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Arguments From Expert Opinion And Persistent Bias, Moti Mizrahi May 2016

Arguments From Expert Opinion And Persistent Bias, Moti Mizrahi

OSSA Conference Archive

Accounts of arguments from expert opinion take it for granted that expert judgments are reliable, and so an argument that proceeds from premises about what an expert judges to a conclusion that the expert is probably right is a strong argument. In my (2013), I considered a potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are more likely to be true than novice judgments, and discussed empirical evidence suggesting that expert judgments are not more reliable than novice judgments or even chance. In this paper, I consider another potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are not ...


Mark Twain, Argumentation Theorist, Chris Campolo May 2016

Mark Twain, Argumentation Theorist, Chris Campolo

OSSA Conference Archive

Commentators have read Twain’s Is Shakespeare Dead? as the strained work of a man worried about his own literary legacy. But it is actually an essay about argumentation. Twain writes about the burden of argument, premise relevance, understanding and inference, and norms and practices of argumentation. I will argue that what is taken to be a thoroughgoing cynicism on Twain’s part is best understood as a thoughtful scepticism about the scope of reasoning.


Ethical Argumentation, Objectivity, And Bias, Derek Allen May 2016

Ethical Argumentation, Objectivity, And Bias, Derek Allen

OSSA Conference Archive

On one account, the moral point of view is impartial, hence in this sense objective. On a different account, morality sometimes seems to recommend partiality, hence, in one sense of 'partiality,' bias. Still another view says that in some cases morality is neutral between impartiality and partiality in choosing between alternative actions. My main concern will be with impartiality and partiality (hence with objectivity and bias in corresponding senses of these words) in relation to arguments of the kind presented in first-order ethical argumentation (hence in relation to first-order ethical arguments). Part of my discussion will focus on one type ...


Bias In Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments, Patrick Bondy May 2016

Bias In Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments, Patrick Bondy

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper is about bias and ad hominem arguments. It will begin by rehearsing some reasons for thinking that there are both legitimate and illegitimate ad hominems, as well as reasons for thinking that biases can be both justified and unjustified. It will explain that justified biases about people with certain social identities can give rise to both legitimate and illegitimate ad hominem attacks, while unjustified biases only give rise to illegitimate ad hominems.

The paper will then describe Audrey Yap’s view that even when an unjustified bias is made explicit and shown to be unjustified, it can still ...


On The Very Concept Of An Enthymeme, G.C. Goddu May 2016

On The Very Concept Of An Enthymeme, G.C. Goddu

OSSA Conference Archive

An enthymeme is often defined as an argument with a missing component or an argument with an unexpressed component. Roy Sorensen, in “Are Enthymemes Arguments?”, argues against the possibility of enthymemes being arguments at all, but he assumes that arguments are abstract objects. I shall present and explore some more metaphysically neutral arguments against enthymemes as arguments and ultimately conclude that while not conclusive, the most viable option is Sorensen’s—enthymemes are not arguments.


Two-Wise And Three-Wise Similarity, And Non-Deductive Analogical Arguments, Marcello Guarini May 2016

Two-Wise And Three-Wise Similarity, And Non-Deductive Analogical Arguments, Marcello Guarini

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper will add to the discourse on analogical arguments by showing that they need not be deductively reconstructed in common contexts of persuasion. Analogical arguments have varying degrees of similarity, which helps us to understand their varying degrees of strength. Pace Shecaira (2013) it will be argued that this is a common and useful way of examining analogical arguments. It will be shown that deductive reconstruction does not adequately capture the needed degrees of strength.

Let us start with two-wise similarity claims. Subject S1 says that the disputed case C1 is (relevantly) similar to C2 and ...


The Emotional Life Of Reason: Exploring Conceptions Of Objectivity, Robert C. Pinto, Laura E. Pinto May 2016

The Emotional Life Of Reason: Exploring Conceptions Of Objectivity, Robert C. Pinto, Laura E. Pinto

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper extends Pinto’s (2011) “Emotions and Reasons” (in which he argued that emotions provide reasons for action in so far as the beliefs and desires which make up reasons are constitutive elements of emotions) by exploring relationships between emotions-as-reasons and in (re)conceptualizing objectivity as naturalized to address the evaluative dimension. The paper addresses the emotional character of reason with respect to subjective and normative validity by shifting analysis to socially situated practices.


Open Mindedness, Tracy A. Bowell Dr, Justine Kingsbury Dr May 2016

Open Mindedness, Tracy A. Bowell Dr, Justine Kingsbury Dr

OSSA Conference Archive

Dewey defines open-mindedness as “freedom from prejudice, partisanship, and other such habits as close the mind and make it unwilling to consider new problems and entertain new ideas" (1910, p. 30). It is commonly included in lists of epistemic and argumentative virtues. We begin this paper with brief discussion of various accounts of open-mindedness. Our principle interest is in what it is to behave as an open-minded enquirer. Drawing on two cases, we consider whether open-minded behaviour varies between the contexts of solitary and community enquiry and whether inquirers face different challenges to behaving open-mindedly in each of these contexts ...


Arguing Conductively Or Arguing Strategically?, Yun Xie May 2016

Arguing Conductively Or Arguing Strategically?, Yun Xie

OSSA Conference Archive

The topic of conductive argument has attracted much attention in recent argumentation studies, but most of the existing discussions are centered on a logical or epistemological perspective. This paper is to argue that conductive arguments could also be understood from a rhetorical perspective, and to offer a Pragma-dialectical point of view regarding to the likelihood and importance of conductive arguments. In particular, it is contended that the mentioning of counter-considerations in a conductive argument is mainly for some rhetorical concerns in order to achieve better persuasiveness in audience. On that basis, it is argued that conductive arguments can be theorized ...


Damed If You Do; Damed If You Don’T: Cohen’S “Missed Opportunities”, Sharon Bailin, Mark Battersby May 2016

Damed If You Do; Damed If You Don’T: Cohen’S “Missed Opportunities”, Sharon Bailin, Mark Battersby

OSSA Conference Archive

In his paper, “Missed Opportunities in Argument Evaluation,” Daniel Cohen has in his sights a “curious” asymmetry in how we evaluate arguments: while we criticize arguments for failing to point out obvious objections to the proposed line of reasoning, we do not consider it critically culpable to fail to take into account arguments for the position. Cohen views this omission as a missed opportunity, for which he lays the blame largely at the metaphorical feet of the “Dominant Adversarial Model” of argumentation – the DAM account. We argue here that, while Cohen criticizes the DAM account for conceptualizing arguments as essentially ...


Thinking Critically About Beliefs It's Hard To Think Critically About, Justine M. Kingsbury, Tracy A. Bowell May 2016

Thinking Critically About Beliefs It's Hard To Think Critically About, Justine M. Kingsbury, Tracy A. Bowell

OSSA Conference Archive

There are some beliefs that are difficult to think critically about, even for those who have critical thinking skills and are committed to applying them to their own beliefs. These resistant beliefs are not all of a kind, and so a range of different strategies may be needed to get ourselves and others (in particular our students) to think critically about them. In this paper we suggest some such strategies.


On The Difference Between Fallacy And Sophism, Michel Dufour May 2016

On The Difference Between Fallacy And Sophism, Michel Dufour

OSSA Conference Archive

The translation into French of the English word “fallacy” opens a discussion on the difference between fallacy and sophism in English. The two words are sometimes synonyms, but a difference is sometimes made on the ground that a sophism is deliberate and a fallacy is non-deliberate. In a second part of the paper this distinctive criterion is taken seriously to discuss the relative frequency of sophisms and of fallacies for a typical kind of fallacious argument. I claim that this aspect should be taken into account by a theory of fallacious argument.


“Strategically Wrong”: Bias And Argumentation, Cristian Santibanez Yanez May 2016

“Strategically Wrong”: Bias And Argumentation, Cristian Santibanez Yanez

OSSA Conference Archive

The brain is composed of mutually inconsistent modules that contain contradictory beliefs. What consequences could this view have on argumentation? In order to sketch an answer, first the family of concepts of what is called generalized deception is discussed; then, this discussion is applied to the problem of the social influence bias to observe both how the mind works strategically wrong and what kind of arguments are used within this mental design in a social argumentative context.


A (Modest) Defense Of Fallacy Theory, Scott F. Aikin May 2016

A (Modest) Defense Of Fallacy Theory, Scott F. Aikin

OSSA Conference Archive

Fallacy theory has three significant challenges to it: the generality, scope, and negativity problems. To the generality problem, the connection between general types of bad arguments and tokens is a matter of refining the use of the vocabulary. To the scope problem, the breadth of fallacy’s instances is cause for development. To the negativity problem, fallacy theory must be coordinated with a program of adversariality-management


Emotional Legal Arguments And A Broken Leg, Rubens Damasceno-Morais May 2016

Emotional Legal Arguments And A Broken Leg, Rubens Damasceno-Morais

OSSA Conference Archive

We intend to examine ways that emotions may be intertwined within argumentative legal discourses. From the transcript of a brief trial in a Court of Appeal in Brazil we have the opportunity to observe how the emotional and rational reasoning live together in a deliberation among magistrates. “The leg broken case” allow us to examine how judges define the value of compensation to be paid in cases of moral damage. We show that not only technical arguments are the compounds of one decision; subjectivity is also important in that legal context. We would yet confirm what jurists and philosophers of ...


The Stance Of Personal Public Apology, Martha S. Cheng May 2016

The Stance Of Personal Public Apology, Martha S. Cheng

OSSA Conference Archive

Personal apology can be understood as self-defense—a response to an actual, implied, or anticipated accusation against one’s character. Within argumentation studies, scholars have investigated how public apologies are constructed to repair a speaker’s image and/or repair the speaker’s relationship with others through specific strategies. This paper broadens the study of apology by employing the sociolinguistic concept of stance, understood as the ways in which a speaker orients herself in relation to sociocultural values, other persons, actions, events, and, especially in the case of apology, another version of herself. In addition to explicit claims, stance can ...


Approaching Logos Among Reason, Rationality, And Reasonableness, Xuan Yang, Minghui Xiong May 2016

Approaching Logos Among Reason, Rationality, And Reasonableness, Xuan Yang, Minghui Xiong

OSSA Conference Archive

Logos, generally regarded as the basic principle of the operating world, seems to be closely tied up with development of human being. With the evolutionary history of human, logos evolves into three different dimensional expressions, namely reason, rationality, and reasonableness. In different historical periods, each expression of logos has their own glory days respectively. In the age of ancient Greek sages, reason referred to the whole range of subjects from geometry argumentation to rhetoric. Later on, there emerged a superiority on theoretical abstraction and logical deduction, which was called the dictatorship of rationality. Yet it was found that the bureaucratization ...


Exploring Argumentation, Objectivity, And Bias: The Case Of Mathematical Infinity, Ami Mamolo May 2016

Exploring Argumentation, Objectivity, And Bias: The Case Of Mathematical Infinity, Ami Mamolo

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper presents an overview of several years of my research into individuals’ reasoning, argumentation, and bias when addressing problems, scenarios, and symbols related to mathematical infinity. There is a long history of debate around what constitutes “objective truth” in the realm of mathematical infinity, dating back to ancient Greece (e.g., Dubinsky et al., 2005). Modes of argumentation, hindrances, and intuitions have been largely consistent over the years and across levels of expertise (e.g., Brown et al., 2010; Fischbein et al., 1979, Tsamir, 1999). This presentation examines the interrelated complexities of notions of objectivity, bias, and argumentation as ...


A Ludological Perspective On Argument, Michael A. Yong-Set May 2016

A Ludological Perspective On Argument, Michael A. Yong-Set

OSSA Conference Archive

This introductory paper explores a new perspective on argumentation that draws upon the resources of ludology – the critical and academic of study of games qua games. In the Philosophical Investigations, one of the later Wittgenstein’s more mysterious suggestions is that if one understands how games work, then one would be able to understand how natural language works. Similarly, it will be argued that if we look to how games function as games, we will be able to understand how the ‘argument-game’ functions. The epistemic importance of rhetorical argumentation rather than analytic demonstration becomes apparent if we consider ‘argument’ as ...


Objectivity, Autonomy, And The Use Of Arguments From Authority, John Fields May 2016

Objectivity, Autonomy, And The Use Of Arguments From Authority, John Fields

OSSA Conference Archive

Objectivity, Autonomy, and the use of

Arguments from Authority

(PAPER)

Starting in the early modern era, the use of arguments from authority to support important factual claims began to be heavily criticized. Recent investigations into the nature of testimony, however, suggest that such criticisms are factually and normatively problematic. In this paper, the author argues for a model of testimonial authority that corrects this earlier, unrealistically individualistic picture of how person bear their burdens in the search for a common reality.


Mapping Objectivity And Bias In Relation To Argument, J. Anthony Blair May 2016

Mapping Objectivity And Bias In Relation To Argument, J. Anthony Blair

OSSA Conference Archive

The conference theme invites contrasts between objectivity and bias, since the two are commonly considered contraries. But there are a variety of meanings of the two and a corresponding variety of contraries. Thus there is a problem for any attempt to discuss bias and objectivity in relation to argument as a contrasting pair. Still, several senses of both terms relate to argumentation. I offer an inventory of them.


Another Dimension To Deep Disagreements: Trust In Argumentation, Moira L. Kloster May 2016

Another Dimension To Deep Disagreements: Trust In Argumentation, Moira L. Kloster

OSSA Conference Archive

I will connect the literature on deep disagreements with the literature on trust to construct a two-dimensional picture of the limits of argument. Argumentation and trust are important to the functioning of society, but each sets different expectations for when arguments can and should be used to resolve disagreements. When trust is factored in, we see a more nuanced picture of which disagreements will remain too deep for objective argument. Affective and social aspects of argument are not independent of procedure and content.


Biases, Bumps, Nudges, Query Lists, And Zero Tolerance Policies, Sheldon Wein May 2016

Biases, Bumps, Nudges, Query Lists, And Zero Tolerance Policies, Sheldon Wein

OSSA Conference Archive

Zero tolerance policies are often mistakenly thought to be the best way to deal with pressing social problems. However, most arguments for zero tolerance policies are either based on inaccurate premises or they commit the zero tolerance fallacy. This paper explores ways that we might counteract the bias in favor of zero tolerance policies by adding a query list to the choice architecture.


Constructing A Periodic Table Of Arguments, Jean H.M. Wagemans May 2016

Constructing A Periodic Table Of Arguments, Jean H.M. Wagemans

OSSA Conference Archive

The existing classifications of arguments are unsatisfying in a number of ways. This paper proposes an alternative in the form of a Periodic Table of Arguments. The newly developed table can be used as a systematic and comprehensive point of reference for the analysis, evaluation and production of argumentative discourse as well as for various kinds of empirical and computational research in the field of argumentation theory.


America Vs. Apple: The Argumentative Function Of Metonyms, Ilon Lauer, Thomas Lauer May 2016

America Vs. Apple: The Argumentative Function Of Metonyms, Ilon Lauer, Thomas Lauer

OSSA Conference Archive

: Our study of public argumentation surrounding iPhone encryption addresses the argumentative function of the metonym. Metonyms accomplish general and specific argumentative purposes. Generally, metonyms help define and redefine the argumentative framework for a dispute. Within a controversy, metonyms operate as inference generators. We isolate and analyze several metonyms and elaborate their warrant-generating valences. Metonyms are inference generating tools capable of instantiating normative frameworks, invoking flexible and indeterminate senses of causality.


Definition: A Three-Dimensional Analysis With Bearing On Key Concepts, Robert H. Ennis Phd May 2016

Definition: A Three-Dimensional Analysis With Bearing On Key Concepts, Robert H. Ennis Phd

OSSA Conference Archive

This essay presents a three-dimensional analysis of definition (form, stance, and content) with application to making and evaluating definitions; teaching how to define; avoiding equivocation with "argument" and "bias"; and, using the concept-conception distinction, avoiding being deterred by the many definitions of "critical thinking", and seeing the usefulness of objectivity in everyday arguments in spite of existing conflict and confusion about aspects of objectivity.


Levels Of Depth In Deep Disagreement, Claudio Duran May 2016

Levels Of Depth In Deep Disagreement, Claudio Duran

OSSA Conference Archive

The concept of deep disagreement was introduced by Richard Fogelin in a 1985 paper published in Critical Thinking. Since then, about 12 papers have been published in journals or presented in conferences on argumentation theory.

All these papers relate back to the initial Fogelin paper. Andrew Lugg’s 1986 critical response to Fogelin introduces significant questions concerning his views. Peter Davson-Galle in 1992, takes a more positive approach to them. The more extensive publication on deep disagreement can be found in a 2005 issue of Critical Thinking dedicated entirely to this topic. Most of the 5 papers found here take ...


Deliberation, Practical Reasoning And Problem-Solving, Douglas Walton, Alice Toniolo May 2016

Deliberation, Practical Reasoning And Problem-Solving, Douglas Walton, Alice Toniolo

OSSA Conference Archive

We present a series of realistic examples of deliberation and discuss how they can form the basis for building a typology of deliberation dialogues. The observations from our examples are used to suggest that argumentation researchers and philosophers have been thinking about deliberation in overly simplistic ways. We argue that to include all the kinds of argumentation that make up realistic deliberations, it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of deliberations. We propose a model including a problem-solving type of deliberation based on practical reasoning, characterised by revisions of the initial issue made necessary by the agents’ increased knowledge ...


Economic Reasoning And Fallacy Of Composition: Pursuing A Woods-Walton Thesis, Maurice A. Finocchiaro May 2016

Economic Reasoning And Fallacy Of Composition: Pursuing A Woods-Walton Thesis, Maurice A. Finocchiaro

OSSA Conference Archive

Woods and Walton deserve credit for including (in all editions of their textbook Argument) a discussion of “economic reasoning” and its susceptibility to the “fallacy of composition.” Unfortunately, they did not sufficiently pursue the topic, and argumentation scholars have apparently ignored their pioneering effort. Yet, obviously, economic argumentation is extremely important, and economists constantly harp on this fallacy. This paper calls attention to this problem, elaborating my own approach, which is empirical, historical, and meta-argumentational.


Ad Stuprum: The Fallacy Of Appeal To Sex, Beverley I. Anger Ms., Catherine Hundleby Dr. May 2016

Ad Stuprum: The Fallacy Of Appeal To Sex, Beverley I. Anger Ms., Catherine Hundleby Dr.

OSSA Conference Archive

Arguments sometimes appeal to sex by invoking the sexuality of a model or a person or the promise of sexual gratification. When sexual gratification is not a relevant consideration, the appeal seems to be fallacious.

We will address when this may be an appropriate line of reasoning -- there is such a thing as “sex appeal”--and when it may be biased to assume the relevance of sexuality. Advertising, which provides infinite examples of appeal to sex, may be questionable as a case of argumentation, as opposed to some other sort of negotiation or communication, especially perhaps in its reliance on ...