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Articles 31 - 45 of 45

Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

Integrating Natural Language Processing And Pragmatic Argumentation Theories For Argumentation Support, Mark Aaknus, Smaranda Muresan, Nina Wacholder May 2013

Integrating Natural Language Processing And Pragmatic Argumentation Theories For Argumentation Support, Mark Aaknus, Smaranda Muresan, Nina Wacholder

OSSA Conference Archive

Natural language processing (NLP) research and design that aims to model and detect opposition in text for the purpose of opinion classification, sentiment analysis, and meeting tracking, generally excludes the interactional, pragmatic aspects of online text. We propose that a promising direction for NLP is to incorporate the insights of pragmatic, dialectical theories of argumentation to more fully exploit the potential of NLP to offer sound, robust systems for various kinds of argumentation support.


Does Happiness Increase The Objectivity Of Arguers?, Moira Howes May 2013

Does Happiness Increase The Objectivity Of Arguers?, Moira Howes

OSSA Conference Archive

At first glance, happiness and objectivity seem to have little in common. I claim, however, that subjective and eudaimonic happiness promotes arguer objectivity. To support my claim, I focus on connections between happiness, social intelligence, and intellectual virtue. After addressing objections concerning unhappy objective and happy unobjective arguers, I conclude that communities should value happiness in argumentative contexts and use happiness as an indicator of their capacity for objective argumentation.


The Virtue Of Restraint: Rebalancing Power In Arguments, Moira Kloster May 2013

The Virtue Of Restraint: Rebalancing Power In Arguments, Moira Kloster

OSSA Conference Archive

Is argument a game everyone should be able to play? If it is, current argument practices do not yet level the playing field enough for a fair game. We may build in subtle imbalances that work against people who cannot easily adapt to the most common patterns of argumentative interaction. We need better ways to build trust, to create safety, and adapt goals in order to bring everyone into the game.


The Incompleteness Problem For A Virtue-Based Theory Of Argumentation, Brian Macpherson May 2013

The Incompleteness Problem For A Virtue-Based Theory Of Argumentation, Brian Macpherson

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The incompleteness problem for virtue ethics is inherited by a virtue-based theory of argumentation as developed by Daniel Cohen (2007). A complete normative theory of argumentation should be able to provide reasons for why argumentative virtues such as open-mindedness are worthwhile, along with being able to resolve conflicts of such virtues. Adumbrating virtue-based argumentation theory with a pragmatic utilitarian approach constitutes a more complete theory that can account for why argumentative virtues are worthwhile.


Virtue, In Context, Daniel H. Cohen May 2013

Virtue, In Context, Daniel H. Cohen

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Virtue argumentation theory provides the best framework for accommodating the notion of an argument that is “fully satisfying” in a robust and integrated sense. The process of explicating the notion of fully satisfying arguments requires expanding the concept of arguers to include all of an argument’s participants, including judges, juries, and interested spectators. And that, in turn, requires expanding the concept of an argument itself to include its entire context.


Norms Of Advocacy, Jean Goodwin May 2013

Norms Of Advocacy, Jean Goodwin

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This essay advances an account of the ordinary speech activity of advocating. The ethical principles developed within advocacy professions such as law and public relations show that advocates are not just out to persuade. Instead, they undertake obligations to make the best case for their positions while also maintaining the integrity of the communication systems within which they operate. While not offering full justifications, advocates nevertheless help auditors by making conspicuous the outer bounds of the arguable.


Fallacy Identification In A Dialectical Approach To Teaching Critical Thinking, Mark Battersby, Sharon Bailin, Jan Albert Van Laar May 2011

Fallacy Identification In A Dialectical Approach To Teaching Critical Thinking, Mark Battersby, Sharon Bailin, Jan Albert Van Laar

OSSA Conference Archive

The dialectical approach to teaching critical thinking is centred on a comparative evaluation of contending arguments, so that generally the strength of an argument for a position can only be assessed in the context of this dialectic. The identification of fallacies, though important, plays only a preliminary role in the evaluation to individual arguments. Our approach to fallacy identification and analysis sees fal-lacies as argument patterns whose persuasive power is disproportionate to their probative value.


‘Cognitive Systemic Dichotomization’ In Public Argumentation And Controversies, Marcelo Dascal, Amnon Knoll, Daniel Cohen May 2011

‘Cognitive Systemic Dichotomization’ In Public Argumentation And Controversies, Marcelo Dascal, Amnon Knoll, Daniel Cohen

OSSA Conference Archive

We describe and analyze an important cognitive obstacle in inter- and intra-community ar-gumentation processes, which we propose to call 'Cognitive Systemic Dichotomization' (CSD). This social phenomenon consists in the collective use of shared cognitive patterns based upon dichotomous schemati-zation of knowledge, values, and affection. We discuss the formative role of CSD on a community’s collec-tive cognition, identity, and public discourse, as well as the challenges it raises to reasoned argumentation, and how different approaches to argumentation undertake to face this obstacle to the reasonable debate of issues of public concern.


Evolution, Cognition And Argumentation, Cristian Santibanez Yanez, Michael A. Gilbert May 2011

Evolution, Cognition And Argumentation, Cristian Santibanez Yanez, Michael A. Gilbert

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Sperber and Mercier (2009, 2010) maintain that argumentation is a meta-representational module. In their evolutionary view of argumentation, the function of this module would be to regulate the flow of information between interlocutors through persuasiveness on the side of the communicator and epistemic vigilance on the side of the audience. The aim of this paper is to discuss this definition of argumen-tation by analyzing what they mean by “communicator’s persuasiveness” and “audience epistemic vigilance”


Conductive Arguments And The ‘Inference To The Best Explanation’, Dean Goorden, Thomas Fischer May 2011

Conductive Arguments And The ‘Inference To The Best Explanation’, Dean Goorden, Thomas Fischer

OSSA Conference Archive

I will demonstrate that conductive arguments are found in the inference to the best explana-tion as it is used in science. Conductive arguments, I argue, operate on two levels: the first is in the con-struction of hypotheses; the second is through the competition of hypotheses. By constructing arguments based on observations of facts, all possible (conceivable) factors are taken into account and a judgment is made based on our weighing of considerations: conductive argumentation.


Reason In The Balance: Teaching Critical Thinking As Dialectical, Sharon Bailin, Mark Battersby, Patrick Clauss May 2011

Reason In The Balance: Teaching Critical Thinking As Dialectical, Sharon Bailin, Mark Battersby, Patrick Clauss

OSSA Conference Archive

In this paper we describe the approach to critical thinking pedagogy used in our new text, Reason in the Balance: An Inquiry Approach to Critical Thinking. In this text we concentrate on develop-ing students’ ability to analyze and assess competing arguments in a dialectical context. This approach shifts the emphasis from the more common and traditional approach of evaluating individual arguments and fallacy identification. Our focus is on teaching students to analyze and assess competing arguments sur-rounding an issue with the goal of achieving a reasoned and justifiable judgment (an enterprise we refer to as inquiry).


Whose Toulmin, And Which Logic? A Response To Van Benthem, Yun Xie, Minghui Xiong, Hans V. Hansen May 2011

Whose Toulmin, And Which Logic? A Response To Van Benthem, Yun Xie, Minghui Xiong, Hans V. Hansen

OSSA Conference Archive

In a recent paper, “One Logician’s Perspective on Argumentation”, van Benthem expressed his reservations on Toulmin’s diagnosis and abandonment of formal logic, and argued that Toulmin was wrong for leading the study of argumentation apart from formal approach. In this paper we will try to reveal two se-rious misunderstandings of Toulmin’s ideas in his discussions, and thereby make an apology for Toulmin.


The Formal Failure And Social Success Of Logic, William Brooke, Andrew Aberdein May 2011

The Formal Failure And Social Success Of Logic, William Brooke, Andrew Aberdein

OSSA Conference Archive

Is formal logic a failure? It may be, if we accept the context-independent limits imposed by Russell, Frege, and others. In response to difficulties arising from such limitations I present a Toulmin-esque social recontextualization of formal logic. The results of my project provide a positive view of formal logic as a success while simultaneously reaffirming the social and contextual concerns of argumentation theorists, critical thinking scholars, and rhetoricians.


Fallacies: Do We “Use” Them Or “Commit” Them? Or: Is All Our Life Just A Collection Of Fallacies?, Igor Zagar, Dima Mohammed May 2011

Fallacies: Do We “Use” Them Or “Commit” Them? Or: Is All Our Life Just A Collection Of Fallacies?, Igor Zagar, Dima Mohammed

OSSA Conference Archive

After C. L. Hamblin's groundbreaking work Fallacies (1970), re-interpreting what used to be known as "mistakes in reasoning" or "bad arguments" since Aristotle (On Sophistical Refutations), the study of fallacies started to bloom, coming up with ever new perspectives and conceptualizations of what should count as a mistake in reasoning and argumentation, and why a certain kind of reasoning should at all be considered a mistake (Woods & Walton 1989, van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, etc.). This paper will be concerned with two questions. First, an epistemological one: do we (unintentionally) commit fallacies, or do we (intentionally) use them? Secondly, a ...


Argumentation And Emotional Cognition In Advertisements, M Ripley, Maureen P. Gowing May 2011

Argumentation And Emotional Cognition In Advertisements, M Ripley, Maureen P. Gowing

OSSA Conference Archive

From Spinoza to today, it has been noted that human beings respond to what is unusual in our lives. The advertising community knows this and struggles to find ways to be unusual in the face of an estimated 3,500 ads per day. One way is through emotion. This paper examines arguments made in advertisements where emotional cognition is appealed to and how they differ from ads that appeal to rational cognition.