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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy

To Thine Own Self Be Untrue: A Diagnosis Of The Cable Guy Paradox, D. P. Rowbottom, Peter Baumann Dec 2008

To Thine Own Self Be Untrue: A Diagnosis Of The Cable Guy Paradox, D. P. Rowbottom, Peter Baumann

Philosophy Faculty Works

Hajek has recently presented the following paradox. You are certain that a cable guy will visit you tomorrow between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. but you have no further information about when. And you agree to a bet on whether he will come in the morning interval (8, 12] or in the afternoon interval (12, 4). At first, you have no reason to prefer one possibility rather than the other. But you soon realise that there will definitely be a future time at which you will (rationally) assign higher probability to an afternoon arrival than a morning one ...


Contrastivism Rather Than Something Else? On The Limits Of Epistemic Contrastivism, Peter Baumann Sep 2008

Contrastivism Rather Than Something Else? On The Limits Of Epistemic Contrastivism, Peter Baumann

Philosophy Faculty Works

One of the most recent trends in epistemology is contrastivism. It can be characterized as the thesis that knowledge is a ternary relation between a subject, a proposition known and a contrast proposition. According to contrastivism, knowledge attributions have the form “S knows that p, rather than q”. In this paper I raise several problems for contrastivism: it lacks plausibility for many cases of knowledge, is too narrow concerning the third relatum, and overlooks a further relativity of the knowledge relation.


Problems For Sinnott-Armstrong's Moral Contrastivism, Peter Baumann Jul 2008

Problems For Sinnott-Armstrong's Moral Contrastivism, Peter Baumann

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In his recent book "Moral Skepticisms" Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues in great detail for contrastivism with respect to justified moral belief and moral knowledge. I raise three questions concerning this view. First, how would Sinnott-Armstrong account for constraints on admissible contrast classes? Secondly, how would he deal with notorious problems concerning relevant reference classes? Finally, how can he account for basic features of moral agency? It turns out that the last problem is the most serious one for his account.


Review Of "Taking Action, Saving Lives: Our Duties To Protect Environmental And Public Health" By K. Shrader-Frechette, Hugh Lacey Jul 2008

Review Of "Taking Action, Saving Lives: Our Duties To Protect Environmental And Public Health" By K. Shrader-Frechette, Hugh Lacey

Philosophy Faculty Works

No abstract provided.


Ciência, Respeito À Natureza E Bem-Estar Humano, Hugh Lacey Jul 2008

Ciência, Respeito À Natureza E Bem-Estar Humano, Hugh Lacey

Philosophy Faculty Works

The central question addressed is: How should scientific research be conducted so as to ensure that nature is respected, its regenerative powers not further undermined and wherever possible restored, and the well being of everyone everywhere enhanced? Then, after pointing to the importance of methodological pluralism for an acceptable answer, and the obstacles posed by identifying science with technoscience that are reinforced by what I call 'the commercial-scientific ethos', two additional questions are considered: How might research, conducted in this way, have impact on - and depend on - strengthening democratic values and practices? And, what is thereby implied for the responsibilities ...


Contextualism And The Factivity Problem, Peter Baumann May 2008

Contextualism And The Factivity Problem, Peter Baumann

Philosophy Faculty Works

Epistemological contextualism - the claim that the truth-value of knowledge-attributions can vary with the context of the attributor - has recently faced a whole series of objections. The most serious one, however, has not been discussed much so far: the factivity objection. In this paper, I explain what the objection is and present three different versions of the objection. I then show that there is a good way out for the contextualist. However, in order to solve the problem the contextualist has to accept a relationalist version of contextualism.


Review Of "Wittgenstein And The Moral Life: Essays In Honor Of Cora Diamond" Edited By A. Crary, Richard Thomas Eldridge Apr 2008

Review Of "Wittgenstein And The Moral Life: Essays In Honor Of Cora Diamond" Edited By A. Crary, Richard Thomas Eldridge

Philosophy Faculty Works

No abstract provided.


Aspectos Cognitivos E Sociais Das Práticas Científicas, Hugh Lacey Jan 2008

Aspectos Cognitivos E Sociais Das Práticas Científicas, Hugh Lacey

Philosophy Faculty Works

Is it constitutive of making judgments of the cognitive acceptability of theories that they are made under certain social relations that embody specific social values that have been cultivated among investigators (Helen Longino)? Or is making sound judgments of this kind just a consequence of social interactions that occur under these relations (Philip Kitcher)? While generally endorsing the latter view, I make a distinction, not made by the philosophers under discussion, between sound acceptance and endorsement of a theory, and argue that Longino's view applies to endorsement.
Será um aspecto constitutivo dos juízos de aceitabilidade cognitiva de teorias o ...


Single-Case Probabilities And The Case Of Monty Hall: Levy's View, Peter Baumann Jan 2008

Single-Case Probabilities And The Case Of Monty Hall: Levy's View, Peter Baumann

Philosophy Faculty Works

In Baumann (American Philosophical Quarterly 42: 71–79, 2005) I argued that reflections on a variation of the Monty Hall problem throws a very general skeptical light on the idea of single-case probabilities. Levy (Synthese, forthcoming, 2007) puts forward some interesting objections which I answer here.