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Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

Review Of "Reckoning With The Imagination: Wittgenstein And The Aesthetics Of Literary Experience" By C. Altieri, Richard Thomas Eldridge Jul 2016

Review Of "Reckoning With The Imagination: Wittgenstein And The Aesthetics Of Literary Experience" By C. Altieri, Richard Thomas Eldridge

Philosophy Faculty Works

No abstract provided.


Knowledge Across Contexts. A Problem For Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, Peter Baumann Jun 2016

Knowledge Across Contexts. A Problem For Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, Peter Baumann

Philosophy Faculty Works

The possibility of knowledge attributions across contexts (where attributor and subject find themselves in different epistemic contexts) can create serious problems for certain views of knowledge. Amongst such views is subject-sensitive invariantism—the view that knowledge is determined not only by epistemic factors (belief, truth, evidence, etc.), but also by non-epistemic factors (practical interests, etc.). I argue that subject-sensitive invariantism either runs into a contradiction or has to make very implausible assumptions. The problem has been very much neglected but is so serious that one should look for alternative accounts of knowledge.


Philosophy, Literature, Death, And Wisdom: On Philip Kitcher's "Deaths In Venice", Richard Thomas Eldridge Apr 2016

Philosophy, Literature, Death, And Wisdom: On Philip Kitcher's "Deaths In Venice", Richard Thomas Eldridge

Philosophy Faculty Works

No abstract provided.


Epistemic Contrastivism, Knowledge And Practical Reasoning, Peter Baumann Feb 2016

Epistemic Contrastivism, Knowledge And Practical Reasoning, Peter Baumann

Philosophy Faculty Works

Epistemic contrastivism is the view that knowledge is a ternary relation between a person, a proposition and a set of contrast propositions. This view is in tension with widely shared accounts of practical reasoning: be it the claim that knowledge of the premises is necessary for acceptable practical reasoning based on them or sufficient for the acceptability of the use of the premises in practical reasoning, or be it the claim that there is a looser connection between knowledge and practical reasoning. Given plausible assumptions, epistemic contrastivism implies that we should cut all links between knowledge and practical reasoning. However ...