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Articles 31 - 60 of 1337

Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

Thinking Beyond Electronic Borders: Global Ideas, Global Values, Benjamin D. Lowinsky Jan 2017

Thinking Beyond Electronic Borders: Global Ideas, Global Values, Benjamin D. Lowinsky

The Canadian Society for Study of Practical Ethics / Société Canadienne Pour L'étude De L'éthique Appliquée — SCEEA

The theme and indeed title of this Conference is “Thinking beyond Borders: Global Ideas, Global Values.” It is a theme in keeping with numerous developments both within and between countries, nationalities, ethnicities and groups of people in general, that militates against old fashioned and traditional notions of nation state and geopolitical, social, cultural and linguistic boundaries founded on some of the basic ingredients of nationhood, nation-making, and nationalism. To think beyond borders is therefore to give voice to global ideas and global values of the sort that transcend national, regional, municipal borders and thereby embrace truly international, world-wide, and universal ...


Forgiveness, Finitude, Apology And Acknowledgment, Mano Daniel, Jim Gough Jan 2017

Forgiveness, Finitude, Apology And Acknowledgment, Mano Daniel, Jim Gough

The Canadian Society for Study of Practical Ethics / Société Canadienne Pour L'étude De L'éthique Appliquée — SCEEA

We argue for a particular conception of forgiveness with the following characteristics: forgiveness as transactional (primarily bi-lateral, rather than unilateral), elective (not obligatory) and conditional. Initiating the process requires forgiveness to be extended to the wrongdoer but not at the expense of forgetting, excusing, or condoning the wrong. The offer of the apology shifts the control or power from the wrongdoer to the victim who may initiate the conditional decision which may culminate in the repairing of the damaged relationship. A wrong may not be simply a perpetration of harm, but also a moral insult. It is the insult, this ...


National Responsibilities To Citizens: Past Or Present?, Melany Banks Jan 2017

National Responsibilities To Citizens: Past Or Present?, Melany Banks

The Canadian Society for Study of Practical Ethics / Société Canadienne Pour L'étude De L'éthique Appliquée — SCEEA

Throughout history governments have neglected, mistreated, or intentionally harmed their own citizens. In Canada this includes the denial of equal rights, the internment of Japanese Canadians during and after WWII, and the forced expulsion of the Acadians in1755, as well as other events. In the literature on reparations, the most popular examples of harm perpetrated by a state is the capture and enslavement of Africans and the acquisition of Aboriginal lands during European exploration and colonization in North America.

In this paper I will examine the argument for reparative claims against nations. I will argue that when we closely examine ...


Exploitation As A Path To Development: Sweatshop Labour, Micro-Unfairness, And The Non-Worseness Claim, Michael Randall Barnes Jan 2017

Exploitation As A Path To Development: Sweatshop Labour, Micro-Unfairness, And The Non-Worseness Claim, Michael Randall Barnes

The Canadian Society for Study of Practical Ethics / Société Canadienne Pour L'étude De L'éthique Appliquée — SCEEA

Sweatshop labour is sometimes defended from critics by arguments that stress the voluntariness of the worker’s choice, and the fact that sweatshops provide a source of income where no other similar source exists. The idea is if it’s exploitation—as their opponents charge—it’s mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation. This defence appeals to the non-worseness claim (NWC), which says that if exploitation is better for the exploited party than neglect, it cannot be seriously wrong. The NWC renders otherwise exploitative—and therefore morally wrong—transactions permissible, making the exploitation of the global poor a justifiable path to ...


Why Practical Ethics Should Be Interested In Cognitive Science, Sheldon J. Chow Jan 2017

Why Practical Ethics Should Be Interested In Cognitive Science, Sheldon J. Chow

The Canadian Society for Study of Practical Ethics / Société Canadienne Pour L'étude De L'éthique Appliquée — SCEEA

Practical ethics can greatly benefit from the work in cognitive science. Cognitive science boasts substantial research and data on how people think, reason, and process information, as well as on the nature of the mind. I argue that cognitive science research and data are invaluable to investigating how people conduct themselves as they plod through practical moral problems. I discuss three reasons why practical ethics should be interested in cognitive science: cognitive science :(i) helps us to better understand how people reason and offers theories about underlying mental processes; (ii) offers substantive discussion on normative accounts of reason and rationality ...


Ask The Philosopher: Practical Advice And Self-Help In Antiquity And Today, Dimitrios Dentsoras Jan 2017

Ask The Philosopher: Practical Advice And Self-Help In Antiquity And Today, Dimitrios Dentsoras

The Canadian Society for Study of Practical Ethics / Société Canadienne Pour L'étude De L'éthique Appliquée — SCEEA

This paper examines the genre of practical philosophical treatises in antiquity, contrasting it with contemporary literature in philosophical practice. Its main focus concerns the role of the philosopher as a guide to practical everyday concerns and the relationship between theoretical and practical ethics. An important question for ancient works on practical philosophy (and to a lesser extent their contemporary equivalents) has to do with whether, and to what extent, adopting the philosopher’s advice also requires an adoption of that person’s broader philosophical framework (Stoicism, Neoplatonism, Skepticism, etc.). Philosophers tend to put heavy emphasis on the existence of a ...


Before The Birth Of Bioethics: The Shaping Of Physicians’ Ethics In Canada, 1940-1970, Maureen Muldoon Jan 2017

Before The Birth Of Bioethics: The Shaping Of Physicians’ Ethics In Canada, 1940-1970, Maureen Muldoon

The Canadian Society for Study of Practical Ethics / Société Canadienne Pour L'étude De L'éthique Appliquée — SCEEA

Students who study bioethics today usually learn very little about the medical ethics of physicians prior to the 1970’s. The practices of earlier physicians are often characterized as being paternalistic and lacking in respect for patient autonomy and justice. Yet just as the emergence of bioethics was shaped by social context, so was the medical ethics that preceded it.

This paper is a work in “descriptive ethics,” which explores the de facto morality of physicians roughly between 1940 and 1970. De facto morality refers to the profession’s officially endorsed standards as stated in its codes of ethics and ...


Trait Attribution Error, W. Owen Thornton Jan 2017

Trait Attribution Error, W. Owen Thornton

The Canadian Society for Study of Practical Ethics / Société Canadienne Pour L'étude De L'éthique Appliquée — SCEEA

Sometimes we make the choice to rely upon the trait of being on time over making the choice to rely upon the trait of driving safely. So Gerry can run the red light to respect Stephanie’s time, while striking Paul’s car and disrespecting his property and life in the process. It appears that there are single situations with two or more morally salient features where we can apply different and ordinarily positive traits to our moral choices and by selecting the wrong moral choice, we can be seen to behave abominably. Notice that when utilizing the trait attribution ...


The Ties That Blind: The Moral Value (And Disvalue) Of Anonymity, Julie Ponesse Jan 2017

The Ties That Blind: The Moral Value (And Disvalue) Of Anonymity, Julie Ponesse

The Canadian Society for Study of Practical Ethics / Société Canadienne Pour L'étude De L'éthique Appliquée — SCEEA

This paper has two main aims: one is to understand the mechanisms that allow anonymity to facilitate both good and bad ends; the other is to use this understanding to determine the value of anonymity relative to its disvalue across a variety of moral and socio-political domains. Building on previous work in which I characterize anonymity by what I call the ‘central anonymity paradigm,’ I argue here that anonymity is primarily instrumentally valuable as a strategic device to procure some other valued good or set of goods, and is justified derivatively to the extent that it successfully achieves this end ...


Mapping Objectivity And Bias In Relation To Argument, J. Anthony Blair May 2016

Mapping Objectivity And Bias In Relation To Argument, J. Anthony Blair

OSSA Conference Archive

The conference theme invites contrasts between objectivity and bias, since the two are commonly considered contraries. But there are a variety of meanings of the two and a corresponding variety of contraries. Thus there is a problem for any attempt to discuss bias and objectivity in relation to argument as a contrasting pair. Still, several senses of both terms relate to argumentation. I offer an inventory of them.


Transsubjectivity, David Hitchcock May 2016

Transsubjectivity, David Hitchcock

OSSA Conference Archive

I describe and evaluate Harald Wohlrapp’s framing of “reasonable argumentation” in The Concept of Argument as argumentation guided by the “principle of transsubjectivity ... that, beginning with my subjectivity, I put my actual ego up for consideration as well as heighten and transcend it by seeking to participate in a general human potential, which is only attainable by recognizing the subjectivity of the Other”, and thus as having a quasi-religious meaning.


The Method Of Relevant Variables, Objectivity, And Boas, James B. Freeman May 2016

The Method Of Relevant Variables, Objectivity, And Boas, James B. Freeman

OSSA Conference Archive

L. J. Cohen has presented an understanding of appraising argument strength which applies to a variety of types of defeasible reasoning. This method can be used to explicate how a body of information may back a warrant and to rank different bodies of evidence on strength of backing. We shall argue that this method allows backing warrants objectively, whether they are inductive warrants backed by observation or moral warrants backed in part a priori. The method also suggests where arguments employing these warrants may be vulnerable to bias bias but need not be infected by it.


Reply To Commentary On “Patrick Bondy, Bias In Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments”, Patrick Bondy May 2016

Reply To Commentary On “Patrick Bondy, Bias In Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments”, Patrick Bondy

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On E. Popa’S “Normative Argumentation Theory Without Fundamental Principles”, S. W. Patterson May 2016

Commentary On E. Popa’S “Normative Argumentation Theory Without Fundamental Principles”, S. W. Patterson

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On “Objectivity In Newsmaking: An Argumentative Perspective”: Reflections On Argument In Practice, Mark Aakhus May 2016

Commentary On “Objectivity In Newsmaking: An Argumentative Perspective”: Reflections On Argument In Practice, Mark Aakhus

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


The Normative Significance Of Deep Disagreement, Tim Dare May 2016

The Normative Significance Of Deep Disagreement, Tim Dare

OSSA Conference Archive

Some normative problems are difficult because of the number and complexity of the issues they involve. Rational resolution might be hard but it seems at least possible. Other problems are not merely complex and multi-faceted but ‘deep’. They have a logical structure that precludes rational resolution. Treatments of deep disagreement often hint at sinister implications. If doubt is cast on our 'final vocabulary', writes Richard Rorty, we are left with "no noncircular argumentative recourse .... [B]eyond them there is only helpless passivity or a resort to force.” I will argue that some normative problems are deep, but that we need ...


On Being Objective: Hard Data, Soft Data And Baseball., Michael A. Gilbert May 2016

On Being Objective: Hard Data, Soft Data And Baseball., Michael A. Gilbert

OSSA Conference Archive

“Objective” is a term that has a long and sometimes tumultuous history and a wide range of meanings. The sense in which I am interested here is the one that refers to ways of thinking, and especially the explicit criticism of an argument or judgment as not being “objective,” as exemplified in the following.

  • You’re not being objective.
  • You have to look at it objectively.
  • Objectively, the best choice is…
  • Being objective, I’d have to say…

Implicit in these statements is an ideology that denigrates emotion and other communicative aspects in favour of an idealized sense of fact ...


Another Dimension To Deep Disagreements: Trust In Argumentation, Moira L. Kloster May 2016

Another Dimension To Deep Disagreements: Trust In Argumentation, Moira L. Kloster

OSSA Conference Archive

I will connect the literature on deep disagreements with the literature on trust to construct a two-dimensional picture of the limits of argument. Argumentation and trust are important to the functioning of society, but each sets different expectations for when arguments can and should be used to resolve disagreements. When trust is factored in, we see a more nuanced picture of which disagreements will remain too deep for objective argument. Affective and social aspects of argument are not independent of procedure and content.


Ad Stuprum: The Fallacy Of Appeal To Sex, Beverley I. Anger Ms., Catherine Hundleby Dr. May 2016

Ad Stuprum: The Fallacy Of Appeal To Sex, Beverley I. Anger Ms., Catherine Hundleby Dr.

OSSA Conference Archive

Arguments sometimes appeal to sex by invoking the sexuality of a model or a person or the promise of sexual gratification. When sexual gratification is not a relevant consideration, the appeal seems to be fallacious.

We will address when this may be an appropriate line of reasoning -- there is such a thing as “sex appeal”--and when it may be biased to assume the relevance of sexuality. Advertising, which provides infinite examples of appeal to sex, may be questionable as a case of argumentation, as opposed to some other sort of negotiation or communication, especially perhaps in its reliance on ...


Don’T Worry, Be Gappy! On The Unproblematic Gappiness Of Alleged Fallacies, Fabio Paglieri May 2016

Don’T Worry, Be Gappy! On The Unproblematic Gappiness Of Alleged Fallacies, Fabio Paglieri

OSSA Conference Archive

The history of fallacy theory is long, distinguished and, admittedly, checkered. I offer a bird eye view on it, with the aim of contrasting the standard conception of fallacies as attractive and universal errors that are hard to eradicate (section 1) with the contemporary preoccupation with “non-fallacious fallacies”, that is, arguments that fit the bill of one of the traditional fallacies but are actually respectable enough to be used in appropriate contexts (section 2). Godden and Zenker have recently argued that reinterpreting alleged fallacies as non-fallacious arguments requires supplementing the textual material with something else, e.g. probability distributions, pragmatic ...


Thinking Critically About Beliefs It's Hard To Think Critically About, Justine M. Kingsbury, Tracy A. Bowell May 2016

Thinking Critically About Beliefs It's Hard To Think Critically About, Justine M. Kingsbury, Tracy A. Bowell

OSSA Conference Archive

There are some beliefs that are difficult to think critically about, even for those who have critical thinking skills and are committed to applying them to their own beliefs. These resistant beliefs are not all of a kind, and so a range of different strategies may be needed to get ourselves and others (in particular our students) to think critically about them. In this paper we suggest some such strategies.


Splitting A Difference Of Opinion, Jan Albert Van Laar, Erik C W Krabbe May 2016

Splitting A Difference Of Opinion, Jan Albert Van Laar, Erik C W Krabbe

OSSA Conference Archive

When unable to resolve a conflict of opinion about the objective worth of an action proposal, discussants may choose to negotiate for a compromise. Is it legitimate to abandon the search for a resolution, and instead enter into a negotiation that aims at settling the difference of opinion? What is the nature of a compromise, in contradistinction to a resolution? What kinds of argument do participants typically put to use in their negotiation dialogues?


Outstanding Questions About Analogies, Trudy Govier May 2016

Outstanding Questions About Analogies, Trudy Govier

OSSA Conference Archive

I consider several outstanding questions about analogies. These include the following: (a) issues of interpretation especially with regard to whether an analogy should be considered argumentative, as distinct from serving as an illustration, explanation, or matter of rhetorical interest; (b) whether and how to draw a distinction between inductive analogies and a priori analogies; and (c) whether a priori analogies should be reconstructed as deductively valid arguments. The discussion will explore broader themes such as the distinction between the a priori and the deductive, and whether a priori analogies offer reasons for a choice, as distinct from a basis for ...


Deliberation, Practical Reasoning And Problem-Solving, Douglas Walton, Alice Toniolo May 2016

Deliberation, Practical Reasoning And Problem-Solving, Douglas Walton, Alice Toniolo

OSSA Conference Archive

We present a series of realistic examples of deliberation and discuss how they can form the basis for building a typology of deliberation dialogues. The observations from our examples are used to suggest that argumentation researchers and philosophers have been thinking about deliberation in overly simplistic ways. We argue that to include all the kinds of argumentation that make up realistic deliberations, it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of deliberations. We propose a model including a problem-solving type of deliberation based on practical reasoning, characterised by revisions of the initial issue made necessary by the agents’ increased knowledge ...


The Use Of Arguments A Fortiori In Decision Making, Sandra Clemencia Valencia Martinez May 2016

The Use Of Arguments A Fortiori In Decision Making, Sandra Clemencia Valencia Martinez

OSSA Conference Archive

Some decisions involve the use of a variety forms of arguments in order to balance different alternatives before getting a choice which is expected to be the better to solve the problem at issue. By doing this, there are some cases where people are able to or urge moving towards the choice that is most advantageous, probable or acceptable, and at other times towards a choice that is less negative or adverse than the others. Both alternatives depict different ways of searching for the stronger reason at stake. This means that the a fortiori argument is being used as a ...


Commentary On: John Fields’S “Objectivity, Autonomy, And The Use Of Arguments From Authority”, Maurice A. Finocchiaro May 2016

Commentary On: John Fields’S “Objectivity, Autonomy, And The Use Of Arguments From Authority”, Maurice A. Finocchiaro

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


When Different Perspectives Interact: A Historical Account Of Informal Logic Between 1983 And 1987, Takuzo Konishi May 2016

When Different Perspectives Interact: A Historical Account Of Informal Logic Between 1983 And 1987, Takuzo Konishi

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper will describe what happened to the community of informal logicians between 1983 and 1987, when they started to interact with communication scholars, rhetoricians and Pragma-Dialecticians. Special attention will be paid to key events, such as the Second International Symposiums on Informal Logic (SISIL), the founding of AILACT (Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking) in 1983, the start of journal Informal logic in 1984, and the international conference on argumentation held at Amsterdam in 1986.


Argument Objectivity And Ontological/Logical Pluralism: Must Arguments Be Domain Sensitive?, Philip Rose May 2016

Argument Objectivity And Ontological/Logical Pluralism: Must Arguments Be Domain Sensitive?, Philip Rose

OSSA Conference Archive

The idea of ontological/logical pluralism raises an interesting question about the objectivity of arguments and argument forms: Are all arguments and argument forms domain dependent? In his recent work Bruno Latour outlines a radical form of ontological pluralism in which each domain or “mode of existence” has its own set of “felicity conditions” that serve as “veridiction” conditions unique to that mode. To “speak well” requires that one speak in the “interpretive key” proper to each mode. Since there is no “meta-language” that crosses all modes, then all modes must be assessed using the felicity or veridiction conditions peculiar ...


Reply To Commentary On Thinking Critically About Beliefs It’S Hard To Think Critically About, Justine M. Kingsbury, Tracy Bowell May 2016

Reply To Commentary On Thinking Critically About Beliefs It’S Hard To Think Critically About, Justine M. Kingsbury, Tracy Bowell

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


On The Objectivity Of Norms Of Argumentation, Michael Hoppmann May 2016

On The Objectivity Of Norms Of Argumentation, Michael Hoppmann

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper addresses the relationship between norms of reasoning and norms of politeness: To what extend can one be polite and reasonable at the same time? For this purpose, a normative system of reasoning (i.e. the model of the pragma-dialectical critical discussion) is contrasted with a normative system of politeness (Leech’s Politeness Maxims). If and when they are in conflict: How can the communicator solve this tension?