Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Arts and Humanities Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 14 of 14

Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities

Physis And Nomos In Aristotle's Ethics, Thornton C. Lockwood Dec 2005

Physis And Nomos In Aristotle's Ethics, Thornton C. Lockwood

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In Nicomachean Ethics V.7, Aristotle claims that political justice (to dikaion politikon) possesses a “natural” (phusikon) pail and a “conventional” (nomikon) part In response to those who separated nature and convention and disparaged the latter because it was different from place to place, Aristotle claims that both nature and convention admit of variation, and his language suggests that the two are ultimately parts which need to be interwoven or combined. Scholars who have struggled with Aristotle’s apparently disparate senses of the idea of nature have assumed that nature is an ethical ideal which can be separated from and ...


Sagp Newsletter 2005/6 December East/Philol, Anthony Preus Dec 2005

Sagp Newsletter 2005/6 December East/Philol, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.


Sagp Ssips 2005 List Of Papers, Anthony Preus Oct 2005

Sagp Ssips 2005 List Of Papers, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Alphabetical listing of the participants in the 2005 SAGP SSIPS meeting at Fordham University.


Plato's Equivocal Wisdom, Mary Lenzi Apr 2005

Plato's Equivocal Wisdom, Mary Lenzi

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

A new interplay between sophia and phronesis emerges in Plato’s conception of wisdom in later dialogues that is quite different from his views in early and middle dialogues. First {Part I), the present inquiry shows that sophia no longer represents primarily theoretical, philosophic wisdom as it does in the Republic (and as Aristotle defines it). Rather, according to the reading and interpretation of the texts presented here, sophia becomes closely akin to Plato’s earlier conception of wisdom in relation to temperance (sophrosyne) in his Socratic dialogues, in that the highest inner harmony and virtue necessarily require sophia qua ...


The Split Gaze Of The Soul: Parts And Wholes In Aristotle's Model Of Epagoge, Mark Faller Apr 2005

The Split Gaze Of The Soul: Parts And Wholes In Aristotle's Model Of Epagoge, Mark Faller

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

In this paper I will try to clarify Aristotle’s conception of induction or epagoge. I will begin by critiquing a variety of contemporary accounts of Aristotelian induction with reference to how they evaluate its adequacy as a grounding for science. I will then try to establish a set of conditions that must ultimately be met for this grounding to succeed.

It will be my contention that by appreciating how the critical faculty {to krinon) can act with the common sense {koine dunamis) to hold multiple dimensions of consciousness in front of the attention in a unitary “gaze,” we can ...


The Meno, Recollection, And The Role Of Hypothesis, Joseph A. Novak Apr 2005

The Meno, Recollection, And The Role Of Hypothesis, Joseph A. Novak

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The aim of this paper is to present Plato's doctrine within a perspective that will both explain why Plato found himself prompted to formulate it, as well as explore some enduring insights exhibited in its applications. First, the paper will argue that Plato was prompted to adopt the doctrine given the difficulties that had arisen from the employment of the Socratic elenchus. Second, it will argue that hypothesis, already implicit in the elenchic method, will begin to be developed into a more complex and refined method that Plato sees necessary for the whole learning process. The retention of a ...


Sagp Newsletter 2005.3 (April), Anthony Preus Apr 2005

Sagp Newsletter 2005.3 (April), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Program of the Society with the Central Division, April 2005


Aristotle, Epistemic Exemplars, And Virtue Epistemology, Scott Rubarth Mar 2005

Aristotle, Epistemic Exemplars, And Virtue Epistemology, Scott Rubarth

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Is contemporary virtue epistemology in fact a revival of Aristotle’s theory of intellectual virtues and an appeal to Aristotelian epistemology? In this paper I will examine Linda Zagzebski's theory of virtue epistemology, the most explicitly Aristotelian version of the agent-based epistemologies. The objective of this analysis is threefold: (1) To examine to what extent Zagzebski's virtue epistemology is genuinely Aristotelian, particularly in the use of moral and epistemic exemplars. (2) To draw attention to some significant concerns regarding the use of exemplars, such as the famous phronimos, in both moral and epistemic evaluation. And finally, (3) to ...


Plato On Episteme And Propositional Knowledge, Denis Vlahovic Mar 2005

Plato On Episteme And Propositional Knowledge, Denis Vlahovic

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Epistêmê cannot just be a matter of knowing a logos. Knowledge, it appears, is demonstrated not in the knowledge of any particular logos, but in the ability to defend a logos against refutation. It is precisely the latter ability that is characteristic of epistêmê. This ability, furthermore, cannot be imparted by means of a logos. For, no logos suffices to endow its possessor with the ability to defend it (i.e., the logos) against refutation.

Given that Plato appears to have believed that no knowledge of a logos—no matter how elaborate the logos—is sufficient for epistêmê, one can ...


Sagp Newsletter 2005.2 (Pacific), Anthony Preus Mar 2005

Sagp Newsletter 2005.2 (Pacific), Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

No abstract provided.


Aristotle On Consciousness, Phil Corkum Jan 2005

Aristotle On Consciousness, Phil Corkum

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle sometimes draws analogies between perceiving and thinking. One analogy, for example, concerns the relation holding between faculties and their objects. If thinking is like perceiving, then as the faculty of perception is to the object perceived, so too the faculty of thought is to the intelligible object. Of course, there are also disanalogies between perception and thought. For example, where perception requires external stimulation by sensible substances, thought does not generally require external stimulation. How far then might we push the analogy? In this essay, I’ll argue that the role of the agent intellect in thought is analogous ...


Aristotle's Formal Language, Mary Mulhern Jan 2005

Aristotle's Formal Language, Mary Mulhern

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

A formal language was invented by Aristotle and used by him in his lectures. This formal language consisted of Greek capital letters used as placeholders, arrayed in the schemata of the three figures recognized as authentically Aristotle’s. In these arrays, arcs under the placeholder letters indicate how the terms are linked in the premisses and conclusion and are read as some inflection of ΰπάρχειν, used by Aristotle as a second- order expression to convey the relation that the terms—not the designata of the terms-of a syllogism have to one another. It is further possible that Aristotle elaborated the ...


Ratiocination And Socrates' Daimonion: A Practical Solution, Anthony K. Jensen Jan 2005

Ratiocination And Socrates' Daimonion: A Practical Solution, Anthony K. Jensen

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Socrates's commitment to 'follow the argument wherever it leads' seems to be at odds with his notorious 'divine sign' or daimonion. It appears in several dialogues as a divine force that Socrates cannot help but to obey, even in some cases where no negative consequences would seem to have otherwise obtained. This paper explores the meaning of the daimonion in the religious and cultural contexts of early Greece, concluding that the scope of the daimonion is restricted to Socrates' practical activities rather than his theoretical engagements.


Did The Ancient Greeks Have A Concept Of Human Rights?, Anthony Preus Jan 2005

Did The Ancient Greeks Have A Concept Of Human Rights?, Anthony Preus

Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

"Although there is no single word in the classical Greek that captures the sense that modern political thinkers give to the word "rights" as it is used in the phrase "human rights," classical Greek and Roman texts have a good deal to contribute to 21st-century discussions of human rights."