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Philosophy Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

2016

Philosophy of Science

Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

Evidence And Formal Models In The Linguistic Sciences, Carlos Gray Santana Jan 2016

Evidence And Formal Models In The Linguistic Sciences, Carlos Gray Santana

Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations

This dissertation contains a collection of essays centered on the relationship between theoretical model-building and empirical evidence-gathering in linguistics and related language sciences. The first chapter sets the stage by demonstrating that the subject matter of linguistics is manifold, and contending that discussion of relationships between linguistic models, evidence, and language itself depends on the subject matter at hand. The second chapter defends a restrictive account of scientific evidence. I make use of this account in the third chapter, in which I argue that if my account of scientific evidence is correct, then linguistic intuitions do not generally qualify as ...


Data Epistemologies / Surveillance And Uncertainty, Sun Ha Hong Jan 2016

Data Epistemologies / Surveillance And Uncertainty, Sun Ha Hong

Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations

Data Epistemologies studies the changing ways in which ‘knowledge’ is defined, promised, problematised, legitimated vis-á-vis the advent of digital, ‘big’ data surveillance technologies in early twenty-first century America. As part of the period’s fascination with ‘new’ media and ‘big’ data, such technologies intersect ambitious claims to better knowledge with a problematisation of uncertainty. This entanglement, I argue, results in contextual reconfigurations of what ‘counts’ as knowledge and who (or what) is granted authority to produce it – whether it involves proving that indiscriminate domestic surveillance prevents terrorist attacks, to arguing that machinic sensors can know us better than we can ...