Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Philosophy Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Conference

Argumentation schemes

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

The Use Of Arguments A Fortiori In Decision Making, Sandra Clemencia Valencia Martinez May 2016

The Use Of Arguments A Fortiori In Decision Making, Sandra Clemencia Valencia Martinez

OSSA Conference Archive

Some decisions involve the use of a variety forms of arguments in order to balance different alternatives before getting a choice which is expected to be the better to solve the problem at issue. By doing this, there are some cases where people are able to or urge moving towards the choice that is most advantageous, probable or acceptable, and at other times towards a choice that is less negative or adverse than the others. Both alternatives depict different ways of searching for the stronger reason at stake. This means that the a fortiori argument is being used as a ...


On Appeals To (Visual) Models, Ian Dove May 2016

On Appeals To (Visual) Models, Ian Dove

OSSA Conference Archive

In some visual cases, especially those in which one reasons from a visual model to a conclusion, it is tempting to think that some new normative base, perhaps a visual logic is in order. I show that, at least in the case of what I’ll call appeal to visual models, the same criteria are required in visual and verbal cases.


Walton’S Argumentation Schemes, Christoph Lumer May 2016

Walton’S Argumentation Schemes, Christoph Lumer

OSSA Conference Archive

The contribution critically discusses Walton's (and Reed’s and Macagno’s) argumentation scheme approach. On the one hand, its enormous richness and closeness to the empirical argumentation material is appreciated, but, on the other, fundamental conceptual weaknesses are revealed. Although the approach more recently has been declared to strive for “true beliefs and correct choices” it has not systematically developed the proposed schemes in a way that these goals are reached. Accordingly, many proposed schemes are fallacious from an epistemological standpoint.


What We Hide In Words: Value-Based Reasoning And Emotive Language, Fabrizio Macagno May 2013

What We Hide In Words: Value-Based Reasoning And Emotive Language, Fabrizio Macagno

OSSA Conference Archive

There are emotively powerful words that can modify our judgment, arouse our emotions and influence our decisions. This paper shows how the use of emotive meaning in argumentation can be explained by showing how their logical dimension, which can be analysed using argumentation schemes, combines with heuristic processes triggered by emotions. Arguing with emotive words is shown to use value-based practical reasoning grounded on hierarchies of values and maxims of experience for evaluative classification.


Modeling Critical Questions As Additional Premises, Douglas Walton, Thomas F. Gordon, Scott F. Aikin May 2011

Modeling Critical Questions As Additional Premises, Douglas Walton, Thomas F. Gordon, Scott F. Aikin

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper shows how the critical questions matching an argumentation scheme can be mod-eled in the Carneades argumentation system as three kinds of premises. Ordinary premises hold only if they are supported by sufficient arguments. Assumptions hold, by default, until they have been questioned. With exceptions the negation holds, by default, until the exception has been supported by sufficient arguments. By “sufficient arguments”, we mean arguments sufficient to satisfy the applicable proof standard.


Implicatures And Hierarchies Of Presumptions, Fabrizio Macagno, Frank Zenker May 2011

Implicatures And Hierarchies Of Presumptions, Fabrizio Macagno, Frank Zenker

OSSA Conference Archive

Implicatures are described as particular forms reasoning from best explanation, in which the para-digm of possible explanations consists of the possible semantic interpretations of a sentence or a word. The need for explanation will be shown to be triggered by conflicts between presumptions, namely hearer’s dialogical expectations and the presumptive sentence meaning. What counts as the best explanation can be established on the grounds of hierarchies of presumptions, dependent on dialogue types and interlocutors’ culture.