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University of Windsor

Fallacies

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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

Commentary On: “Ad Stuprum: The Fallacy Of Appeal To Sex”, Maureen Linker May 2016

Commentary On: “Ad Stuprum: The Fallacy Of Appeal To Sex”, Maureen Linker

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Employing And Exploiting The Presumptions Of Communication In Argumentation: An Application Of Normative Pragmatics, Scott Jacobs May 2016

Employing And Exploiting The Presumptions Of Communication In Argumentation: An Application Of Normative Pragmatics, Scott Jacobs

OSSA Conference Archive

Argumentation occurs through and as communicative activity. Communication (and therefore argumentation) is organized by pragmatic principles of expression and interpretation. Grice’s (1975) theory of conversational implicature provides a model for how people use rational principles to manage the ways in which they reason to representations of arguments, and not just reason from those representations. These principles are systematic biases that make possible reasonable decision-making and intersubjective understandings in the first place; but they also make possible all manner of errors and abuses. Much of what is problematic in argumentation involves the ways in which the pragmatic principles of communication ...


Polylogical Fallacies: Are There Any?, Marcin Lewiński May 2013

Polylogical Fallacies: Are There Any?, Marcin Lewiński

OSSA Conference Archive

Dialectical fallacies are typically defined as breaches of the rules of a regulated discussion between two participants (di-logue). What if discussions become more complex and involve multiple parties with distinct positions to argue for (poly-logues)? Are there distinct argumentation norms of polylogues? If so, can their violations be conceptualized as polylogical fallacies? I will argue for such an approach and analyze two candidates for argumentative breaches of multi-party rationality: false dilemma and collateral straw man.


Trust Based On Bias: Cognitive Constraints On Source-Related Fallacies, Steve Oswald, Christopher Hart May 2013

Trust Based On Bias: Cognitive Constraints On Source-Related Fallacies, Steve Oswald, Christopher Hart

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper advances a cognitive account of the rhetorical effectiveness of fallacious arguments and takes the example of source-related fallacies. Drawing on cognitive psychology and evolutionary linguistics, we claim that a fallacy enforces accessibility and epistemic cognitive constraints on argument processing targeted at preventing the addressee from spotting its fallaciousness, by managing to prevent or circumvent critical reactions. We address the evolutionary bases of biases and the way that these are exploited in fallacious argumentation.


Fallacies: Do We “Use” Them Or “Commit” Them? Or: Is All Our Life Just A Collection Of Fallacies?, Igor Zagar, Dima Mohammed May 2011

Fallacies: Do We “Use” Them Or “Commit” Them? Or: Is All Our Life Just A Collection Of Fallacies?, Igor Zagar, Dima Mohammed

OSSA Conference Archive

After C. L. Hamblin's groundbreaking work Fallacies (1970), re-interpreting what used to be known as "mistakes in reasoning" or "bad arguments" since Aristotle (On Sophistical Refutations), the study of fallacies started to bloom, coming up with ever new perspectives and conceptualizations of what should count as a mistake in reasoning and argumentation, and why a certain kind of reasoning should at all be considered a mistake (Woods & Walton 1989, van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, etc.). This paper will be concerned with two questions. First, an epistemological one: do we (unintentionally) commit fallacies, or do we (intentionally) use them? Secondly, a ...


Fallacies In Transition: An Assessment Of The Pragma-Dialectical Perspective, Christopher Tindale Jan 1996

Fallacies In Transition: An Assessment Of The Pragma-Dialectical Perspective, Christopher Tindale

Philosophy Publications

The paper critically investigates the pragma-dialectics of van Eemeren and Grootendorst, particularly the treatment of fallacies. While the pragma-dialectieians claim that dialectics combines the logical and rhetorical approaches to argumentation, it is argued here that the perspective relies heavily on rhetorical features that have been suppressed in the account and that overlooking these features leads to significant problems in the pragma-dialectical perspective. In light of these problems, the author advocates turning attention to a rhetorical account which subsumes the logical and dialectical.