectivity And Bias In Relation To Argument, J. Anthony Blair

OSSA Conference Archive

The conference theme invites contrasts between objectivity and bias, since the two are commonly considered contraries. But there are a variety of meanings of the two and a corresponding variety of contraries. Thus there is a problem for any attempt to discuss bias and objectivity in relation to argument as a contrasting pair. Still, several senses of both terms relate to argumentation. I offer an inventory of them.


The Method Of Relevant Variables, Objectivity, And Boas, James B. Freeman May 2016

The Method Of Relevant Variables, Objectivity, And Boas, James B. Freeman

OSSA Conference Archive

L. J. Cohen has presented an understanding of appraising argument strength which applies to a variety of types of defeasible reasoning. This method can be used to explicate how a body of information may back a warrant and to rank different bodies of evidence on strength of backing. We shall argue that this method allows backing warrants objectively, whether they are inductive warrants backed by observation or moral warrants backed in part a priori. The method also suggests where arguments employing these warrants may be vulnerable to bias bias but need not be infected by it.


Virtuous Vices: On Objectivity, Bias, And Virtue In Argumentation, Daniel H. Cohen, Katharina Stevens May 2016

Virtuous Vices: On Objectivity, Bias, And Virtue In Argumentation, Daniel H. Cohen, Katharina Stevens

OSSA Conference Archive

How is it possible that biases are cognitive vices, objectivity is an exemplary intellectual virtue, and yet objectivity is itself a bias? In this paper, we argue that objectivity is indeed a kind of bias but is still an argumentative virtue. In common with many biases – and many virtues – its effects are neither uniformly negative nor uniformly positive. Consequences alone are not enough to determine which character traits are argumentative virtues. Context matters.

The opening section addresses the problem of identifying argumentative virtues and provides a preliminary response to recent questions from Goddu and Godden regarding the foundations of virtue-based ...


“Strategically Wrong”: Bias And Argumentation, Cristian Santibanez Yanez May 2016

“Strategically Wrong”: Bias And Argumentation, Cristian Santibanez Yanez

OSSA Conference Archive

The brain is composed of mutually inconsistent modules that contain contradictory beliefs. What consequences could this view have on argumentation? In order to sketch an answer, first the family of concepts of what is called generalized deception is discussed; then, this discussion is applied to the problem of the social influence bias to observe both how the mind works strategically wrong and what kind of arguments are used within this mental design in a social argumentative context.


Emotional Arguments: What Would Neuroscientists And Psychologists Say?, Linda Carozza May 2016

Emotional Arguments: What Would Neuroscientists And Psychologists Say?, Linda Carozza

OSSA Conference Archive

Why is there resistance in acknowledging emotional arguments? I explore the ambiguity entrenched in the emotional mode of argument, which may contribute to the lack of widespread agreement about its existence. In particular, belief systems and personality styles are addressed, as they are integral to the emotional mode of argumentation. This multidisciplinary approach neither advocates or dismisses the emotional mode; it adds another layer of understanding to the literature that is important to consider.


Bias In Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments, Patrick Bondy May 2016

Bias In Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments, Patrick Bondy

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper is about bias and ad hominem arguments. It will begin by rehearsing some reasons for thinking that there are both legitimate and illegitimate ad hominems, as well as reasons for thinking that biases can be both justified and unjustified. It will explain that justified biases about people with certain social identities can give rise to both legitimate and illegitimate ad hominem attacks, while unjustified biases only give rise to illegitimate ad hominems.

The paper will then describe Audrey Yap’s view that even when an unjustified bias is made explicit and shown to be unjustified, it can still ...


Exploring Argumentation, Objectivity, And Bias: The Case Of Mathematical Infinity, Ami Mamolo May 2016

Exploring Argumentation, Objectivity, And Bias: The Case Of Mathematical Infinity, Ami Mamolo

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper presents an overview of several years of my research into individuals’ reasoning, argumentation, and bias when addressing problems, scenarios, and symbols related to mathematical infinity. There is a long history of debate around what constitutes “objective truth” in the realm of mathematical infinity, dating back to ancient Greece (e.g., Dubinsky et al., 2005). Modes of argumentation, hindrances, and intuitions have been largely consistent over the years and across levels of expertise (e.g., Brown et al., 2010; Fischbein et al., 1979, Tsamir, 1999). This presentation examines the interrelated complexities of notions of objectivity, bias, and argumentation as ...


Biases, Bumps, Nudges, Query Lists, And Zero Tolerance Policies, Sheldon Wein May 2016

Biases, Bumps, Nudges, Query Lists, And Zero Tolerance Policies, Sheldon Wein

OSSA Conference Archive

Zero tolerance policies are often mistakenly thought to be the best way to deal with pressing social problems. However, most arguments for zero tolerance policies are either based on inaccurate premises or they commit the zero tolerance fallacy. This paper explores ways that we might counteract the bias in favor of zero tolerance policies by adding a query list to the choice architecture.


Virtue Argumentation And Bias, Andrew Aberdein May 2016

Virtue Argumentation And Bias, Andrew Aberdein

OSSA Conference Archive

Virtue Argumentation and Bias

PAPER

Virtue theories of argumentation (VTA) are a burgeoning programme [2]. Bias is a familiar impediment to good argument, which has drawn renewed attention as a result of psychological research demonstrating the prevalence of cognitive biases and implicit associations. Despite some attempts to utilise the resources of VTA to address bias, there has been little acknowledgement of the obstacle that bias presents to VTA. Specifically, VTA seems vulnerable to a situationist challenge, analogous to similar challenges in virtue ethics and epistemology, that behavioural dispositions are too sensitive to specific situations for virtues to be psychologically plausible ...


Agnotology And Argumentation: A Rhetorical Taxonomy Of Not-Knowing, Blake D. Scott May 2016

Agnotology And Argumentation: A Rhetorical Taxonomy Of Not-Knowing, Blake D. Scott

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper attempts to integrate an agnotological taxonomy of “not-knowing” with argumentation theory. Given rhetoric’s emphasis on what arguers choose to make present for their audience, it is argued that the rhetorical approach is best suited to accommodate the proposed taxonomy. In doing so we can improve the capacities of both arguers and audiences to detect adverse elements such as prejudices, implicit biases, and ideologies, which can restrict an argument’s claim to objectivity.


Pursuing Objectivity: How Virtuous Can You Get?, José Ángel Gascón May 2016

Pursuing Objectivity: How Virtuous Can You Get?, José Ángel Gascón

OSSA Conference Archive

While, in common usage, objectivity is usually regarded as a virtue, and failures to be objective as vices, this concept tends to be absent in argumentation theory. This paper will explore the possibility of taking objectivity as an argumentative virtue. Several problems immediately arise: could objectivity be understood in positive terms— not only as mere absence of bias? Is it an attainable ideal? Or perhaps objectivity could be explained as a combination of other virtues?


The Polysemy Of ‘Fallacy’—Or ‘Bias’, For That Matter, Frank Zenker May 2016

The Polysemy Of ‘Fallacy’—Or ‘Bias’, For That Matter, Frank Zenker

OSSA Conference Archive

Starting with a brief overview of current usages (Sect. 2), this paper offers some constituents of a use-based analysis of ‘fallacy’, listing 16 conditions that have, for the most part implicitly, been discussed in the literature (Sect. 3). Our thesis is that at least three related conceptions of ‘fallacy’ can be identified. The 16 conditions thus serve to “carve out” a semantic core and to distinguish three core-specifications. As our discussion suggests, these specifications can be related to three normative positions in the philosophy of human reasoning: the meliorist, the apologist, and the panglossian (Sect. 4). Seeking to make these ...


Commentary On Explicating And Negotiating Bias In Interdisciplinary Argumentation Using Abductive Tools, Tracy A. Bowell May 2016

Commentary On Explicating And Negotiating Bias In Interdisciplinary Argumentation Using Abductive Tools, Tracy A. Bowell

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On: Frank Zenkers’S “The Polysemy Of ‘Fallacy’– Or ‘Bias’, For That Matter”, Michel Dufour May 2016

Commentary On: Frank Zenkers’S “The Polysemy Of ‘Fallacy’– Or ‘Bias’, For That Matter”, Michel Dufour

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On 'Pursuing Objectivity: How Virtuous Can You Get?', William R. Minto May 2016

Commentary On 'Pursuing Objectivity: How Virtuous Can You Get?', William R. Minto

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Definition: A Three-Dimensional Analysis With Bearing On Key Concepts, Robert H. Ennis Phd May 2016

Definition: A Three-Dimensional Analysis With Bearing On Key Concepts, Robert H. Ennis Phd

OSSA Conference Archive

This essay presents a three-dimensional analysis of definition (form, stance, and content) with application to making and evaluating definitions; teaching how to define; avoiding equivocation with "argument" and "bias"; and, using the concept-conception distinction, avoiding being deterred by the many definitions of "critical thinking", and seeing the usefulness of objectivity in everyday arguments in spite of existing conflict and confusion about aspects of objectivity.