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Deep disagreement

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The Normative Significance Of Deep Disagreement, Tim Dare May 2016

The Normative Significance Of Deep Disagreement, Tim Dare

OSSA Conference Archive

Some normative problems are difficult because of the number and complexity of the issues they involve. Rational resolution might be hard but it seems at least possible. Other problems are not merely complex and multi-faceted but ‘deep’. They have a logical structure that precludes rational resolution. Treatments of deep disagreement often hint at sinister implications. If doubt is cast on our 'final vocabulary', writes Richard Rorty, we are left with "no noncircular argumentative recourse .... [B]eyond them there is only helpless passivity or a resort to force.” I will argue that some normative problems are deep, but that we need ...


Another Dimension To Deep Disagreements: Trust In Argumentation, Moira L. Kloster May 2016

Another Dimension To Deep Disagreements: Trust In Argumentation, Moira L. Kloster

OSSA Conference Archive

I will connect the literature on deep disagreements with the literature on trust to construct a two-dimensional picture of the limits of argument. Argumentation and trust are important to the functioning of society, but each sets different expectations for when arguments can and should be used to resolve disagreements. When trust is factored in, we see a more nuanced picture of which disagreements will remain too deep for objective argument. Affective and social aspects of argument are not independent of procedure and content.


Argumentative Virtues And Deep Disagreement, Chris Campolo May 2013

Argumentative Virtues And Deep Disagreement, Chris Campolo

OSSA Conference Archive

The theoretical possibility of deep disagreement gives rise to an important practical problem: a deep disagreement may in practice look and feel like a merely stubborn normal disagreement. In this paper I critique strategies for dealing with this practical problem. According to their proponents these strategies exhibit argumentative virtue, but I will show that they embody serious argumentative (and even moral) vices.


Argumentation And The Epistemology Of Disagreement, Harvey Siegal May 2013

Argumentation And The Epistemology Of Disagreement, Harvey Siegal

OSSA Conference Archive

When epistemic peers disagree, what should a virtuous arguer do? Several options have been defended in the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement, which connects interestingly to the controversy launched by Fogelin’s famous paper on ‘deep disagreement.’ I will argue that Fogelin’s case is transformed by the new work on disagreement, and that when seen in that broader epistemological context ‘deep’ disagreement is much less problematic for argumentation theory than it once seemed.


Cognitive Communities And Argument Communities, Manfred Kraus, David Zarefsky May 2011

Cognitive Communities And Argument Communities, Manfred Kraus, David Zarefsky

OSSA Conference Archive

Since Toulmin’s discovery of the field-dependency of arguments, and Perelman’s emphasis on audiences, argumentation theorists have developed the notion of “spheres of arguments” or “argument communities”. Since argument communities are communities of discourse guided by the participants’ cog-nitive experiences, they are also cognitive communities. “Cognitive breaks” between different argument communities will produce misunderstanding and futile argument. The paper will investigate “cognitive breaks” and describe in which ways they may obstruct reasonable argumentation between communities.


Deepening Disagreement In Engineering Education, Robert Irish, Brian Macpherson May 2011

Deepening Disagreement In Engineering Education, Robert Irish, Brian Macpherson

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper argues that deep disagreements stem from conflicting worldviews. In particular, I examine how recent moves in engineering education contribute to deep disagreement by inculcating stu-dents into valuing the environment as a key stakeholder in engineering design. However, some graduates who value the environment meet resistance from employers who hold a more traditional engineering worldview, which regards the environment as an externality. Clashing worldviews can, as Robert Fogelin posited, render rational resolution to argument impossible. Disputants must consider the emotional and rhetorical as means to move toward productive ground for argument. I offer two moves from classical rhet-oric–making ...