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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

Mapping Objectivity And Bias In Relation To Argument, J. Anthony Blair May 2016

Mapping Objectivity And Bias In Relation To Argument, J. Anthony Blair

OSSA Conference Archive

The conference theme invites contrasts between objectivity and bias, since the two are commonly considered contraries. But there are a variety of meanings of the two and a corresponding variety of contraries. Thus there is a problem for any attempt to discuss bias and objectivity in relation to argument as a contrasting pair. Still, several senses of both terms relate to argumentation. I offer an inventory of them.


Another Dimension To Deep Disagreements: Trust In Argumentation, Moira L. Kloster May 2016

Another Dimension To Deep Disagreements: Trust In Argumentation, Moira L. Kloster

OSSA Conference Archive

I will connect the literature on deep disagreements with the literature on trust to construct a two-dimensional picture of the limits of argument. Argumentation and trust are important to the functioning of society, but each sets different expectations for when arguments can and should be used to resolve disagreements. When trust is factored in, we see a more nuanced picture of which disagreements will remain too deep for objective argument. Affective and social aspects of argument are not independent of procedure and content.


Ad Stuprum: The Fallacy Of Appeal To Sex, Beverley I. Anger Ms., Catherine Hundleby Dr. May 2016

Ad Stuprum: The Fallacy Of Appeal To Sex, Beverley I. Anger Ms., Catherine Hundleby Dr.

OSSA Conference Archive

Arguments sometimes appeal to sex by invoking the sexuality of a model or a person or the promise of sexual gratification. When sexual gratification is not a relevant consideration, the appeal seems to be fallacious.

We will address when this may be an appropriate line of reasoning -- there is such a thing as “sex appeal”--and when it may be biased to assume the relevance of sexuality. Advertising, which provides infinite examples of appeal to sex, may be questionable as a case of argumentation, as opposed to some other sort of negotiation or communication, especially perhaps in its reliance on ...


Deliberation, Practical Reasoning And Problem-Solving, Douglas Walton, Alice Toniolo May 2016

Deliberation, Practical Reasoning And Problem-Solving, Douglas Walton, Alice Toniolo

OSSA Conference Archive

We present a series of realistic examples of deliberation and discuss how they can form the basis for building a typology of deliberation dialogues. The observations from our examples are used to suggest that argumentation researchers and philosophers have been thinking about deliberation in overly simplistic ways. We argue that to include all the kinds of argumentation that make up realistic deliberations, it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of deliberations. We propose a model including a problem-solving type of deliberation based on practical reasoning, characterised by revisions of the initial issue made necessary by the agents’ increased knowledge ...


Outstanding Questions About Analogies, Trudy Govier May 2016

Outstanding Questions About Analogies, Trudy Govier

OSSA Conference Archive

I consider several outstanding questions about analogies. These include the following: (a) issues of interpretation especially with regard to whether an analogy should be considered argumentative, as distinct from serving as an illustration, explanation, or matter of rhetorical interest; (b) whether and how to draw a distinction between inductive analogies and a priori analogies; and (c) whether a priori analogies should be reconstructed as deductively valid arguments. The discussion will explore broader themes such as the distinction between the a priori and the deductive, and whether a priori analogies offer reasons for a choice, as distinct from a basis for ...


Transsubjectivity, David Hitchcock May 2016

Transsubjectivity, David Hitchcock

OSSA Conference Archive

I describe and evaluate Harald Wohlrapp’s framing of “reasonable argumentation” in The Concept of Argument as argumentation guided by the “principle of transsubjectivity ... that, beginning with my subjectivity, I put my actual ego up for consideration as well as heighten and transcend it by seeking to participate in a general human potential, which is only attainable by recognizing the subjectivity of the Other”, and thus as having a quasi-religious meaning.


Don’T Worry, Be Gappy! On The Unproblematic Gappiness Of Alleged Fallacies, Fabio Paglieri May 2016

Don’T Worry, Be Gappy! On The Unproblematic Gappiness Of Alleged Fallacies, Fabio Paglieri

OSSA Conference Archive

The history of fallacy theory is long, distinguished and, admittedly, checkered. I offer a bird eye view on it, with the aim of contrasting the standard conception of fallacies as attractive and universal errors that are hard to eradicate (section 1) with the contemporary preoccupation with “non-fallacious fallacies”, that is, arguments that fit the bill of one of the traditional fallacies but are actually respectable enough to be used in appropriate contexts (section 2). Godden and Zenker have recently argued that reinterpreting alleged fallacies as non-fallacious arguments requires supplementing the textual material with something else, e.g. probability distributions, pragmatic ...


The Method Of Relevant Variables, Objectivity, And Boas, James B. Freeman May 2016

The Method Of Relevant Variables, Objectivity, And Boas, James B. Freeman

OSSA Conference Archive

L. J. Cohen has presented an understanding of appraising argument strength which applies to a variety of types of defeasible reasoning. This method can be used to explicate how a body of information may back a warrant and to rank different bodies of evidence on strength of backing. We shall argue that this method allows backing warrants objectively, whether they are inductive warrants backed by observation or moral warrants backed in part a priori. The method also suggests where arguments employing these warrants may be vulnerable to bias bias but need not be infected by it.


Splitting A Difference Of Opinion, Jan Albert Van Laar, Erik C W Krabbe May 2016

Splitting A Difference Of Opinion, Jan Albert Van Laar, Erik C W Krabbe

OSSA Conference Archive

When unable to resolve a conflict of opinion about the objective worth of an action proposal, discussants may choose to negotiate for a compromise. Is it legitimate to abandon the search for a resolution, and instead enter into a negotiation that aims at settling the difference of opinion? What is the nature of a compromise, in contradistinction to a resolution? What kinds of argument do participants typically put to use in their negotiation dialogues?


On Being Objective: Hard Data, Soft Data And Baseball., Michael A. Gilbert May 2016

On Being Objective: Hard Data, Soft Data And Baseball., Michael A. Gilbert

OSSA Conference Archive

“Objective” is a term that has a long and sometimes tumultuous history and a wide range of meanings. The sense in which I am interested here is the one that refers to ways of thinking, and especially the explicit criticism of an argument or judgment as not being “objective,” as exemplified in the following.

  • You’re not being objective.
  • You have to look at it objectively.
  • Objectively, the best choice is…
  • Being objective, I’d have to say…

Implicit in these statements is an ideology that denigrates emotion and other communicative aspects in favour of an idealized sense of fact ...


The Normative Significance Of Deep Disagreement, Tim Dare May 2016

The Normative Significance Of Deep Disagreement, Tim Dare

OSSA Conference Archive

Some normative problems are difficult because of the number and complexity of the issues they involve. Rational resolution might be hard but it seems at least possible. Other problems are not merely complex and multi-faceted but ‘deep’. They have a logical structure that precludes rational resolution. Treatments of deep disagreement often hint at sinister implications. If doubt is cast on our 'final vocabulary', writes Richard Rorty, we are left with "no noncircular argumentative recourse .... [B]eyond them there is only helpless passivity or a resort to force.” I will argue that some normative problems are deep, but that we need ...


Argument Objectivity And Ontological/Logical Pluralism: Must Arguments Be Domain Sensitive?, Philip Rose May 2016

Argument Objectivity And Ontological/Logical Pluralism: Must Arguments Be Domain Sensitive?, Philip Rose

OSSA Conference Archive

The idea of ontological/logical pluralism raises an interesting question about the objectivity of arguments and argument forms: Are all arguments and argument forms domain dependent? In his recent work Bruno Latour outlines a radical form of ontological pluralism in which each domain or “mode of existence” has its own set of “felicity conditions” that serve as “veridiction” conditions unique to that mode. To “speak well” requires that one speak in the “interpretive key” proper to each mode. Since there is no “meta-language” that crosses all modes, then all modes must be assessed using the felicity or veridiction conditions peculiar ...


The Use Of Arguments A Fortiori In Decision Making, Sandra Clemencia Valencia Martinez May 2016

The Use Of Arguments A Fortiori In Decision Making, Sandra Clemencia Valencia Martinez

OSSA Conference Archive

Some decisions involve the use of a variety forms of arguments in order to balance different alternatives before getting a choice which is expected to be the better to solve the problem at issue. By doing this, there are some cases where people are able to or urge moving towards the choice that is most advantageous, probable or acceptable, and at other times towards a choice that is less negative or adverse than the others. Both alternatives depict different ways of searching for the stronger reason at stake. This means that the a fortiori argument is being used as a ...


Commentary On E. Popa’S “Normative Argumentation Theory Without Fundamental Principles”, S. W. Patterson May 2016

Commentary On E. Popa’S “Normative Argumentation Theory Without Fundamental Principles”, S. W. Patterson

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Reply To Commentary On “Patrick Bondy, Bias In Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments”, Patrick Bondy May 2016

Reply To Commentary On “Patrick Bondy, Bias In Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments”, Patrick Bondy

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


When Different Perspectives Interact: A Historical Account Of Informal Logic Between 1983 And 1987, Takuzo Konishi May 2016

When Different Perspectives Interact: A Historical Account Of Informal Logic Between 1983 And 1987, Takuzo Konishi

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper will describe what happened to the community of informal logicians between 1983 and 1987, when they started to interact with communication scholars, rhetoricians and Pragma-Dialecticians. Special attention will be paid to key events, such as the Second International Symposiums on Informal Logic (SISIL), the founding of AILACT (Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking) in 1983, the start of journal Informal logic in 1984, and the international conference on argumentation held at Amsterdam in 1986.


Commentary On “Objectivity In Newsmaking: An Argumentative Perspective”: Reflections On Argument In Practice, Mark Aakhus May 2016

Commentary On “Objectivity In Newsmaking: An Argumentative Perspective”: Reflections On Argument In Practice, Mark Aakhus

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


On The Objectivity Of Norms Of Argumentation, Michael Hoppmann May 2016

On The Objectivity Of Norms Of Argumentation, Michael Hoppmann

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper addresses the relationship between norms of reasoning and norms of politeness: To what extend can one be polite and reasonable at the same time? For this purpose, a normative system of reasoning (i.e. the model of the pragma-dialectical critical discussion) is contrasted with a normative system of politeness (Leech’s Politeness Maxims). If and when they are in conflict: How can the communicator solve this tension?


Background Nonverbal Disagreement During Televised Political Debates: A Strategic Maneuvering Approach, Harry Weger Jr., Edward Hinck, John Seiter May 2016

Background Nonverbal Disagreement During Televised Political Debates: A Strategic Maneuvering Approach, Harry Weger Jr., Edward Hinck, John Seiter

OSSA Conference Archive

Since the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon presidential debates, interest in the impact of televised debates on political campaigns has grown steadily among scholars of argumentation and rhetorical communication. In addition to communicating policy positions of a candidate, televised debates provide the voting public one of the few opportunities to build or solidify impressions of candidates based on a (at least semi-) spontaneous social performance in which candidates meet face-to-face to discuss their differences. The strategies candidates use to communicate their policies and their desired image during a debate can influence the direction of public opinion toward them. We claim in this essay ...


Commentary On: John Fields’S “Objectivity, Autonomy, And The Use Of Arguments From Authority”, Maurice A. Finocchiaro May 2016

Commentary On: John Fields’S “Objectivity, Autonomy, And The Use Of Arguments From Authority”, Maurice A. Finocchiaro

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Douglas N. Walton And Alice Toniolo’S “Deliberation, Practical Reasoning And Problem-Solving”, Hubert Marraud May 2016

Commentary On Douglas N. Walton And Alice Toniolo’S “Deliberation, Practical Reasoning And Problem-Solving”, Hubert Marraud

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Cionea And Hample, Michael Hoppmann May 2016

Commentary On Cionea And Hample, Michael Hoppmann

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Reply To Commentary On Thinking Critically About Beliefs It’S Hard To Think Critically About, Justine M. Kingsbury, Tracy Bowell May 2016

Reply To Commentary On Thinking Critically About Beliefs It’S Hard To Think Critically About, Justine M. Kingsbury, Tracy Bowell

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Virtuous Vices: On Objectivity, Bias, And Virtue In Argumentation, Daniel H. Cohen, Katharina Stevens May 2016

Virtuous Vices: On Objectivity, Bias, And Virtue In Argumentation, Daniel H. Cohen, Katharina Stevens

OSSA Conference Archive

How is it possible that biases are cognitive vices, objectivity is an exemplary intellectual virtue, and yet objectivity is itself a bias? In this paper, we argue that objectivity is indeed a kind of bias but is still an argumentative virtue. In common with many biases – and many virtues – its effects are neither uniformly negative nor uniformly positive. Consequences alone are not enough to determine which character traits are argumentative virtues. Context matters.

The opening section addresses the problem of identifying argumentative virtues and provides a preliminary response to recent questions from Goddu and Godden regarding the foundations of virtue-based ...


Meta-Argumentation In Deliberative Discourse: Rhetoric 1360b05-1365b21, Paula Olmos May 2016

Meta-Argumentation In Deliberative Discourse: Rhetoric 1360b05-1365b21, Paula Olmos

OSSA Conference Archive

In Rhetoric 1360b05-1365b21, Aristotle naturally assumes the debatable, exceptionable and multidimensional character of the kind of allegations, adduced as reasons for the proposals (Kock 2006, 2012; Vega 2013) which act as conclusions of the practical arguments typical of political debate. This is a problem which has been currently addressed in terms of the prima facie incommensurability caused by the multi-dimensionality of value-based argumentation, an approach that seems to lead us to an evaluative and dialectical dead-end. But in the Aristotelian text, we find a different tactic. Aristotle analyses in very explicit and revealing terms how the “continuum between argument and ...


On Appeals To (Visual) Models, Ian Dove May 2016

On Appeals To (Visual) Models, Ian Dove

OSSA Conference Archive

In some visual cases, especially those in which one reasons from a visual model to a conclusion, it is tempting to think that some new normative base, perhaps a visual logic is in order. I show that, at least in the case of what I’ll call appeal to visual models, the same criteria are required in visual and verbal cases.


“Strategically Wrong”: Bias And Argumentation, Cristian Santibanez Yanez May 2016

“Strategically Wrong”: Bias And Argumentation, Cristian Santibanez Yanez

OSSA Conference Archive

The brain is composed of mutually inconsistent modules that contain contradictory beliefs. What consequences could this view have on argumentation? In order to sketch an answer, first the family of concepts of what is called generalized deception is discussed; then, this discussion is applied to the problem of the social influence bias to observe both how the mind works strategically wrong and what kind of arguments are used within this mental design in a social argumentative context.


Thinking Critically About Beliefs It's Hard To Think Critically About, Justine M. Kingsbury, Tracy A. Bowell May 2016

Thinking Critically About Beliefs It's Hard To Think Critically About, Justine M. Kingsbury, Tracy A. Bowell

OSSA Conference Archive

There are some beliefs that are difficult to think critically about, even for those who have critical thinking skills and are committed to applying them to their own beliefs. These resistant beliefs are not all of a kind, and so a range of different strategies may be needed to get ourselves and others (in particular our students) to think critically about them. In this paper we suggest some such strategies.


Arguing Conductively Or Arguing Strategically?, Yun Xie May 2016

Arguing Conductively Or Arguing Strategically?, Yun Xie

OSSA Conference Archive

The topic of conductive argument has attracted much attention in recent argumentation studies, but most of the existing discussions are centered on a logical or epistemological perspective. This paper is to argue that conductive arguments could also be understood from a rhetorical perspective, and to offer a Pragma-dialectical point of view regarding to the likelihood and importance of conductive arguments. In particular, it is contended that the mentioning of counter-considerations in a conductive argument is mainly for some rhetorical concerns in order to achieve better persuasiveness in audience. On that basis, it is argued that conductive arguments can be theorized ...


Studying Rhetorical Audiences, Jens E. Kjeldsen May 2016

Studying Rhetorical Audiences, Jens E. Kjeldsen

OSSA Conference Archive

In rhetoric and argumentation research studies of empirical audiences are rare. Most studies are speaker- or text focussed. However, new media and new forms of communication make it harder to distinguish between speaker and audience. The active involvement of users and audiences is more important than ever before. Therefore, this paper argues that rhetorical research should reconsider the understanding, conceptualization and examination of the rhetorical audience. From mostly understanding audiences as theoretical constructions that are examined textually and speculatively, we should give more attention to empirical explorations of actual audiences and users.