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Deliberation

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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

Meta-Argumentation In Deliberative Discourse: Rhetoric 1360b05-1365b21, Paula Olmos May 2016

Meta-Argumentation In Deliberative Discourse: Rhetoric 1360b05-1365b21, Paula Olmos

OSSA Conference Archive

In Rhetoric 1360b05-1365b21, Aristotle naturally assumes the debatable, exceptionable and multidimensional character of the kind of allegations, adduced as reasons for the proposals (Kock 2006, 2012; Vega 2013) which act as conclusions of the practical arguments typical of political debate. This is a problem which has been currently addressed in terms of the prima facie incommensurability caused by the multi-dimensionality of value-based argumentation, an approach that seems to lead us to an evaluative and dialectical dead-end. But in the Aristotelian text, we find a different tactic. Aristotle analyses in very explicit and revealing terms how the “continuum between argument and ...


Where Is The Reasonable? Objectivity And Bias Of Practical Argument, Marcin Lewinski May 2016

Where Is The Reasonable? Objectivity And Bias Of Practical Argument, Marcin Lewinski

OSSA Conference Archive

The paper offers a theoretical investigation regarding the sources of normativity in practical argument from the following perspective: Do we need objectively-minded, unbiased arguers or can we count on “good” argumentative processes in which individual biases cancel each other out? I will address this problem by analysing a detailed structure of practical argument and its varieties. I will argue that given the structure proposed, biased advocacy upholds reasonableness whenever the argumentative activity is adequately designed.


Argumentative Virtues And Deep Disagreement, Chris Campolo May 2013

Argumentative Virtues And Deep Disagreement, Chris Campolo

OSSA Conference Archive

The theoretical possibility of deep disagreement gives rise to an important practical problem: a deep disagreement may in practice look and feel like a merely stubborn normal disagreement. In this paper I critique strategies for dealing with this practical problem. According to their proponents these strategies exhibit argumentative virtue, but I will show that they embody serious argumentative (and even moral) vices.


Considering The Roles Of Values In Practical Reasoning Argumentation Evaluation, Michael D. Baumtrog May 2013

Considering The Roles Of Values In Practical Reasoning Argumentation Evaluation, Michael D. Baumtrog

OSSA Conference Archive

Building upon the role values take in Walton’s theory of practical reasoning, this paper will frame the question of how values should be evaluated into the broader question of what reasonable practical argumentation is. The thesis argued for is that if a positive evaluation of practical reasoning argumentation requires that the argument avoid a morally negative conclusion, then the role of values should be given a central, rather than supportive, position in practical argument evaluation.


The Editorial Meeting Discussion As An Argumentative Activity Type, Marta Zampa May 2013

The Editorial Meeting Discussion As An Argumentative Activity Type, Marta Zampa

OSSA Conference Archive

A still uninvestigated argumentative reasoning hides behind news texts, in the discussions surrounding the writing process. I try to fill this gap by reconstructing how newsroom decision-making functions from a combined argumentative and discourse analytical perspective. In order to do so, I analyze the editorial meeting discussion about a potential news item and its production as an argumentative activity type, using a French- and German-language corpus collected at the Swiss public broadcast service.


Virtue Reversed: Principal Argumentative Vices In Political Debate, Christian Kock May 2013

Virtue Reversed: Principal Argumentative Vices In Political Debate, Christian Kock

OSSA Conference Archive

Contributing to an understanding of the true virtues of argumentation, this paper sketches and exemplifies a theoretically reasoned but simple typology of argumentative vices or ‘malpractices’ that are rampant in political debate in modern democracies. The typology reflects, in negative, a set of argumentative norms, thus making a bid for something that civic instruction might profitably teach students at all levels about deliberative democracy.