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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

A Critique Of Henrik Friberg-Fernros's Defense Of The Substance View, William Simkulet Nov 2016

A Critique Of Henrik Friberg-Fernros's Defense Of The Substance View, William Simkulet

Philosophy & Comparative Religion Department Faculty Publications

Proponents of the substance view contend that abortion is seriously morally wrong because it is killing something with the same inherent value and right to life as you or I. Rob Lovering offers two innovative criticisms of the anti-abortion position taken by the substance view - the rescue argument and the problem of spontaneous abortion. Henrik Friberg-Fernros offers an interesting response to Lovering, but one I argue would be inconsistent with the anti-abortion stance taken by most substance view theorists.


Abortion And Animal Rights: Does Either Topic Lead To The Other?, Nathan M. Nobis Dec 2015

Abortion And Animal Rights: Does Either Topic Lead To The Other?, Nathan M. Nobis

Nathan M. Nobis, Ph.D.

Should people who believe in animal rights think that abortion is wrong? Should pro-lifers accept animal rights? If you think it’s wrong to kill fetuses to end pregnancies, should you also think it’s wrong to kill animals to, say, eat them? If you, say, oppose animal research, should you also oppose abortion?
Some argue ‘yes’ and others argue ‘no’ to either or both sets of questions.The correct answer, however, seems to be, ‘it depends’: it depends on why someone accepts animal rights, and why someone thinks abortion is wrong: it depends on their reasons.

https://whatswrongcvsp.com ...


Review Of Sherry F. Colb And Michael C. Dorf Beating Hearts: Abortion And Animal Rights, Nathan M. Nobis Dec 2015

Review Of Sherry F. Colb And Michael C. Dorf Beating Hearts: Abortion And Animal Rights, Nathan M. Nobis

Nathan M. Nobis, Ph.D.


In this book[1], law professors Sherry F. Colb and Michael C. Dorf argue that:
  1. many non-human animals, at least vertebrates, are morally considerable and prima facie wrong to harm because they are sentient, i.e., conscious and capable of experiencing pains and pleasures;
  2. most aborted human fetuses are not sentient -- their brains and nervous systems are not yet developed enough for sentience -- and so the motivating moral concern for animals doesn't apply to most abortions[2];
  3. later abortions affecting sentient fetuses, while rare, raise serious moral concerns, but these abortions -- like all abortions -- invariably involve the interests and ...